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INTRODUCTION 
 The	  research	  contained	  in	  these	  pages	  was	  conducted	  initially	  through	  the	  practice	  methods	  of	  filmmaking	  and	  film	  curating	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  further	  articulating	  knowledge	  findings	  through	  critical	  theoretical	  research.	  I	  mention	  the	  practice-­‐as-­‐research	  method	   first,	   not	   to	   place	   greater	   attribution	   to	   filmmaking	  or	   curating	  than	   I	   do	   to	   critical	   writing	   resulting	   from	   theoretical	   research,	   but	   in	   order	   to	  argue	  for	  practice	  as	  an	  equally	  valid	  form	  of	  knowledge	  production.	  The	  analysis	  contained	   in	   the	  written	   elements	   of	   the	   thesis	   comes	   together	   equally	   through	  research	   into	   critical	   theories,	   through	   interviews,	   and	   through	  my	  practice	   as	   a	  filmmaker	  and	  film	  curator.	  In	  short,	  the	  research	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  an	  engagement	  with	   critical	   theory,	   following	   periods	   of	   practice-­‐as-­‐research.	   The	   practice	  elements,	   the	   film	   titled	  Everything	   (2017),	  and	   the	   two	  curatorial	  projects	   titled	  
Object	  Documentary	  (2016)	  and	  Object!	  On	  the	  Documentary	  as	  Art	   (2017)	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Appendix	  section	  of	  the	  thesis.	  It	   is	  difficult	  to	  categorically	  delineate	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  my	  practice	  informs	  the	  theoretical	   concerns	   presented	   here.	   In	   some	   sense	   the	   individual	   elements	   of	  practice	   are	   the	   research	   ‘lived’	   before	  being	   articulated	   as	   theoretical	   positions.	  My	   filmmaking,	   curatorial	   work	   and	   writing	   practice	   are	   then	   intertwined	   and	  mutually	  informing,	  with	  each	  being	  motivated	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  critically	  examine	  the	  ethics	  of	  documentary	  as	  a	  critical	  method	   in	  art.	  A	  significant	  portion	  of	   the	  practice	   element	   of	   this	   thesis	   has	   been	   rooted	   in	   my	   film-­‐curatorial	   activities.	  Most	  of	  this	  has	  been	  consolidated	  through	  the	  Sheffield	  Fringe	  projects,	  engaging	  in	   both	   research	   and	   public	   presentation,	   together	   contributing	   to	   public	   access	  and	   discourse	   concerning	   the	   documentary	   method.	   The	   projects	   were	   realised	  variously	   through	   screenings,	   artist’s	   talks,	   performances,	   exhibitions	   and	   a	  symposium.	  I	  have	  been	  responsible	  for	  the	  organisation	  and	  production	  of	  these	  small-­‐scale,	  artist-­‐run	  projects	  for	  Sheffield	  Fringe	  since	  2011.	  My	  working	  method	  in	   framing	   films	  –	   the	  particular	  way	  I	  articulate	  my	  curatorial	   intention	  through	  films	   –	   is	   as	   a	   filmmaker.	   This	  means	   that,	   as	   well	   as	   focusing	   on	   concepts	   and	  ideas,	  my	  process	  of	  selecting	  and	  placing	  films	  privileges	  rhythm	  and	  the	  sensory,	  and	  most	  significantly,	  my	  interest	  is	  in	  the	  filmmakers’	  relationship	  to	  the	  objects	  of	   their	   study,	   as	   well	   as	   their	   relationship	   to	   film	   viewers.	   My	   research	   and	  analysis	   is	   focused	   on	  works	  where	   this	   relationship	   is	   discernable	   in	  ways	   that	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may	   be	   experienced	   by	   viewers	   as	   discomforting,	   due	   to	   the	   sometimes	   oblique	  and	  at	  other	  times	  confronting	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  works	  articulate	  themselves.	  For	   me,	   curating	   films	   is	   in	   many	   ways	   an	   editorial	   task	   akin	   to	   the	   task	   of	  filmmaking.	  It	   is	  about	  how	  one	  sees,	  the	  particular	  details	  one	  is	  attuned	  to,	  and	  how	  one	  edits.	   In	  this	  sense,	  everything	  presented	  here	   is	  as	  much	  about	  what	   is	  left	  out	  as	  what	  is	  included.	  To	  think	  through	  one’s	  own	  practice,	  in	  order	  to	  reflect	  on,	  and	  critically	  evaluate	  the	  work	  of	  others,	  involves	  aesthetic	  interests,	  political	  frictions,	   and	   ethical	   concerns	   that	   are	   specific	   to	   one’s	   experience.	   The	   task	   of	  creatively	   writing	   up	   one’s	   experience	   contains	   a	   bias.	   The	   question	   may	   arise:	  why	  this	  film,	  or	  that	  artist?	  	  In	  my	   capacity	   as	   a	   film	   curator,	   I	   have	   on	   a	   number	   of	   occasions	   intentionally	  chosen	   to	   include	   works	   that	   raise	   ethical	   questions.	   This	   is	   because	   I	   am	  interested	   in	   contributing	   to	   the	   cross-­‐pollination	   of	   ethical	   debates	   in	   an	  interdisciplinary	  context.	  My	  overall	  aim	  with	   this	  project	   is	   to	  revisit	   the	  ethical	  debates	  that	  started	  in	  documentary	  studies	  in	  the	  1970s	  in	  order	  to	  reframe	  the	  ethics	  of	  the	  documentary	  method	  within	  the	  contemporary	  moment.	  Very	  broadly	  expressed,	  my	  work	  investigates	  documentary	  practices	  in	  the	  contexts	  of	  both	  art	  and	  documentary.	  Within	   these	   very	  broad	   fields,	   I	   explore	   the	  objectification	  of	  the	   real	   in	   order	   to	   help	   advance	   debates	   on	   documentary	   ethics	   in	   both	   fields.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  making	  ethical	  assessments,	  I	  contend	  that	  ethical	  inquiries	  into	  documentary	   practices	   are	   –	   like	   many	   other	   aspects	   of	   our	   cultural	   and	  intellectual	  history	  –	  dominated	  by	  ‘master’	  narratives.	  All	  too	  often,	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	   agency	   of	   the	   filmmaker	   is	   privileged	   over	   considering	   the	   agency	   of	   the	  objects	  of	  study.	  The	  aim	  of	  my	  research	  is	  to	  recalibrate	  this	  relationship	  through	  greater	  focus	  on	  considerations	  for	  the	  latter.	  1	  My	  research	  intervenes	  by	  arguing	  for	   the	   need	   of	   this	   recalibration	   as	   the	   primary	   ethical	   obligation	   of	   the	  viewer/critic.	  	  The	   central	   concern	   of	   this	   thesis,	   therefore,	   is	   to	   analyse	   the	   ethics	   of	  working	  with	  documentary	  material	  as	  part	  of	  an	  artistic	  practice	  by	  paying	  close	  attention	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  an	  empirical	  study	  into	  documentary	  ethics	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  experiences	  of	  participants,	  see	  K.	  Nash,	  “Beyond	  the	  frame:	  researching	  documentary	  ethics”,	  TEXT	  Special	  Issue,	  ASPERA:	  New	  Screens,	  New	  Producers,	  New	  Learning,	  April	  2011,	  eds.	  Broderick	  &	  Leahy;	  and	  “Telling	  stories:	  the	  narrative	  study	  of	  documentary	  ethics”,	  New	  Review	  of	  Film	  and	  Television	  Studies	  2012,	  iFirst	  Article,	  pp.	  1–14	  (K.	  Nash,	  2011a,	  2012).	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to	  and	  bringing	   into	  the	  discussion	  the	  viewer’s	  attitude	  and	  responsibility	  when	  making	   critical	   assessments.	   This	   is	   what	   interests	   me	   in	   the	   aforementioned	  relationship	  of	  the	  filmmaker	  to	  the	  viewer.	  It	   is	  also	  what	  motivates	  the	  writing.	  To	   be	   sure,	   when	   I	   speak	   of	   documentary	   material	   I	   mean	   the	   ‘real’,	   however	  defined,	   being	   ‘utilised’	   both	   as	   a	  material	   resource	   in	   art	   production,	   and	  being	  ‘consumed’	  as	  part	  of	  the	  viewing	  process.	  As	  an	  artistic	  method	  or	  a	  formal	  device,	  I	  am	  particularly	  interested	  in	  what	  I	  term	  the	  objectification	  of	  the	  real.	  By	  that	  I	  mean	  working	  with	  and	  perceiving	  the	  real	  as	  an	  object,	  or	  a	  material	  resource.	  I	  do	  not	   place	   a	   negative	   value	   judgement	   on	   the	   term	  objectification,	   but	   instead	  think	   of	   it	   as	  making	   something,	   or	   someone	   an	   object	   of	   one’s	   perception	   as	   a	  starting	   point	   from	  which	   to	   explore	   the	   complex	   relationship	   between	   self	   and	  world,	  or	  self	  and	  other,	  in	  a	  documentary	  context.	  2	  At	  times	  it	  may	  be	  noticeable	  that	  my	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘object’	  is	  interchanged	  and	  interchangeable	  with	  the	  term	  ‘other’.	  I	  work	  with	  this	  productive	  slippage	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  amplify	  that	  the	  self	  is,	  that	  I	  am,	  and	  that	  you	  are	  always	  already	  an	  ‘other’,	  an	  object.	  This	  perceptual	  shift	  attempts	  to	  break	  out	  of	  a	  solely	  internalised	  view.	  Externalising	  the	  self	  on	  a	  horizontal	  plane	  alongside	  other	  objects	  may,	  I	  argue,	  help,	  and	  in	  turn	  may	  impact	  on	  assessments	  of	  ethical	  practice.	  This	  horizontal	  perspective	  need	  not	  negate	  or	  cancel	  out	   interiority.	  Contrary	  to	  any	  fear	  of	  negation,	  greater	  conceptual	   ‘room’	  can	  become	  available	  for	   interiority	  and	  exteriority	  to	  co-­‐exist	  on	  a	  simultaneous	  timeline.	   In	   short,	   subjectivity	   and	   objectivity	   can	   be	   axiological	   and	   mutually	  informing.	  	  The	  research	  context	  situated	  itself	  around	  the	  so-­‐called	  documentary	  turn,	  when	  documentary	  propositionally	  came	  to	  be	  seen,	  distributed,	  and	  theorised	  about	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  I	  lean	  on	  sociologist	  Peter	  Berger	  and	  Stanley	  Pullberg’s	  differentiation	  of	  the	  terms,	  objectivation	  and	   objectification.	   Deriving	   their	   theoretical	   framework	   from	   the	   Hegelian/Marxian	   term	  
Versachlichung	   (Berger	   &	   Luckmann,	   1991),	   objectivation	   is	   a	   concept	   relating	   to	   all	   human	  products	  (material	  and	  non-­‐material).	  It	  is	  a	  process,	  “whereby	  human	  subjectivity	  embodies	  itself	  in	   products	   that	   are	   available	   to	   oneself	   and	   one’s	   fellow	  men	   as	   elements	   of	   a	   common	  world”	  (Berger	  &	  Pullberg,	  1965:	  199).	  According	  to	  Berger	  and	  Pullberg,	  to	  objectivate	  is	  to	  produce	  the	  world.	   Objectification,	   derived	   from	   the	   Hegelian	   Vergegenständlichung	   (Berger	   &	   Luckmann,	  1991),	  specifically	  refers	  to	  “the	  moment	  in	  the	  process	  of	  objectivation	  in	  which	  man	  establishes	  distance	  from	  his	  producing	  and	  its	  product,	  such	  that	  he	  can	  take	  cognisance	  of	  it	  and	  make	  of	  it	  an	  object	  of	  his	  consciousness”	  (Berger	  &	  Pullberg,	  1965:	  200).	  Objectification	  then	  is	  a	  point	  during	  the	  objectivation	  process	  that	  facilitates	  the	  naming,	  communicating,	  commodifying,	  and	  similar	  of	  any	  particular	   thing,	   animate	  or	   inanimate.	  When	   I	   speak	  of	   objectification,	   I	   am	   referring	   to	   the	  common	  understanding	  of	  that	  moment	  of	  distancing,	  naming,	  thinking,	  relating.	  Objectivation	  and	  objectification,	  they	  stress,	  are	  a	  piori.	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an	   art	   object.	   The	   main	   title	   of	   this	   thesis,	   “Object	   Documentary”,	   positions	  ‘documentary’	  as	  an	  object	  and	  intends	  to	  obliquely	  suggest	  the	  ‘real’	  as	  an	  object	  like	  any	  other,	  or	  as	  “a	  thing	  like	  you	  and	  me”	  as	  Hito	  Steyerl	  may	  put	  it	  (Steyerl,	  2010a).	  With	   this	   in	  mind,	   I	   consider	   the	  productive	  value	  of	   objectification	  as	   a	  process,	   and	   as	   a	   method	   of	   drawing	   attention	   to	   the	   slippery	   politics	   of	   the	  documentary	   method	   itself.	   Objectification	   in	   this	   context,	   as	   I	   formulate	   it,	  functions	   to	   counter	   assumption	   of	   how	   to	   ‘do	   politics’	   with	   documentary,	  traditionally	   assumed	   to	   inform,	   educate,	   and	   campaign	   for	   political	   ends.	   In	  particular,	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  how	  objectification	  as	  a	  method	  can	  work	  against	  the	  viewer’s	  identification-­‐impulse	  as	  an	  act	  of	  surrogacy	  over	  the	  documentary	  image,	  and	  over	   the	  elements	  contained	  within	   it.	  Objectification,	   I	  argue,	  works	  against	  empathic	  identification	  and	  forces	  upon	  the	  viewer	  the	  issue	  of	  their	  complicity	  in	  the	  process	  of	  objectification	  through	  the	  very	  act	  of	  viewing.	  In	  its	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  use,	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  word	  ‘objectification’	  is	  inscribed	  with	  feminist	  critiques	  of	  the	  reductive	  process	  of	  seeing	  or	  treating	  a	  person	  as	  an	  object,	  a	  thing,	  or	  a	  commodity.	  As	  writer	  and	  scholar	  Ann	  J.	  Cahill	  points	  out,	  the	  problem	   of	   perceiving	   objectification	   as	   necessarily	   negative	   is	   to	   do	   with	   the	  “conceptual	   baggage	   that	   accompanied	   objectification”,	   and	   this	   has	   “served	   to	  inhibit	  feminism’s	  ability	  to	  articulate	  a	  positive,	  embodied	  […]	  ethics	  that	  neither	  marginalized	  nor	  vilified	  materiality”	  (Cahill,	  2010:	  ix).	  My	  work	  shares	  with	  Cahill,	  and	   in	  particular	  with	   feminist	  writers	   like	  Trinh	  T.	  Minh-­‐ha	  and	  Hito	  Steyerl,	  as	  well	   as	   with	   Rosi	   Braidotti,	   Karen	   Barad,	   Jane	   Bennett	   and	   Vivian	   Sobchack,	   a	  philosophical	   interest	   in	  reframing	  how	  we	  think	  about	  and	  relate	   to	  human	  and	  non-­‐human	  agents.	  My	  work	  aims	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  objectification	  of	  the	  real	  in	  the	  context	  of	  documentary	  making	  and	  documentary	  viewing,	  without	  neglecting	  the	  ethical	   challenges	   at	   hand.	   The	   written	   component	   of	   the	   thesis	   explores	   this	  through	   the	   analysis	   of	   a	   number	   of	   films	   as	   case	   studies	   in	   support	   of	   my	  arguments.	   The	   theoretical	   framework	   is	   presented	   in	   four	   parts,	   comprising	  distinct	  elements.	  Whilst	  some	  of	  the	  works	  I	  write	  about	  particularly	  in	  Parts	  I,	  II,	  and	   III	   have	   received	   significant	   scholarly	   attention,	   both	   in	   the	   field	   of	  documentary	   and	   in	   critical	   theories	   about	   art,	   the	   aim	   of	   this	   research	   is	   to	  produce	   new	   readings.	   These	   readings	   clearly	   depart	   from	   already	   existing	  scholarly	   discourse	   by	   explicitly	   addressing	   objectification	   as	   a	   core	   aesthetic	  quality	   of	   the	   films	   with	   specific	   and	   intended	   political,	   as	   well	   as	   ethical	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implications.	   Rather	   than	   following	   a	   narrative	   structure,	   the	   four	   parts	   are	  organised	  around	  thematic	  interconnections	  that	  support	  my	  overall	  argument.	  To	  privilege	  a	  creative	  approach	  to	  the	  writing,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  an	  associative	  flow,	  an	  integrated	  approach	  has	  been	  taken	  to	  reviewing	  literature	  relevant	  to	  the	  thesis,	  drawing	  on	  diverse	  texts	  from	  documentary	  studies,	  ethics,	  critical	  writing	  on	  art,	  and	  new	  materialist	  philosophies.	  	  
In	  my	  writing	  I	  am	  guided	  by	  the	  traditions	  of	  feminist,	  post-­‐structural	  and	  post-­‐colonial	   theories	   of	   language.	   My	   fondness	   in	   particular	   for	   the	   writing	   of	  Trinh	   T.	  Minh-­‐ha	   and	   Ashon	   T.	   Crawley	   has	   encouraged	  me	   to	   follow	   this	   path.	  	  Thought	  –	  as	  Minh-­‐ha	  puts	  it	  –	  and	  consequently,	  I	  believe,	  writing	  too,	  is	  “as	  much	  a	  product	  of	  the	  eye,	  the	  finger,	  or	  the	  foot	  as	  it	  is	  of	  the	  brain”	  (Minh-­‐ha,	  1989:	  39).	  I	   speak	  not	   in	   jest	  when	   I	   say	  as	  a	  writer	   I	  am	   interested	   in	  how	  thought	  can	  be	  informed	  by	  my	   toes	   touching	   the	   surface	  beneath.	  To	  echo	  Minh-­‐ha,	   any	   lapses,	  silences,	  or	  impasses	  unsettling	  an	  otherwise	  linear	  flow	  between	  the	  analytic	  and	  the	  poetic	  are	  desired.	  The	  writing	  then	  is	  intended	  to	  remain	  in	  part	  open	  “so	  that	  it	  may	   later	  on	   find,	  or	  not	   find,	   its	  closure”	   in	   the	  deferred	  communion	  with	  the	  reader	  (Minh-­‐ha,	  1989:	  19).	  
The	   structure	   of	   the	   thesis	   represents	   the	   chronology	   of	   my	   research	  journey,	   though	   it	   need	   not	   be	   read	   in	   chronological	   order.	   Rather	   than	   for	   the	  specialist	  reader,	  the	  structure	  is	  designed	  with	  a	  general	  reader	  in	  mind,	  who	  may	  be	   uninitiated	   in	   the	   context	   and	   history	   of	   documentary	   ethics	   and	   in	  documentary’s	  relationship	  to	  art.	  At	  times	  this	  may	  result	  in	  the	  specialist	  reader	  finding	  themselves	  overly	  familiar	  with	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  thesis.	  For	  example,	  Part	  I	  places	  the	  context	  of	  the	  research	  journey	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  documentary	  turn	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  It	  gives	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  context	  out	  of	  which	  the	  documentary	  turn	   emerged	   and	   begins	   to	   explore	   the	   relationship	   between	   documentary	   and	  art,	  and	  their	  historical	  relation	  to	  contemporary	  practices.	  The	  emphasis	  here	  it	  to	  establish	  how	  the	  historically	  conflicting	  ideas	  on	  what	  a	  documentary	  is,	  continue	  to	   impact	  on	  common	  perceptions	  amongst	  viewers	  and	  critics	  on	  the	  role	  of	   the	  documentary	  today,	  and	  on	  ethics,	  on	  what	  a	  documentary	  “ought”	  to	  do.	  For	  some,	  particularly	  those	  active	  in	  the	  academic	  context,	  and	  for	  those	  working	  within	  the	  sector	  of	  artists’	  moving	  image,	  these	  conflicts	  or	  divisions	  have	  eroded	  in	  recent	  years.	  But	  when	  considering	  a	  wider,	  more	  general	   readership	  and	   for	   those	  not	  
	  	   16 
familiar	   with	   the	   specific	   history	   of	   the	   documentary	   turn	   and	   its	   relation	   to	  documentary	   history,	   I	   would	   hope	   that	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   historical	   divisions	  serves	   as	   a	   useful	   foundation.	   For,	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   critically	   evaluating	   ethical	  assumptions	  about	  what	  a	  documentary	  “ought”	   to	  do,	   it	   is	  vital	   to	  establish	  first	  how	  prevailing	  views	  on	  ethics	  in	  general,	  and	  dominant	  discourses	  on	  the	  ethics	  of	   documentary	   in	   particular,	   may	   have	   their	   roots	   in	   historical	   divisions	   about	  what	  a	  documentary	  is,	  its	  categorisation.	  Part	  I	  serves	  to	  establish	  this	  through	  a	  discussion	  of	  two	  examples	  of	  early	  cinema.	  Louis	  Lumière’s	  historic	  work,	  A	  Boat	  
Leaving	  Harbour	  [Barque	  sortant	  du	  port]	  from	  1895,	  and	  Stan	  Brakhage’s	  The	  Act	  
of	  Seeing	  with	  one’s	  own	  eyes,	  from	  1971.	  These	  examples	   serve	   to	   show	   that	   the ontology	  of	  a	  work	   is	   in	  part	  signposted	  by	   its	  naming	  or	  categorisation	  and	  this	  categorisation	   may	   impact	   on	   expectations	   of	   what	   a	   work	   of	   art	   or	   a	   work	   of	  documentary	  ought	   to	  do,	  what	   its	  political	   function	   is	   and	   its	   ethical	   obligation.	  Yet,	   the	  ontology	  of	  both	   these	  works	   remains	  unresolved.	  For	  example,	   viewers	  and	  critics	  are	  in	  two	  minds	  about	  whether	  A	  Boat	  Leaving	  Harbour	  was	  intended	  by	   Lumière	   as	   narrative	   fiction	   or	   if	   it	   is	   an	   early	  work	   of	   documentary.	  As	   Dai	  Vaughan	  suggests,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  “spontaneous	  moment”	  in	  form	  of	  unexpected	  waves	  pushing	  the	  rowers	  back	  towards	  the	  harbour	  may	  qualify	  it	  as	  the	  notional	  beginning	  of	  documentary	  history.	  In	  Part	  I,	  I	  take	  up	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  “spontaneous”	  and	   position	   it	   as	   a	   form	   of	   disobedient	   communication.	   I	   then	   formulate	  disobedient	   communication	   as	   one	   of	   documentary’s	   core	   qualities	   and	   the	  inherent	   agency	   of	   documentary.	   In	   support	   of	   this,	   a	   brief	   analysis	   of	   Stan	  Brakhage’s	  The	  Act	  of	  Seeing	  with	  one’s	  own	  eyes	  here	  has	  a	  dual	  purpose.	  For	  one,	  it	   demonstrates	   a	   second	   instance	   of	   conflicting	   views	   on	   ontology.	   Whilst	  Brakhage’s	  work	  is	  commonly	  discussed	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  the	  avant-­‐garde,	  he	  himself	   considered	   his	   films	   documentaries	   (Renov,	   2007a;	   Brakhage,	   1983).	  Secondly,	   The	   Act	   of	   Seeing	   with	   one’s	   own	   eyes	   lends	   itself	   especially	   to	   a	  discussion	  of	  ethics	  and	  the	  responsibility	  of	  art.	  Due	  to	  graphic	  images	  of	  bodies	  undergoing	  autopsy	  and	  the	  related	  issue	  of	  consent,	  viewers	  may	  experience	  the	  film	   as	   discomforting,	   or	   as	   ethically	   ‘problematic’.	   The	   discussion	   on	   conflicting	  views	   on	   what	   a	   documentary	   is,	   the	   ontology	   of	   works,	   their	   naming	   and	  categorisation	  is	  then	  vital	  in	  leading	  us	  into	  Part	  II,	  where	  an	  extended	  discussion	  on	   what	   a	   documentary	   does,	   or	   may	   do,	   is	   postulated	   through	   the	   impact	   of	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objectification	   and	   how	   objectification	   as	   method	   works	   against	   the	   viewer’s	  expectation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  documentary.	  	  
The	   discussion	   there	   is	   concentrated	   on	   the	  ways	   objectification	   as	  method	   can	  activate	   self-­‐interrogation	  on	   the	  part	  of	  viewers	  with	   regard	   to	   their	   role	   in	   the	  viewing	  process,	  and	  in	  extension,	  raise	  questions	  about	  the	  role	  of	  documentary	  itself.	   This	   process,	   and	   this	   type	   of	   relationship	   between	   films,	   filmmakers	   and	  film	  viewers	   is	   complex	   and	   can	  be	  discomforting.	   The	  key	   terms	   I	   keep	   coming	  back	   to	   throughout	   the	   thesis	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   objectification	   of	   the	   real	   are:	  discomfort	  and	  ethical	  labour.	  	  
Part	   II explores	   the	   objectification	   impulse,	   as	   a	   productive	   antagonism,	   which	  engenders	   ethical	   labour	   through	   the	  production	  of	  discomfort.	  The	   case	   studies	  discussed	   at	   length	   are	   Luis	   Buñuel’s	   Land	   Without	   Bread	   (1933)	   and	   Renzo	  Martens’	  Episode	  III:	  Enjoy	  Poverty	  (2008). 	  I	  argue	  that,	  for	  the	  viewer,	  discomfort	  is	   both	   a	  product	  of	   and	  a	   response	   to	   the	   confrontation	  with	   the	  objectification	  that	  these	  works	  purposefully	  engage	  with.	  Objectification	  is	  here	  positioned	  as	  a	  productive	  resource	  in	  engaging	  viewers	  in	  a	  process	  that	  involves	  the	  investment	  of	   their	   ethical	   labour.	   But	   ethical	   labour,	   as	   I	   formulate	   it,	   is	   a	   process	   both	  filmmakers	  and	  viewers	  are	  engaged	  in.	   I	  contend	  this	   is	  so,	  because	  soliciting	  or	  causing	   discomfort,	   as	   well	   as	   engaging	   with	   and	   responding	   to	   discomfort,	  engenders	   a	   specific	   relationship	   between	   filmmakers	   and	   viewers.	   This	  relationship	  is	  so	  designed	  as	  to	  demand	  ethical	  labour	  on	  the	  part	  of	  viewers.	  	  For,	  the	   engagement	   with	   documentary	   material	   carries	   with	   it	   the	   demand	   for	  omnidirectional	   responsibility;	   that	   is,	   a	   shared	   responsibility.	   Like	   the	  onmidirectional	   microphone,	   I	   argue	   for	   this	   responsibility	   to	   be	   attuned	   to	   a	  conceptual	  and	  corporal	  dexterity	  that	  emanates	  in	  circular	  motion.	  But	  Part	  II	  also	  offers	   an	   alternative	   that	   is	   otherwise	   attuned	   to	   omnidirectional	   responsibility:	  Boris	  Gerrets’	  Shado’man	  (2014).	  Here	  objectification	  does	  not	  produce	  discomfort	  but	   extends	   out	   to	   give	   a	   sculptural	   quality	   to	   the	   documentary.	   I	   analyse	   the	  sculptural	   quality	   of	   Shado’man	   (2014)	   coming	   together	   through	   a	   working	  method	  that	  privileges	  the	  materiality	  of	  bodies,	  through	  physical	  encounters	  and	  detailed	   observations	   of	   physical	   actions.	   The	   analysis	   shows	   that	   Gerrets	  encounters	   the	   social	   as	   a	   malleable	   material	   to	   which	   he	   is	   tied	   through	   the	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materiality	   of	   his	   own	   body	   and	   the	   shared	   experience	   of	   filming	   people	   on	   the	  margins	  of	  society	  in	  Freetown,	  Sierra	  Leone. 
I	  have	  held	  the	  ideas	  expressed	  so	  far	  and	  which	  I	  expand	  upon	  throughout	  the	   thesis	   for	  some	  years	  preceding	   this	  particular	  research	  project	  and	   they	  are	  rooted	   in	  my	  own	  filmmaking	  practice	  and	  my	  experiences	  working	   in	  broadcast	  documentary	  production.	  To	  some	  degree	  my	  work	  is	  a	  response	  to	  my	  experience	  of	  working	  in	  the	  broadcast	  documentary	  field,	  where	  I	  witnessed,	  and	  was	  party	  to,	  the	  strategising	  and	  shaping	  of	  material	  content	  in	  ways	  that	  I	  questioned.	  This	  project,	   making	   the	   film	   titled	   Everything	   (2017),	   and	   the	   curatorial	   work	  consolidated	  through	  the	  Sheffield	  Fringe	  projects	  presented	  in	  the	  Appendix,	  are	  a	  response	   to	   the	   politics	   of	   production	   and	   distribution.	   These	   responses	   are	  extended	   here	   with	   specific	   reference	   to	   the	   contemporary	   prevalence	   of	  documentary	   as	   a	   critical	   method	   in	   art.	   In	   other	   words,	   this	   project	   brings	  together	  my	   response	   to	   experiences	   in	   both	   fields	   –	   a	   response	   that	   is	   initially	  enacted	   through	   the	   film	   and	   curatorial	   practice	   that	   make	   up	   this	   research	  project.	   This	   means	   that	   both	   the	   film	   and	   the	   curatorial	   presentations	   act	   as	  experiments	  where	  the	  objectification	  of	  the	  real	  as	  a	  proposition	  is	  played	  out	  in	  practice	   in	   order	   to	   tease	   out	   and	   amplify	   the	   proposition’s	   challenge	   in	   ethical	  terms.	   Indeed,	   the	   films	   I	  have	  been	   interested	   in,	  and	  my	  own	  practice,	  do	  raise	  ethical	  challenges,	  but	  the	  greater	  discomfort	  I	  have	  felt	  comes	  from	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  those	  challenges	  have	  been	  discussed	  historically	  in	  ethical	  debates	  relating	  particularly	   to	   the	   documentary	   method.	   My	   contention	   has	   been	   that	   those	  challenges	   are	   often	   framed	   by	   ethical	   principles	   that	   are	   culturally,	   and	  ideologically,	   inscribed	   without	   adequate	   consideration	   for	   a	   lived	   ethics.	   This	  lived	   ethics	   I	   see	   played	   out	   through	   complex	   relationships	   formed	   between	  filmmakers	   and	   others	   (contributors,	   subjects,	   participants,	   protagonists,	   objects	  of	   study,	   or	   however	  we	  may	  name	   the	   other).	   Any	  definitive	   clarity	   about	   such	  relationships	  is	  inherently	  difficult	  to	  access	  for	  documentary	  viewers	  and	  critics,	  and	   I	   talk	   about	   this	   in	   relation	   to	   Boris	   Gerrets’s	   Shado’man	   (2014)	   and	   Renzo	  Martens’	  Episode	  III:	  Enjoy	  Poverty	  (2008)	  in	  Part	  II.	  Not	  unlike	  relationships	  in	  the	  private	   domestic	   sphere,	   as	   outsiders	   to	   that	   relationship,	  we	   don’t	   really	   know	  what	   goes	   on.	  We	  were	   not	   there	   and	   not	   part	   of	   the	   complex	   verbal	   and	   non-­‐verbal	   negotiations,	   interactions,	   and	   practices	   that	   made	   up	   that	   relationship.	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Likewise,	  the	  relationship	  between	  filmmakers	  and	  participants,	  or	  situations,	  can	  at	  times	  be	  hard	  to	  access.	  As	  viewers,	  we	  are	  outsiders	  to	  those	  relationships.	  Yet,	  as	   viewers	   and	   as	   critics	   we	   are	   invited	   to	   them	   retrospectively.	   We	   become	  involved	  through	  the	  extension	  of	  that	  relationship	  into	  the	  world.	  It	  becomes	  our	  world	  through	  the	  viewing	  process.	  But	  my	  proposition	  is	  that	  in	  our	  assessment	  of	   that	  originary	   relationship,	   and	  of	   ethics,	  we	  are	   absolutely	  obliged	   to	  bear	   in	  mind	  our	  position	  as	  invited	  guests.	  	  The	   word	   guest	   is	   believed	   by	   some	   linguists	   to	   share	   an	   etymological	  relation	   to	   the	   ancient	   Greek	   word	   xenos	   derived	   from	   hostis,	   which	   can	   mean	  guest	   as	   well	   as	   stranger,	   or	   enemy.	   The	   double-­‐sided	   nature	   of	   the	   word	  illustrates	  how	  a	  stranger	  can	  be	  a	  friendly	  as	  well	  as	  a	  hostile	  guest.	  Either	  way,	  the	   concept	   of	   reciprocity	   is	   embedded	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   being	   a	   host	  (filmmaker/curator)	   as	   well	   as	   being	   a	   guest	   (viewer/critic).	   I	   tried	   to	   first	  articulate	  this	  through	  Reciprocal	  Relations,	  a	  screening	  event	  that	  was	  part	  of	  a	  9-­‐day	  programme	  of	  talks,	  screenings,	  and	  exhibition	  that	  I	  curated,	  also	  titled	  Object	  
Documentary	  (Bloc	  Projects	  Gallery,	  10–18	  June	  2016).	  	  
Reciprocal	  Relations	  is	  an	  example	  of	  how	  the	  curatorial	  activity	  as	  research	  fed	  into	  the	  writing	  presented	  here.	  The	  programme	  was	  made	  up	  of	  a	  selection	  of	  films	   that	   privileged	   the	   relationship	   of	   the	   filmmakers	   to	   their	   material.	   The	  content	  of	  the	  films	  varied	  from	  opaque	  formulations	  on	  the	  politics	  of	  accelerated	  living,	   to	   the	   controversial	   phenomena	   of	   electro-­‐hypersensitivity,	   and	   memory	  facing	   digital,	   chemical,	   neuronal,	   and	   environmental	   coercion,	   as	   well	   as	  automated	  language	  tuition	  as	  authoritative	  prose.	  Each	  of	  the	  films	  in	  Reciprocal	  
Relations	   is	   for	  me	  an	  example	  of	  a	  very	  specific	  relationship	  between	  storyteller	  and	  listener	  as	  a	  form	  of	  reciprocal	  power.	  I	  framed	  the	  films	  as	  examples	  of	  object-­‐to-­‐object	  relations,	  calling	  the	  process	  the	  “objectification	  of	  the	  real”,	  and	  I	  discuss	  in	  Part	  III	  one	  of	  the	  films	  included	  in	  the	  Reciprocal	  Relations	  programme,	  We	  See	  
Ourselves,	  We	  See	  Each	  Other	   (Martin,	   2015).	   To	   some,	   this	   specific	   framing	   and	  relation	  may	  be	  discomforting	   in	  principle,	  but	  placed	   together	  as	  a	   collection	  of	  films,	   I	   hoped	   to	   show	   that	   the	   films	   shared	   a	   dialogue,	   and	   its	  makers	   a	   strong	  sense	  of	   the	  positions	   from	  which	  they	  were	  speaking.	  Each	  preferring	  a	  relation	  that	  does	  not	  subjugate	  its	  object	  of	  study,	  the	  films	  as	  I	  see	  them	  instead	  form	  a	  register	   of	  what	   reciprocal	   relations	   in	   films	  may	   look	   like	   and	   feel	   like	  without	  relying	  on	  the	  viewer’s	  empathic	  identification	  with	  what	  they	  see/hear.	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The	  way	  the	  curatorial	  work	  and	  academic	  research	  are	  intertwined,	  then,	  is	  that	  they	  are	  mutually	  informing,	  with	  each	  motivated	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	   our	   ethical	   obligation	   –	   as	   guests	   in	   a	   film-­‐viewing	   situation	   –	   to	   reserve	  judgements	   and	   to	   avoid	   applying	   universal	   principles	   according	   to	   general	  assumptions	  about	   the	  relationships	  we	  are	   invited	   into	  as	  viewers.	  Most	  of	  all,	   I	  feel	  our	  assessment	  cannot	  and	  should	  not	  be	  in	  reference	  to	  ourselves.	  Our	  ethical	  obligation,	   I	   argue,	   is	   to	   resist	   the	   identification-­‐impulse,	   and	   to	   examine	   this	  impulse	  for	  what	  we	  are	  missing	  in	  our	  assessments	  of	  the	  originary	  relationship:	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  filmmaker	  and	  the	  things	  he/she	  films.	  	  The	   discussion	   about	  Grey	  Gardens	   (Maysles	   &	  Maysles,	   1975)	   in	   Part	   III	  frames	   this	   identification-­‐impulse	  as	  an	  act	  of	  misguided	  surrogacy	  over	   the	   film	  itself	  and	  the	  objects	  of	  study	  in	  it.	  Reaching	  back	  for	  this	  documentary	  film	  classic	  helps	   demonstrate	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   discussions	   about	   ethics	   still	   largely	  concentrate	   on	   the	   responsibility	   of	   filmmakers.	   To	   help	   reinvigorate	   these	  discussions	  and	  raise	  new	  questions,	  I	  argue	  that	  our	  obligation	  as	  viewers/critics	  is	   to	   instead	  examine	   the	  agency	  of	  said	  objects	  and	   the	  ways	   these	  agencies	  are	  made	  visible	  in	  the	  film.	  	  	  The	   identification-­‐impulse	   can	   oftentimes	   be	   tied	   in	   with	   feelings	   of	  empathy.	   I	   do	  not	  discuss	   empathy	   and	   its	   relationship	   to	   ethics	   at	   great	   length,	  other	  than	  arguing	  that	  one	  of	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  films	  I	  write	  about,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  films	   I	   have	   shown	   in	   my	   curatorial	   work,	   is	   to	   circumvent	   the	   possibility	   of	  empathic	   identification	   through	   various	   strategies	   unique	   to	   each	   film.	   The	  unifying	  element	   in	   this	   circumvention	   that	   I	   keep	   coming	  back	   to	   throughout	   is	  objectification,	  a	  perceived	  distancing.	  The	  reason	  I	  steer	  away	  from	  an	  analysis	  of	  empathy	   as	   an	   ethical	   relation	   in	   and	   of	   itself	   is	   because	   I	   believe	   that	   for	   the	  viewer	   or	   critic,	   it	   may	   be	   an	   engagement	   that	   runs	   the	   risk	   of	   absolving	   us	   of	  responsibility.	   It	  hinders	  us	  from	  an	  other-­‐wise	  viewing,	   from	  looking	  differently,	  at	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   our	   perception	   of	   ethical	   relations	   might	   be	   culturally	   or	  historically	  inscribed.	  	  In	  Part	  III,	  I	  bring	  into	  the	  discussion	  Levinas’	  philosophy	  relating	  to	  notions	  of	   alterity.	   His	   approach	   to	   and	   responsibility	   towards	   the	   other	   is	   expressed	  through	  his	  unique	  formulation	  of	  separation	  and	  in	  what	  he	  describes	  as	  the	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  encounter.	  Another	  film	  programme	  titled	  Willing	  The	  Possible	  presented	  as	  part	  of	  the	  practice	  element,	  the	  Object	  Documentary	  series	  at	  Bloc	  Projects	  (2016)	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and	   included	   in	   the	   Appendix,	   framed	   the	   encounter	   between	   films	   and	   film	  viewers	  as	  exactly	   the	  kind	  of	   face-­‐to-­‐face	  contact	  Levinas	  speaks	  of.	  Though	   the	  films	   gathered	   in	   Willing	   The	   Possible	   are	   all	   situated	   in	   conflict	   zones	   across	  geographies	   and	   times,	   none	   make	   any	   singular	   known	   conflict-­‐narrative	   the	  central	  object	  of	  their	  study.	  Placed	  together	  as	  they	  were,	  the	  films,	  I	  hoped,	  allow	  the	  possibility	  of	  collective	  narrative	  plotting	  as	  an	  open-­‐ended	  process	  –	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  through	  conflicting	  positions	  together	  as	  a	  productive	  confrontation.	  The	  intention	  was	  to	  help	  facilitate	  a	  shift	  of	  responsibility	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  engagement	  towards	  the	  viewer.	  The	  way	  I	  placed	  the	  films,	  and	  the	  context	  in	  which	  I	  framed	  them	  solicited	  the	  age-­‐old	  question	  of	  our	  responsibilities	  as	  filmmakers	  or	  artists.	  When	   making	   films	   in	   or	   about	   past	   or	   present	   conflicts,	   what	   are	   our	  responsibilities?	  That	   is	  one	  of	   the	  prevailing	  questions.	  However,	  because	  of	   the	  oblique	  quality	   to	   the	   films,	   and	   for	   some,	   their	  unsatisfying	  political	   advocacy,	   I	  hoped	   the	   question	   of	   obligation	   on	   the	   side	   of	   viewers	   had	   a	   chance	   of	   being	  addressed,	   because	   it	   teased	   out	   the	   question	   of	   what	   to	  make	   of	   documentary	  films	   where	   an	   emotive	   conflict-­‐narrative	   is	   absent,	   replaced	   by	   strategies	   of	  ambivalence,	   humour,	   contradiction,	   or	   the	   ordinary.	   The	   intention	   was	   to	   help	  facilitate	  an	  examination	  of	  our	  ethical	  responsibility	  as	  viewers	  and	  as	  critics	  with	  the	   kind	   of	   separation	   that	   Levinas	   speaks	   of,	   a	   confrontation	   of	   sorts.	   The	   film	  programme	  aimed	  to	  tease	  out	  an	  acknowledgement	  of	  this	  separation	  through	  the	  practice	   of	   confrontation,	   by	   circumventing	   the	   solicitation	   of	   the	   viewer’s	  identification-­‐impulse;	  to	  view	  the	  other,	  as	  well	  as	  his/her/its	  desire,	  as	  radically	  separate	  from	  our	  own.	  	  	  	  	  To	   some	   extent	   it	   could	   be	   argued,	   that	   my	   relationship	   to	   the	   works	   and	   the	  artists	  I	  speak	  about	   in	  the	  following	  pages	  has	  been	   ‘use-­‐oriented’.	   It	  could	  even	  be	  argued	  that	  I	  objectified	  the	  works	  by	  placing	  them	  in	  a	  context	  that	  served	  my	  desire	  to	  contribute	  to	  reframing	  discussions	  on	  ethics	   in	  documentary.	   Indeed,	   I	  have	   intentionally	  chosen	   films	  that	  have	   troubled	  me,	  or	   that	   I	  suspected	  would	  trouble	  others.	  I	  have	  done	  so	  because	  my	  overall	  agenda	  with	  the	  curatorial	  work,	  my	  own	  film	  work	  Everything	  (2017),	  both	  presented	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Appendix,	  and	  the	   theoretical	  analysis	  of	   film	  works	  presented	  here	  has	  been	  to	  redirect	  classic	  ethical	   debates	   about	   the	   responsibility	   of	   filmmakers	   towards	   the	   obligation	   of	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viewers.	  With	  these,	  we	  could	  say,	  “planned	  confrontations”,	   I	  hope	  to	  contribute	  to	  further	  challenging	  debates.	  	  For	   example,	   classic	   discussions	   of	   how	   to	   ‘do	   politics’	   in	   and	   with	  documentary	   and	   the	   responsibility	   of	   filmmakers	   arose	   in	   a	   post-­‐screening	  discussion	  with	  Rosalind	  Nashashibi.	  The	  discussion	  was	  part	  of	  a	  programme	  of	  her	   films	   that	   I	   curated	   at	   Close-­‐Up	   Film	   Centre,	   titled	   FILMN	  YOUR	   LIFE	  WITH	  
FASHION	  (2017).	  One	  of	  the	  concerns	  that	  arose	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  advocacy	  that	  one	  of	   her	   films,	   Electrical	   Gaza	   (2015),	   presents	   of	   on-­‐going	   injustice	   towards	  Palestinian	  people	  and	  the	  responsibility	  of	  representing	  the	  other	  particularly	  in	  a	  European	   viewing	   context.	   A	   fruitful	   discussion	   ensued	   around	   those	   perhaps	  classical	   questions	   with	   insights	   gained	   on	   Nashashibi’s	   relationship	   to	   the	  material	   she	   films	   and	   her	   filming	   process.	   Nashashibi’s	   articulation	   and	  awareness	   of	   her	   specific	   position	   –	   not	   being	   from	   Gaza	   and	   the	   ensuing	  difficulties	  of	  crossing	  that	  geographical	  border	  –	  brought	  to	  the	  surface	  that	  which	  oftentimes	  is	  overlooked	  in	  inquiries	  about	  ethics	  and	  responsibility:	  the	  condition	  of	  herself	  also	  being	  the	  ‘other’	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  place	  and	  its	  people.	  Therefore,	  as	  she	   explained	   in	   the	   post-­‐screening	   discussion,	   her	   viable	   ‘access’	   and	   approach	  was	  through	  her	  body:	  her	  eyes,	  her	  ears,	  her	  touch.	  In	  short,	  through	  a	  register	  of	  her	   physical	   presence	   in	   Gaza	   and	   the	   people	   that	   facilitated	   that	   presence:	   the	  fixer,	  the	  driver,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  To	   acknowledge	   one’s	   own	  position	   in	   the	  world,	   and	   to	   speak/film	   from	  that	  position	  –	  by	  all	  accounts	  both	  limited	  and	  limiting	  –	  is	  then	  to	  honour	  one’s	  position	   as	   a	   guest.	   Though	   not	   exactly	   expressed	   in	   this	   way,	   and	   perhaps	   for	  some	   an	  unsatisfying	  political	   strategy,	   the	  discussion	  of	  Electrical	  Gaza,	  which	   I	  attend	  to	  at	  length	  in	  Part	  IV,	  nonetheless	  teases	  out	  the	  idea	  of	  material	  presence	  and	  being	  a	  thing	  amongst	  other	  things,	  of	  speaking	  not	  for	  but	  nearby	  the	  other,	  to	  echo	  Minh-­‐ha	  (Minh-­‐ha,	  1982).	  3	  The	  related	  discussion	  on	  a	  state	  of	  being	  I	  term	  “as	  the	  other”	  –	  for	  me,	  an	  expression	  of	  reciprocity,	  meaning	  to	  not	  speak	  for	  the	  other,	  or	  about	   the	  other	  but	  as	  well	  as	   the	  other	  –	  also	  filters	  into	  the	  discussion	  and	  is	  extended	  throughout	  the	  latter	  parts	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Being	  a	  thing	  amongst	  other	  things	  is	  derived	  from	  Maurice	  Merleau-­‐Ponty.	  See,	  “Eye	  and	  Mind”,	  
The	  Primacy	  of	  Perception	  and	  Other	  Essays	  on	  Phenomenological	  Psychology,	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Art,	  
History,	  and	  Politics,	  ed.	  James	  M.	  Edie,	  (Evanston:	  Northwestern	  University	  Press,	  1964),	  p.	  163.	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The	   concluding	   part	   of	   the	   thesis,	   Part	   IV	   in	   particular,	   is	   written	   as	   a	   direct	  response	   to	   the	   symposium	   Object!	   On	   the	   Documentary	   as	   Art	   at	   Whitechapel	  Gallery	  (2017),	  where	  I	   invited	  Rosalind	  Nashashibi	   to	  present	  as	  part	  of	  a	  panel	  that	   included	   Erika	   Balsom,	   amongst	   others,	   in	   the	   day-­‐long	   symposium.	   The	  contributions	   informed	   the	  writing	   in	   significant	  ways,	   but	   the	   text	   presented	   in	  Part	  IV	  is	  as	  much	  about	  what	  was	  not	  said	  as	  it	  is	  about	  what	  was	  said	  on	  that	  day.	  The	   aim	   for	   the	   panel	   was	   to	   address	   the	   aesthetic	   potential	   and	   the	   ethical	  challenges	   of	   considering	   the	  materiality	   of	   things,	   human	   and	   non-­‐human,	   as	   a	  primary	   approach	   to	   documentary	  making.	   Erika	   Balsom	   argued	   polemically	   for	  the	  return	  or	  the	  “rehabilitation”	  of	  the	  observational	  documentary	  mode	  and	  the	  value	  of	  	  “situated”	  objectivity,	  which	  she	  expanded	  upon	  in	  her	  essay	  publication	  titled	   “The	   Reality-­‐Based	   Community”	   (e-­‐flux	   Journal	   #83,	   June	   2017).	   Rosalind	  Nashashibi	  articulated	  her	  interest	  in	  the	  things	  and	  people	  she	  films,	  her	  method	  of	   access,	   her	   relationship	   to	   the	   real,	   and	   to	   the	   filming	   process	   as	   its	  “touchability”.	   She	   expressed	   this	   touchability	   as	   her	   pleasure	   and	   with	   that	  brought	   to	   the	   centre	   of	   attention	   the	   sensible,	   tactile,	   material	   aspects	   of	  documentary	  making,	  not	  just	  as	  a	  form	  of	  artistic	  production,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  form	  of	  knowledge	  production.	  In	  Part	  IV	  I	  discuss	  Nashashibi’s	  approach	  at	  length	  and	  in	  particular	  how	  this	   touchability	   translates	   to	  a	  sense	  of	  proximity	  or	  nearness	   to	  the	  other	  through	  her	  use	  of	  breath	  in	  the	  sound	  construction	  of	  Electrical	  Gaza.	  	  With	   the	   analysis	   of	   a	   second	   work,	   a	   collaborative	   work	   by	  Nashashibi/Skaer	   titled	  Why	  Are	  You	  Angry	   (2017),	   I	   speculate	  on	  photography’s	  proximity	   to	   the	   real	   and	   explore	   its	   “muteness”	   not	   as	   a	   lack,	   but	   rather	   as	   the	  “communicative	  power	  of	  silence”.	  Overall,	  Part	  IV	  brings	  together	  the	  ideas	  of	  the	  previous	   chapters,	   building	   on	   those	   discussions	   by	   fleshing	   out	   an	   egalitarian	  approach	   to	   ethics	   in	   documentary.	   I	   do	   so	   by	   considering	   the	   filmmaking,	   film-­‐	  viewing	  and	  film-­‐critiquing	  self	  as	  a	  thing	  amongst	  other	  things.	  	  Running	  the	  risk	  of	  moving	  into	  slippery	  articulations,	  I	  feel	  inclined	  to	  summarise	  the	   films	   I	   care	   to	   discuss	   here	   by	   using	   perhaps	   one	   of	   the	  most	   slippery	   of	   all	  terms:	  love.	  Cognisant	  of	  this	  term	  falling	  short	  of	  academic	  qualification,	  I	  want	  to	  call	   these	   films	   acts	   of	   love.	   There	   is	   painful	   love,	   and	   tender	   love,	   a	   whole	  spectrum	   of	   emotional	   connections	   including	   anger,	   violence,	   surrender	   and	  humility.	  Acts	  of	  love	  in	  film,	  as	  in	  life,	  can	  be	  enabling,	  expansive	  and	  humbling	  as	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PART I	  	  
DOCUMENTARY & THE DOCUMENTARY TURN: An Overview 	  This	  project	   is	  concerned	  with	   the	  process	  of	  objectification	   in	  documentary	   film	  practices,	  and	  the	  relationships	  formed	  with	  human	  and	  non-­‐human	  others	  as	  self-­‐determined	  agents.	  We	  may	  call	  these	  ‘agents’	  objects,	  we	  may	  call	  them	  things,	  or	  we	   may	   call	   them	   the	   ‘other’.	   Whilst	   each	   term	   has	   its	   own	   distinct	   history	  investigated,	   amongst	   other	   disciplines,	   through	   art	   history	   and	   ethics,	   through	  object	  studies,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  sociology,	  anthropology,	  and	  ethnographic	  studies,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  I	  suggest	  there	  is	  a	  value	  in	  surrendering	  to	  the	  slippage	  between	   the	   terms.	   Because,	   as	   this	   study	   will	   show,	   the	   slippage	   can	   impact	  productively	  on	  how	  we	  perceive	  the	  ethics	  of	  objectification	  as	  a	  process.	  	  	  Expressed	  more	  broadly,	  the	  project	  aims	  to	  study	  the	  aesthetic	  potential,	  and	  the	  political	   stakes	   of	   the	   objectification	   impulse	   in	   order	   to	   reframe	   discussions	   on	  documentary	  ethics	  by	  paying	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  obligation	  of	  viewers.	  The	  analysis	  therefore	  first	  considers	  whether	  or	  not	  objectification	  as	  a	  process	  and	  as	  a	  method	  involves	  an	  ethical	  relation	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  we	  need	  to	  ask:	  What	  can	  be	  perceived	  of	  that	  relation	  in	  the	  work	  itself?	  How	  is	  that	  relation	  produced?	  How	  does	   it	  manifest,	   or	   not,	   particularly	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   relatively	  recent	   proliferation	   of	   documentary	   works	   in	   the	   art	   context,	   and	   the	   so-­‐called	  documentary	   turn?	   I	   will	   discuss,	   for	   example,	   how	   to	   reconcile	   the	   politically	  charged	  polemic	  of	   a	   film	   like	  Renzo	  Martens’s	  Episode	  III:	  Enjoy	  Poverty	  (2008),	  with	   the	   filmmaker’s	   ‘objectified’	   treatment	  of	   the	  people	  depicted.	  Enjoy	  Poverty	  exposes	  the	  organisational	  framework	  involved	  in	  the	  economic	  exploitation	  of	  the	  Congolese	   through	   the	   extraction	   of	   resources.	   The	   painful	   proposition	   the	   film	  makes	   is	   that	   poverty	   is	   but	   one	   of	   those	   resources	   available	   for	   profitable	  ‘extraction’.	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   filmmaker’s	   performed	   self	   and	   his	   contrarian	  proposition	   offer	   a	   clue	   to	   an	   alternative	   reading	   of	   ethical	   relations.	   But	   before	  taking	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  this	  specific	  example	  in	  Part	  II,	  I	  want	  to	  backtrack	  a	  little	  to	  establish	   the	   context	   of	   the	  documentary	   turn.	  This	   is	   in	   order	   to	   show	   that	   our	  assumption	   of	   what	   constitutes	   ethical	   practice	   in	   documentary,	   what	   a	  documentary	  ‘ought’	  to	  do,	  is	  intimately	  tied	  up	  not	  just	  with	  historic	  conditioning	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of	   documentary’s	   socio-­‐political	   purpose,	   but	   significantly,	   with	   historically	  conflicting	  ideas	  of	  what	  a	  documentary	  actually	  is	  and	  does,	  in	  art,	  or	  otherwise.	  Whilst	   divisions	   in	   relation	   to	   film	   practice	   between	   the	   categories	   of	   art	   and	  documentary	  have	  eroded	   in	  recent	  years,	  particularly	   in	   the	  academic	  context,	   I	  contend	   that	   perceived	   differences	   between	   the	   two	   live	   on	   and	   find	   expression	  through	   notions	   of	   ethical	   practice	   and	   through	   normative	   readings	   of	  documentary	   relations,	   expectant	   of	   what	   a	   documentary	   ‘ought’	   to	   do.	   For	   the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  make	  this	  point	  for	  the	  following	  reason.	  One	  view	  of	  the	  art	  historical	  moment	  that	  inaugurated	  the	  ‘documentary	  turn’	  is	  that	   it	   represents	   for	   many	   practitioners	   a	   new	   dawn	   with	   its	   promise	   of	   the	  expanded	   potential	   for	   documentary	   form.	   We	   may	   also	   view	   the	   documentary	  turn	   as	   the	  moment	  when	   the	   promise	   of	   reigniting	   the	   social	   dimension	   of	   art	  found	  a	  new	  lease	  of	  life	  (Enwezor,	  2004;	  Enwezor	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  M.	  Nash,	  2008).	  The	  documentary	  turn	  also	  very	  usefully	  inaugurated	  renewed	  debates	  on	  the	  politics	  of	   truth,	   power	   and	   ethics	   (Steyerl,	   2005).	   But	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  making	   ethical	  assessments	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  documentary,	  debates	  I	  argue	  still	  remain	  partially	  stuck	   in	   Idealist	   philosophy	   of	   ‘man’	   –	   or	   for	   our	   purposes	   here,	   of	   the	  filmmaker/critic	  –being	  ‘the	  measure	  of	  all	  things’.	  My	  intention	  with	  an	  overview	  of	   historical	   divisions	   in	   the	   classification	   of	   documentary	   is	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	  root	  cause	   for	   this	  partial	  stuckness	  can	  be	   located	   for	  some	   in	   the	  certainty	  and	  for	   others	   in	   the	  uncertainty	   of	   documentary’s	   ontology;	   in	  what	   a	   documentary	  actually	   is.	   As	   scholar	   Kate	   Nash	   points	   out	   “deployed	   in	   the	   context	   of	   ethical	  debate,	   definitions	   [of	   documentary]	   can	   have	   significant	   implications	   for	  filmmaking	  practice”	  and	  consequently,	  I	  would	  argue,	  for	  film	  viewing	  and	  for	  film	  criticism	  (K.	  Nash,	  2011b:	  225),	  because	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  viewer,	  perceptions	  of	  what	  a	  documentary	  is	  impact	  on	  expectations	  of	  what	  a	  documentary	  ‘ought’	  to	  do.	  And	  this	  has	  implications	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  documentary	  ethics.	  	  The	  main	   thesis	   title,	  Object	  Documentary,	  obliquely	  points	   towards	  a	  moment	   in	  recent	  art	  history	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  documentary	  turn,	  when	  documentary	  entered	  the	  field	  of	  art,	  let	  us	  say	  propositionally,	  as	  an	  art	  object.	  It	  is	  not	  my	  intention	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  integration	  of	  documentary	  works	  in	  the	  field	  of	  contemporary	  art was	  motivated	  by	  purely	  functional	  market	  calculations. I	  am	  merely	  citing	  the	  so-­‐called	   documentary	   turn	   as	   the	   point	   at	   which,	   propositionally,	   documentary	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became	  an	  object	  due	  to	  the	  art-­‐institutional	  context	  in	  which	  it	  began	  to	  be	  more	  increasingly	  seen,	  distributed,	  and	  theorised	  about.	  4 For	  instance,	  indicating	  more	  than	   market	   calculations,	   curator	   and	   scholar	   Mark	   Nash,	   one	   of	   a	   number	   of	  supporters	   of	   documentary	   film	   in	   the	   art	   field,	   saw	   artists	   working	   with	   the	  medium	  as	  having	  “the	  potential	  to	  inject	  a	  new	  realism	  into	  contemporary	  art”	  (M.	  Nash,	   2008:	   120).	   He	   was	   interested	   in	   “the	   potential	   that	   the	   form	   still	   has	   to	  reinvigorate	  the	  social	  dimension	  of	  art”	  (M.	  Nash,	  2008:	  120).	  Nash	  was	  one	  of	  the	  seven	  co-­‐curators	  of	  documenta	  11	  in	  2002,	  under	  the	  artistic	  direction	  of	  Okwui	  Enwezor,	  who	  wanted	  to	  comment	  on	  “the	  disinterestedness	  of	  art	   in	   its	  relation	  with	   social	   life”	   (Enwezor,	   2004:	   97),	   through	   works	   that	   questioned	   this	   very	  disinterestedness	  (M.	  Nash,	  2008).	  	  	   But	  beyond	  the	  commodification	  of	  documentary	  in	  the	  market	  place	  as	  an	  art	   object,	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   objectification	   of	   the	   real	   can	   manifest	   are	  difficult	   to	  articulate. One	  approach	   is	   to	  think	  of	  documentary	  material	   from	  the	  artists’	  perspective,	   and	   film	  objects	   from	  a	   curatorial	  perspective,	   similar	   to	   the	  way	   that	   Alfred	   Hitchcock	   thought	   of	   actors:	   as	   material	   objects	   “willing	   to	   be	  utilized	  and	  wholly	  integrated”	  (Truffaut,	  Hitchcock,	  &	  Scott,	  1985:	  111).	  Hitchcock	  is	   speaking	   here	   to	   French	   film	   director	   François	   Truffaut	   about	   the	   task	   of	  directing	   and	   his	  method	   of	  working	  with	   actors.	  What	   transpires	   through	   their	  conversational	  exchange	  is	  that	  Hitchcock	  valued	  an	  actor’s	  ability	  to	  be	  “neutral”,	  to	  avoid	  “emoting”,	  “to	  do	  nothing	  well”,	  as	  he	  put	  it	  (Truffaut	  et	  al.,	  1985:	  111).	  	  The	  connection	  between	  Hitchcock,	  a	   fiction	  director,	  and	  documentary	  or	  art,	  may	   seem	   strenuous	   here.	  What	   I	   am	   interested	   in,	   and	  what	   emerges	   from	  this	  example,	   is	  Hitchcock’s	   relationship	   to	  actors	  and	  a	  particular	  work	  method.	  Artistic	   composition	   here	   seems	   to	   be	   about	   organising	   objects;	   about	   sculpting	  material	  –	  in	  Hitchcock’s	  particular	  case,	  it	  is	  the	  physical	  body	  as	  material.	  But	  in	  the	   realm	  of	  documentary,	  when	  working	  with	   ‘real’	   things	  and	  people,	  how	  can	  we	  be	  mindful	  of	   the	  dignity	  of	   ‘subjects’	  when	  our	  artistic	  habit	   is	   to	  work	  with	  ‘objects’?	  An	  interview	  with	  Jeremy	  Deller,	  who	  had	  been	  nominated	  to	  represent	  Britain	   at	   the	   55th	   Venice	   Biennale	   in	   2013,	   illustrates	   this	   paradox	   through	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  When	   I	   refer	   to	  documentary,	   I	   am	  specifically	   talking	  about	  moving	   image	  documentary.	  For	  a	  wider	  and	  earlier	  discourse	  that	   includes	  documentary	  photography	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  art,	  see	  G.	  Kester,	   “Towards	   a	   New	   Social	   Documentary,”	   Afterimage	   Vol.	   14,	   No.	   8	   (March	   1987).	   Also	   A.	  Sekula,	  “Dismantling	  Modernism,	  Reinventing	  Documentary,”	  The	  Massachusetts	  Review,	  	  Vol.	  19,	  No.	  4,	  Photography	  (Winter,	  1978):	  859–883.	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language.	  Deller	  is	  well	  known	  for	  his	  collaborations	  with	  non-­‐actors	  in	  works	  such	  as	  The	  Battle	  Of	  Orgreave	  (2001),	  Procession	  (2009),	  Many	  Ways	  To	  Hurt	  (2010),	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few.	  When	  asked	  if	  he	  sees	  collaboration	  as	  an	  artistic	  medium,	  he	  said:	  “Yes.	  Or	  people	  as	  an	  artistic	  medium.	  And	  collaboration	  is	  a	  form	  of	  that”	  (Milliard,	  2013).	   If	  we	  understand	  “artistic	  medium”	  to	  mean	  the	  material	  an	  artist	  uses	   to	  create	  work,	   then	  we	  may	   take	  Deller’s	  words	   to	  mean	  he	  works	  with	  people	  as	  material.	  Initially	  this	  may	  present	  a	  paradox	  for	  the	  realm	  of	  documentary,	  which	  is	  more	  comfortably	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  social	  practice	  between	  ‘subjects’.	  People	  are	  not	   things,	   material,	   or	   objects,	   we	   might	   say.	   But	   we	   may	   also	   recall	   Sergei	  Tret’iakov’s	  proposal	  in	  “The	  Biography	  of	  the	  Object”,	  to	  cast	  a	  human	  in	  place	  of	  an	  object,	  and	  to	  move	  through	  a	  material	  configuration	  amongst	  other	  objects.	  	  In	   1929,	   Russian	   playwright	   Sergei	   Tret’iakov	   wrote	   the	   manifesto-­‐like	  essay	  titled	  “The	  Biography	  of	  the	  Object”	  in	  which	  he	  sought	  to	  displace	  the	  figure	  of	   the	   hero	   from	   the	   centre	   of	   the	   novel.	  5	  In	   his	   text,	   Tret’iakov	   proposes	   a	  methodology,	  a	  system	  of	  narrative	  construction,	  which	  reconfigures	  the	  novel	  as	  that	   which	  might	   be	   theorised	   as	   a	   non-­‐human	   centred	   critical	   approach	   to	   the	  interrelatedness	   of	   things.	   The	   hero,	   he	   critiques,	   “is	   what	   holds	   the	   novel’s	  universe	  together.	  The	  whole	  world	  is	  perceived	  through	  him.	  The	  whole	  world	  is,	  furthermore,	  essentially	  just	  a	  collection	  of	  details	  that	  belong	  to	  him”	  (Tret’iakov,	  2006:	   58).	   As	   an	   antidote	   to	   Idealist	   philosophy,	   of	   ‘man	   as	   the	   measure	   of	   all	  things’,	  of	  subject-­‐centeredness,	  he	  proposed	  to	  think	  of	  narrative	  construction	  as	  a	   conveyor	   belt	   along	   which	   a	   material	   entity,	   including	   conceivably	   a	   human	  entity,	   is	   moved	   and	   transformed.	   People	   otherwise	   separated	   by	   social	  stratification,	   in	   a	   linearly	   progressing	   production	   line,	   are	   positioned	   on	   both	  sides	   of	   the	   production	   line	   and	   thereby	   share	   an	   egalitarian	   process	   of	  encountering.	  Presumably,	  Tret’iakov	  envisioned	  that	  a	  dialogic	  positioning	  rather	  than	   a	   linear	   one	   could	   bring	   into	   visibility	   the	   social	   relations	   that	   produce	   the	  ‘thing’.	  So,	  whilst	  the	  classic	  hero	  of	  the	  novel	  moves	  through	  a	  system	  of	  objects	  that	  are	  “details	  that	  belong	  to	  him”,	  Tret’iakov	  envisioned	  people	  moving	  through	  a	   system	   of	   objects	   in	   literary	   creations	   that	   might	   be	   called	   “Coal”,	   “Iron”,	   or	  “Bread”.	   What’s	   more,	   he	   states:	   “once	   we	   run	   a	   human	   along	   the	   narrative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  According	   to	   an	   introduction	   to	   the	   essay’s	   republication	   in	   the	   critical	   art	   journal	  October,	   the	  original	  Russian	  title	  “Biografiia	  veshchi”	  can	  also	  be	  translated	  as	  “The	  Biography	  of	  the	  Thing”.	  See	  
October	  118	  (Fall	  2006):	  57.	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conveyer	  belt	   like	  an	  object,	  he	  will	  appear	  before	  us	   in	  a	  new	   light”	   (Tret’iakov,	  2006:	  62).	  6	  	  Reconfigured	   with	   Tret’iakov’s	   proposal	   in	   mind,	   Jeremy	   Deller’s	  proposition,	  “people	  as	  an	  artistic	  medium”,	  may	  no	  longer	  feel	  reductive	  in	  ethical	  terms.	   This	   study	   explores	   the	   paradox	   of	   people	   as	   material	   and	   the	  “objectification	  of	  the	  real”	  in	  documentary	  art	  practices	  through	  two	  interrelated	  strands:	  one	  looks	  at	  working	  with	  things	  and	  people	  as	  a	  material	  resource	  from	  the	   artist’s	   perspective.	   The	   other	   considers	   the	   discomfort	   of	   being	   confronted	  with	  this	  process,	  the	  process	  of	  objectification,	  from	  the	  viewer’s	  perspective.	  But	  what	   do	   I	   mean	   by	   objectification	   in	   the	   context	   of	   documentary?	   Rather	   than	  making	   an	   ontological	   claim,	   it	   is	   vital	   to	   clarify	   that	   the	   positioning	   of	  documentary,	  as	  ‘object’	  in	  this	  study	  is	  propositional.	  The	  proposition	  is	  made	  in	  order	   to	   tease	   out	   and	   amplify	   the	   ethical	   challenges	   that	   come	   with	   such	   a	  proposition.	  What	  is	  offered	  in	  this	  study	  is	  not	  a	  theoretical	  or	  historical	  account	  of	   the	   ontology	   of	   objects.	   Instead,	   the	   aesthetic	   potential,	   political	   stakes,	   and	  ethical	  challenges	  that	  accompany	  the	  propositional	  thinking	  of	  documentary	  as	  an	  object,	  are	  interrogated.	  7	  	  	  Discounting	   commercial	   or	   ideological	   interests,	   and	   expressed	   broadly,	   the	  gathering	   and	   distribution	   of	   documentary	   material	   in	   journalistic	   practice	   is	  traditionally	  thought	  of	  as	  having	  a	  desire	  to	  meet	  educational	  and	   informational	  ends.	   In	  documentary	  practice,	   the	  ends	  can	  also	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  being	  oriented	  towards	   advocacy,	   evoking	   change,	   or	   activism.	   In	   art	   practice,	   documentary	  
material	  can	  also	  be	  a	  resource	  employed	  to	  meet	  the	  ends	  of	  the	  work	  itself,	  or	  the	  artist’s	   ends.	   It	   is	   the	   latter	   field	   that	   I	   am	   investigating,	   and	   I	   am	   particularly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Rather	   than	   crediting	   herself	   as	   filmmaker	   or	   director	   or	   artist	   as	   might	   be	   customary,	   Hito	  Steyerl	  decentres	  her	  own	  ‘heroic’	  subject	  position	  in	  the	  making	  of	  the	  film	  titled	  In	  Free	  Fall,	  with	  the	  credit	  line	  “Recycling	  by	  Hito	  Steyerl”.	  The	  film	  also	  directly	  references	  Sergei	  Tret’iakov’s	  “The	  Biography	  of	  the	  Object”	  in	  its	  second	  chapter	  titled	  “Before	  the	  Crash”.	  It	  was	  presented	  in	  2010	  as	  a	  moving-­‐image	  exhibition	  at	  Chisenhale	  Gallery,	   London	   (Steyerl,	   2010b).	  The	   topic	  was	   further	  explored	  in	  an	  associated	  panel	  discussion	  (Archive	  Past	  Exhibitions	  Hito	  Steyerl	  |	  Chisenhale	  Gallery,	  2010).	  7	  I	   am	   thankful	   to	   Mihaela	   Brebenel	   for	   her	   help	   in	   summarising	   the	   central	   concerns	   of	   this	  research	   project	   through	   this	   triangulated	   articulation	   in	   our	   collaborative	   effort	   preparing	   the	  
Object!	  On	  The	  Documentary	  as	  Art	  symposium	  (Whitechapel	  Gallery,	  February	  2017).	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interested	  in	  the	  ethics	  of	  artistic	  practises	  that	  utilise	  documentary	  strategies,	  or	  documentary	  materials,	  as	  part	  of	  their	  artistic	  production.	  8	  	  Speaking	  of	  an	  “aesthetic	  of	  ethics”,	  Walead	  Beshty	  asks,	  “[H]ow	  do	  ethical	  relations	   create	   aesthetic	   form?”	   (Beshty,	   2015:	   19).	   Extending	   out	   from	   this	  question,	  this	  project	  asks:	  if	  the	  performance	  of	  objectification	  for	  political	  ends	  in	  documentary	  art	  practices	  indicates	  an	  ethical	  relation,	  is	  this	  relation	  necessarily	  always	  exploitative	  or	  reductive?	  9	  Instead,	  I	  propose	  it	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  resistance	  to	  the	   ‘governance’	  of	  the	  real,	  associated	  with	  the	  documentary	  mode	  (Steyerl,	   2003a).	  Whilst	   the	   “social	   turn”	   (Bishop,	   2006,	   2012)	   and	   the	   so-­‐called	  documentary	   turn	   (both	   understood	   as	   artistic	   directions	   in	   the	   art	   field)	   have	  received	  wide	  scholarly	  attention,	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  project	  is	  to	  investigate	  the	  object	  turn	  in	  documentary	  art	  practice.	  Albeit	  a	  ‘turn’	  that	  has	  its	  foundation	  in	  the	  long-­‐standing	  history	  of	  documentary	  film.	  	  	  In	   what	   follows,	   I	   will	   draw	   on	   two	   theoretical	   contexts	   through	   which	   our	  understanding,	  and	  one	  could	  argue	  our	  misunderstanding,	  of	  what	  a	  documentary	  
is,	   has	   been	   shaped.	   The	   contexts	   are	   the	   field	   of	   documentary	   and	   the	  documentary	   turn	   in	   the	   art	   field.	   This	   is	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   a	   contextual	  background,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  make	  connections	  between	  historical	  perspectives	  in	  the	  field	   of	   documentary	   studies	   and	   recent	   theoretical	   concerns	   about	   the	   role	   of	  documentary	   in	   the	   art	   field.	   As	   examples,	   I	   present	   A	   Boat	   Leaving	   Harbour	  (Lumière,	  1895),	  and	  The	  Act	  of	  Seeing	  with	  one’s	  own	  eyes	  (Brakhage,	  1971).	  Both	  are	   particularly	   relevant	   to	   building	   my	   argument	   because	   the	   status	   of	   these	  works	   as	   ‘documentary’	   has	   been	   contested.	   For	   example,	   although	   Brakhage	  considered	  The	  Act	  of	  Seeing	  with	  one’s	  own	  eyes	   to	  be	  a	  documentary,	   the	   film	   is	  more	  commonly	  categorised	  as	  an	  artwork,	  an	  avant-­‐garde	  or	  experimental	  film.	  I	  cite	   these	   examples	   as	   a	   foundation	   on	  which	   to	   base	   the	  discussion	   in	   order	   to	  demonstrate	   that,	   regardless	   of	   the	   status	   of	   a	   work,	   whether	   it	   is	   considered	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  See	   Brian	   Winston’s	   Claiming	   the	   Real	   (1995:	   8–14)	   for	   insight	   into	   the	   early	   use	   of	   the	  terminologies	   in	   film	   history	   and	   its	   preceding	   context	   outside	   film	   practice.	   The	   terms	  “documentary	   works”	   and	   “documentary	   materials”	   were	   both	   used	   as	   early	   as	   1914	   by	  photographer	   and	   filmmaker	   Edward	   Curtis.	   And	   the	   term	   “documentary”	   was	   defined	   as	   “the	  creative	   treatment	   of	   actuality”	   by	   John	   Grierson	   in	   the	   1930s.	   According	   to	   Winston,	   the	  Griersonian	  definition	  has	  its	  foundation	  in	  idealist	  philosophy.	  	  For	  further	  discussion	  of	  this,	  see	  Ian	   Aitken,	   Film	   and	   Reform:	   John	   Grierson	   and	   the	   Documentary	   Film	   Movement	   (London:	  Routledge,	  1992).	  9	  By	  “performance	  of	  objectification”	  I	  mean	  a	  deliberate,	  visible	  distancing	  from	  the	  object	  of	  study	  for	  aesthetic	  and	  political	  ends.	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documentary	  or	  art,	  the	  ethical	  challenges	  still	  remain.	  Yet	  interpretations	  of	  these	  challenges	  are,	  I	  argue,	  tied	  in	  with	  and	  complicated	  by	  expectations	  on	  the	  part	  of	  cultural	   consumers	   about	  what	   a	   documentary	   ‘ought’	   to	   do	   in	   either	   field.	   And	  these	   expectations	   are,	   I	   contend,	   rooted	   in	   historically	   conflicting	   ideas	   about	  what	  a	  documentary	  actually	  is,	  or	  what	  a	  documentary	  may	  be.	  	  
NAMING THINGS DOCUMENTARY: Critical Reflections  
	  When	  theorising	  about	  what	  a	  documentary	  is	  in	  his	  essay	  	  “What	  a	  Documentary	  Is,	   After	   All”,	   film	   scholar	   Carl	   Plantinga	   speaks	   of	   characterisation	   rather	   than	  definition.	  He	  does	  so	   in	   the	  context	  of	  normative	  documentary,	  or	  what	  he	  calls	  “typical	  or	  usual	  documentary”	  (Plantinga,	  2005:	  105).	  The	  problem,	  he	  says,	  is	  not	  with	   documentary	   itself,	   but	   with	   the	   “confused	   theories	   of	   documentary”	  (Plantinga,	   2005:	   106).	   To	   begin	   with,	   it	   cannot	   go	   unobserved	   that	   perceived	  divisions	   amongst	   the	   various	   approaches	   to	   documentary	   is	   the	   limiting	  characterisation	  of	  the	  term	  itself.	  	  In	   the	   early	   to	  mid-­‐1990s,	   documentary	   theorists	   like	  Michael	  Renov	   and	  Brian	   Winston	   observed	   that,	   as	   a	   term,	   genre,	   methodology,	   or	   practice,	   the	  ideation	   of	   what	   a	   documentary	   is,	   is	   historically	   conditioned.	   What	   does	   this	  mean,	  and	  how	  does	  historic	  conditioning	  affect	  both	  the	  reading	  and	  the	  reception	  of	   a	   film?	   Historically,	   documentary	   is	   burdened	   with	   an	   assumed	   equation	   to	  other	  “discourses	  of	  sobriety”,	   like	  that	  of	  science,	  or	  technology,	  presumed	  to	  be	  capable	   of	   (re)producing	   actuality,	   the	   real	   (Nichols,	   1991;	   2001).	   Bill	   Nichols,	  Trinh	  T.	  Minh-­‐ha,	  and	  Hito	  Steyerl	  are	  but	  some	  of	  the	  theorists	  who	  point	  out	  that	  by	   now,	   this	   assumption	   about	   documentary	   is	   also	   known	   to	   have	   perpetuated	  the	  myth	  of	  ‘truth’	  within	  wider	  ideological	  systems	  of	  power.	  Historical	  questions	  about	   truth	   and	  power	   in	   relation	   to	   documentary	   are	  however	  not	   the	   focus	   of	  this	  study.	  Instead,	  the	  nexus	  of	  this	  study	  situates	  itself	  at	  the	  particular	  point	  in	  very	   recent	   art	   history,	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   documentary	   turn.	   In	   order	   to	  contextualise	   this	   ‘turn’,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   revisit	   some	   of	   the	   critical	   literature	  related	  to	  the	  socio-­‐political	  status	  of	  documentary,	  its	  naming,	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	   art.	   Through	   this,	   I	   hope,	   a	   clearer	   overview	   will	   emerge	   of	   the	   continuing	  difficulties	   that	   exist	  when	  analysing	  documentary	  ethics	   in	   the	   context	  of	   art	  or	  otherwise.	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Having	  been	  brought	   to	   the	  wider	  public’s	  attention,	   the	  heyday	  of	   the	  so-­‐	  called	  documentary	   turn	   is	   often	  perceived	   to	  be	   around	  documenta	  11	   in	  2002,	  when	  curators	  like	  Okwui	  Enwezor	  and	  Mark	  Nash,	  amongst	  a	  number	  of	  other	  cultural	  producers,	   started	   presenting	   documentary	   films	   at	  major	   exhibitions,	   alongside	  moving	  image	  works	  that	  were	  rooted	  in	  fine	  art	  practice,	  but	  could	  be	  thought	  of	  as	   being	   driven	   by	   a	   wish	   to	   comment	   on	   a	  wider	   social	   or	   political	   reality	   (M.	  Nash,	  2008).	  10	  This	  type	  of	  work	  –	  previously	  referred	  to	  as	  “documentary”	  –	  was	  now	  in	  need	  of	  terminological	  reconfiguration.	  	  Presented	  as	  art	  in	  the	  context	  of	  exhibitions,	  the	  reading	  and	  reception	  of	  these	  works	  as	  documentary,	  and	  particularly	  the	  terminology	  developed	  around	  it,	   was	   fraught	   with	   expectations	   of	   what	   a	   documentary	   is	   or	   does.	   These	  expectations	   can	   be	   put	   down	   to	   not	   only	   inherited	   beliefs,	   but	   to	   historic	  conditioning	   in	   regard	   to	   documentary’s	   socio-­‐political	   purpose	   (Renov,	   1993).	  Critical	   evaluations	   of	   how	   documentaries	   function	   in	   the	   field	   of	   commercial	  television	  and	  “corporate	  documentarism”	  also	  enter	  into	  it	  (Steyerl,	  2011).	  What	  complicates	   things	   further	   is	   that	   the	  reception	  of	  documentary	  as	  art	   is	  not	   just	  burdened	  by	  preconceptions	  of	  what	  a	  documentary	  is,	  but	  also	  by	  what	  a	  work	  of	  art	   is	   or	   does	   (Enwezor,	   2004:	   98;	   Steyerl,	   2011).	   According	   to	   Steyerl,	   when	  reflecting	  on	  the	  relation	  of	  the	  two,	  “we	  have	  to	  face	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  barely	  know	  what	   we	   are	   talking	   about”,	   because	   viable	   definitions	   of	   either	   ‘art’	   or	  ‘documentary’	  remain	  limited	  (Steyerl,	  2011).	  Long	  before	   the	   ‘documentary	   turn’,	   earlier	   film	  historical	   precedents	   can	  be	  thought	  of,	  such	  as	   filmmakers	   Jean	  Rouch,	  Chris	  Marker,	  or	  Trinh	  T.	  Minh-­‐ha	  amongst	   others,	   who	   sought	   to	   deconstruct	   traditional	   conceptions	   of	  documentary.	  However,	   this	   study	   speaks	   from	   the	  particular	  position	  of	   the	   so-­‐called	   documentary	   turn.	   Viewed	   from	   this	   specific,	   contemporary	   position,	   the	  desire	   for	   a	   reconfigured	   characterisation	   of	   ‘documentary’	   is	   for	   example	  expressed	  by	  Harvard	  University’s	  Sensory	  Ethnography	  Lab	  (hereafter	  SEL).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  An	  earlier	   instance	  of	   the	  documentary	   film	  being	  presented	   in	   the	  art	   field	  was	  documenta	  X,	  curated	  by	  Catherine	  David	  in	  1997.	  Another	  instance	  curated	  by	  Catherine	  David	  and	  Jean-­‐Pierre	  Rehm	  in	  2003	  was	  [based	  upon]	  TRUE	  STORIES,	  organised	  in	  collaboration	  with	  International	  Film	  Festival	  Rotterdam	  and	  the	  International	  Documentary	  Film	  Festival	  of	  Marseille.	  Manifesta	  5	  (San	  Sebastian,	  2004)	  concentrated	  on	  works	  that	  “translate	  reality	  into	  enigmatic	  forms,	  owing	  less	  to	  rhetoric	  than	  to	  a	  carefully	  differentiated	  understanding	  of	  people’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  world.”	  See	  “Concept”:	   http://www.manifesta.es/	   [accessed	   25.01.2016]).	   Also	   in	   2004,	   curators	   Barbara	  Vanderlinden	  and	  Amy	  Huei	  Hua	  Cheng	  brought	  together	  artistic	  reflections	  on	  reality	  that	  are	  both	  “poetic	  and	  documentary	  in	  quality”	  for	  the	  Taipei	  Biennial,	  titled,	  Do	  You	  Believe	  in	  Reality?	  
	  	   33 
If	  one	  examines	  the	  SEL’s	  description	  (on	  their	  website)	  of	  the	  type	  of	  work	  they	  support,	   a	   desire	   becomes	   apparent	   to	   dissociate	   from	   existing	   terms	   like	   art,	  documentary,	   and	   visual	   anthropology	   so	   as	   to	   define	   a	   distinct	   disciplinary	  direction:	  	  	  [SEL]	  opposes	  the	  traditions	  of	  art	  that	  are	  not	  deeply	  infused	  with	  the	  real,	  those	   of	   documentary	   that	   are	   derived	   from	   broadcast	   journalism,	   and	  those	  of	  visual	  anthropology	  that	  mimic	  the	  discursive	  inclinations	  of	  their	  mother	  discipline	  (Sensory	  Ethnography	  Lab,	  n.d.).	  11	  	  	  But	  varying	  perceptions	  about	  what	  a	  documentary	  is,	  its	  role,	  or	  the	  challenge	  to	  name	   and	   characterise	   the	   documentary	   are	   by	   no	   means	   new. 12 Indeed,	  throughout	   the	   history	   of	   documentary,	   discourses	   concerning	   its	   ontology	   have	  challenged	   production	   methods	   and	   periodically	   caused	   formal	   innovation	   and	  aesthetic	  shifts	  within	  the	  field.	  For	  example,	  state	  sponsored	  documentary	  works	  during	   the	   Griersonian	   phase	   in	   the	   1930s	   claimed	   both	   the	   social	   purpose	   of	  public	   education,	   and	   personal	   expression	   as	   the	   distinguishing	   marks	   of	  documentary	  (Winston,	  1995:	  51).	  From	  the	  1960s	  onwards,	  the	  scientific	  claims	  of	   objectivity	   within	   the	   Direct	   Cinema	   movement	   were	   acquired	   through	  technological	   innovations	   with	   newly	   available	   portable	   and	   lightweight	   filming	  equipment.	   This	   too	   caused	   formal	   shifts.	   Simultaneously,	   the	   inclusion	   of	   self-­‐reflexive	  documentary	  filming	  modes	  (pioneered	  by	  the	  Cinéma	  Vérité	  movement	  during	   the	  same	  period)	   likewise	  eventuated	  critical	  reflections	  on	  documentary,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  aesthetic	  shift	  in	  the	  documentary	  form.	  In	  more	  recent	  years,	  the	  late	  Canadian	   documentarist	   Peter	   Wintonick,	   believing	   in	   the	   novelty	   of	   digital	  strategies,	   proclaimed:	   “For	   now,	   and	   forever,	   I	   am	   banishing	   the	   word	  documentary	   from	  our	   lexicon.	   I	   am	  replacing	   it	  with	  a	   contemporary	  word,	  one	  which	   reflects	   the	   future	   and	   the	   now.	   My	   new	   word	   is:	   docmedia”	   (Winston,	  Vanstone,	   &	   Chi,	   2017:	   vi).	   Today,	   the	   documentary	   field	   proliferates	   with	   an	  assortment	  of	  digital	  methods,	  each	  producing	  its	  own	  form	  of	  objectivity,	  such	  as	  “cyber-­‐docs,	  digidocs,	  transmedia	  docs,	  cross-­‐docs,	  cross-­‐media,	  360	  degree	  docs,	  netcast	  docs,	  interactive	  docs,	  3D-­‐docs,	  made-­‐for-­‐mobile	  docs”	  (Wintonick	  quoted	  in	  Winston	  et	  al.,	  2017:	  3).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  From	  https://sel.fas.harvard.edu/	  [accessed	  20.03.2016].	  12	  Nor	   are	   varying	   perceptions	   settled	   today,	   when	   one	   considers	   a	   wider,	   general	   viewership	  outside	  of	  the	  academic	  field.	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In	  summary,	  each	  critical	  period,	  and	  each	  adaptation	  in	  production	  modes,	  whether	  motivated	  by	  ideological	  concerns	  or	  technical	  innovations,	  has	  caused	  an	  aesthetic	   shift	   that	   in	   turn	   eventuated	   shifts	   in	   various	  modes	   of	   reception.	   But	  perhaps,	  most	   significantly,	   each	   shift,	   for	   a	   time,	   convincingly	   legitimated	   itself	  through	  the	  promise	  of	  ‘truth’,	  or	  the	  delivery	  of	  ‘objectivity’	  as	  methods	  for	  social	  reform.13	  To	  put	  the	  claim	  simply,	  the	  voices	  of	  the	  oppressed	  and	  the	  marginalised	  need	  not	  go	  unheard	  thanks	  to	  the	  continuous	  ‘improvement’	  of	  the	  documentary	  method	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  objective	  ‘truth’.	  Our	  expectation	  of	  what	  a	  documentary	  
is	  and	  does	  then	  is	  conditioned	  by	  these	  various	  formal	  and	  ideological	  strategies	  to	  “sell”	   a	   truth	   about	   one	   thing	   or	   another.	   The	   belief	   in	   documentary’s	   political	  efficacy	   is	   the	   abiding	   claim	   of	   the	   field.	   But	   in	   documentary	   film	   production,	  ‘reality’,	   the	   ‘real’,	   ‘truth’,	   ‘realism’	   as	   ideology	  was	   from	   the	  outset,	   and	   remains	  today	  an	  object	  ‘for	  sale’	  in	  the	  procurement	  of	  funds	  through	  sponsors	  –	  be	  they	  government,	  industry,	  institutional	  networks,	  or	  social	  science	  research	  (Winston,	  1995).	   In	   art	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   this	   procurement	   can	   be	   free	   from	   both	   the	  ideological	   assertion	   of	   truth	   or	   objectivity,	   as	  well	   as	   being	   free	   from	  having	   to	  assert	   any	   kind	   of	   certainty	   thereof	   in	   the	   formal	   construction	   of	   works.	   Hito	  Steyerl	   points	   out	   that	   “the	   uncertainty	   principle	   of	   modern	   documentarism”	  (Steyerl,	  2011),	  in	  relation	  to	  what	  is	  real,	  what	  is	  true,	  etc.,	  persists	  today	  not	  just	  through	  the	   instability	  of	  documentary	  pictures	   themselves,	  but	  also	   through	  the	  historically	  conflicting	  theory	  of	  documentary.	  Steyerl	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  since	  post-­‐structualism	   has	   furnished	   us	   with	   reasonable	   doubt	   in	   regards	   to	   the	  stability	  of	   truth	  claims,	   this	  uncertainty	  about	  what	   is	   true,	  what	   is	  real,	  what	   is	  fact,	  is	  not	  “some	  shameful	  lack,	  which	  has	  to	  be	  hidden,	  but	  instead	  constitutes	  the	  core	   quality	   of	   contemporary	   documentary	   modes	   as	   such”	   (Steyerl,	   2011;	  emphasis	  added).	  	  Similarly,	  and	  nearly	  two	  decades	  earlier,	  Michael	  Renov’s	  critical	  focus	  was	  on	   the	   value	  of	   “documentary’s	   delirious	   as	  well	   as	   its	   sober	   self”	   (Renov,	   1993:	  194).	   With	   the	   notion	   of	   documentary’s	   delirious	   self,	   Renov’s	   critical	   focus	  becomes	   a	   counter	   point	   to	   the	   association	   of	   documentary	   with	   other	   rational	  non-­‐fiction	   systems,	   like	   for	   example	   that	   of	   science,	   politics,	   economics,	   each	  believed	   to	   be	   a	   “sober”	   discourse	   (Renov,	   1993:	   195).	   Around	   the	   same	   time,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  For	   a	   discussion	   of	   documentary’s	   claim	   on	   evidentiary	   “objectivity”	   and	   its	   close	   relation	   to	  ideological	   systems	   of	   power,	   see	   Bill	   Nichols,	   Representing	   Reality	   (Bloomington:	   Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1991).	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filmmaker	  and	  theorist	  Trinh	  T.	  Minh-­‐ha	  echoed	  Renov’s	  call	  for	  a	  deconstruction	  of	   the	   dominant	   historical	   conditioning	   within	   the	   documentary	   realm	   for	  totalising	   functions	   and	   meanings,	   i.e.	   what	   documentary	   is	   and	   what	   it	   does.	  Finding	   support	   in	   Walter	   Benjamin’s	   concept	   of	   language,	   she	   attributes	   this	  totalisation	  to:	  	  	  (the)	   bourgeois	   conception	   of	   language,	   which	   holds	   that	   the	   means	   of	  communication	  is	  the	  word,	  its	  object	  factual,	  its	  addressee	  a	  human	  subject	  (the	  linear,	  hierarchical	  order	  of	  things	  in	  a	  world	  of	  reification);	  whereas,	  language	  as	  the	  ‘medium’	  of	  communication	  in	  its	  most	  radical	  sense,	  ‘only	  communicates	  itself	  in	  itself.’	  14	  The	  referential	  function	  of	  language	  is	  thus	  not	   negated,	   but	   freed	   from	   its	   false	   identification	   with	   the	   phenomenal	  world	   and	   from	   its	   assumed	  authority	   as	   a	  means	  of	   cognition	  about	   that	  world.	  (Minh-­‐ha,	  1990:	  78)	  	  In	  her	  essay	  “The	  Totalizing	  Quest	  of	  Meaning”,	  Minh-­‐ha	  denounces	  categorically	  that	   there	   is	   such	   a	   thing	   as	   documentary	   at	   all,	   never	   mind	   whether	   we	   are	  speaking	  of	   a	   technique,	   a	   genre,	   a	  material,	   or	   an	  approach.	  15	  She	   suggests	   that	  the	  difficulty	  in	  talking	  about	  the	  thing	  we	  call	  documentary	  may	  reside	  in	  the	  gap	  between	  a	  meaning	  of	  something	  and	  its	  truth.	  She	  calls	  this	  gap	  an	  “interval”,	  and	  insists	   that	   this	  gap	   is	  necessary	   for	  meaning	  not	   to	   remain	   “fixed”	  and	   for	   truth	  not	  to	  manifest	  as	  a	  solid	  unmovable	  mass	  (Minh-­‐ha,	  1990:	  76).	  Meaning,	  she	  says,	  can	  be	  political	   “only	  when	   it	  does	  not	   let	   itself	  be	   easily	   stabilized,	   and	  when	   it	  does	   not	   rely	   on	   any	   single	   source	   of	   authority,	   but,	   rather,	   empties	   or	  decentralizes	  it”	  (Minh-­‐ha,	  1990:	  89).	  Aside	  from	  asking	  how	  the	  real	  is	  produced,	  when	  questioning	  production	  relations	  for	  instance,	  Minh-­‐ha’s	  emphasis	  is	  on	  how	  truth	   is	   being	   ruled	   (Minh-­‐ha,	   1990:	   85).	   Recalling	   John	   Grierson’s	   early	  pronouncement	   about	   documentary	   as	   the	   “new	   and	   vital	   art	   form,”	   Minh-­‐ha	  reminds	   us	   that	   since	   its	   inception,	   documentary	   was	   considered	   an	   art	   form,	  albeit	  one	  that	  had	  to	  “bother”	  with	  “being	  right”,	  not	  “beautiful”	  (Minh-­‐ha	  quoting	  Grierson,	   1990:	   85).	  16	  	   Steyerl	   also	   problematises	   the	   production	   of	   ‘truth’	   in	  documentary	   as	   a	   form	   of	   governing.	   She	   draws	   on	   Foucault’s	   concept	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Minha-­‐ha	   is	   quoting	   from	  Benjamin’s	  One-­‐Way	  Street	  and	  Other	  Writings	   (London:	  NLB,	   1979:	  109).	  	  15 	  “The	   Totalizing	   Quest	   of	   Meaning”	   was	   published	   earlier	   in	   a	   condensed	   version	   as	  “Documentary	   Is/Not	   a	  Name”,	   in	  The	  Postcolonial	  Question:	  Common	  Skies,	  Divided	  Horizons,	  eds.	  Iain	  Chambers,	  Lidia	  Curti	  (London;	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1995).	  16	  Minh-­‐ha	  is	  quoting	  from	  Grierson	  On	  Documentary,	  ed.	  Forsyth	  Hardy	  (London:	  Faber	  and	  Faber,	  1966:	  249).	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governmentality	  as	   “a	   specific	   form	  of	  exercising	  power,	  which	  operates	   through	  the	  production	  of	  truth”	  (Steyerl,	  2003a).	  Steyerl	  comes	  to	  define	  “documentality”	  as	   something	   that	   “describes	   the	   complicity	  with	  dominant	   forms	  of	   a	  politics	  of	  truth,	   just	  as	  it	  can	  describe	  a	  critical	  stance	  with	  regard	  to	  these	  forms”	  (Steyerl,	  2003a;	  emphasis	  added).	  17	  What	  I	  am	  suggesting	  here	  with	  this	  research,	  and	  in	  particular	  with	   films	  like	  Land	  Without	  Bread	  [Las	  Hurdes]	  (Buñuel,	  1933)	  and	  Episode	  III:	  Enjoy	  Poverty	  (Martens,	  2008),	  an	  analysis	  of	  which	  follows	  in	  Part	  II,	  is	  this:	  each	  film	  in	  its	  own	  way	   performs	   “documentality”	   as	   a	   mode	   of	   resistance	   to	   a	   larger	   frame	   of	  dominance	   beyond	   the	   micro-­‐scales	   of	   the	   documentary	   or	   art	   fields.	   This	  performance	   is	   itself	   a	   critical	   position,	   and	   is	   demonstrated	   through	  purposeful	  and	  deliberate	  objectification.	  These	   films,	   I	  argue,	  mirror	   the	  relations	  of	  power	  and	   the	   truth-­‐seeking	   assertions	   of	   the	   ‘observer’	   as	   forms	   of	   critique	   to	   the	  inclusion	  of	   the	   viewer/critic.	   	   I	  will	   touch	  upon	   some	  examples	  briefly	   for	  now,	  some	  of	  which	  I	  will	  return	  to	  in	  later	  chapters.	  Luis	   Buñuel’s	   Land	  Without	   Bread	   documents	   people	   afflicted	   by	   hunger	  and	  disease	  in	  a	  remote	  part	  of	  1930s	  Spain.	  While	  the	  film	  mimics	  in	  its	  structure	  and	  delivery	  a	  standard	  type	  of	  ethnographic	  study,	  or	  as	  it	  would	  then	  be	  called,	  a	  travelogue,	   it	   is	   upon	   closer	   inspection	   abundant	   with	   critique	   and	   acts	   of	  destabilisation.	  	  Buñuel	  chose	  a	  ‘voice-­‐of-­‐god’	  delivery	  for	  the	  narration,	  which	  can	  be	  read	  as	  being	  deliberately	  condescending,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  absurdist	  at	   times.	  This	   tone,	   it	   could	   be	   argued,	   was	   adopted	   to	   comment	   critically	   on	   the	   quasi-­‐ethnographic	   writing	   in	   Maurice	   Legendre’s	   Las	   Jurdes:	   Etude	   de	   geographie	  
humaine	  (1927);	  at	  the	  time,	  head	  of	  the	  French	  Institute	  in	  Madrid.	  	  As	  for	  another	  brief	  example	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  at	  greater	  length	  in	  Part	  II,	   in	  Episode	  III:	  Enjoy	  Poverty,	   Renzo	  Martens	   enacts	   the	   role	  of	   a	   colonial	   style	  missionary	  and	   invents	  a	  multitude	  of	   strategies	   for	   the	   impoverished	  Congolese	  he	  encounters	  on	  his	  travels	  in	  The	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  the	  Congo	  to	  turn	  their	  own	  poverty	  into	  an	  income	  source.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  More	  recently,	  and	  in	  light	  of	  our	  so-­‐called	  post-­‐truth	  times,	  when	  fact	  and	  fiction	  are	  said	  to	  be	  indiscernible,	  theorist	  Erika	  Balsom	  argues	  passionately	  for	  the	  “rehabilitation”	  of	  objectivity.	  She	  finds	  evidence	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  this	  rehabilitation	  in	  the	  trust	  filmmakers	  place	  in	  the	  viewer	  to	  discern	  meaning,	  however	   incomplete	  or	  ambiguous	   the	   images	   they	  are	  presented	  with	  may	  be.	  Citing	  recent	  examples,	  like	  Jerome	  Everson’s	  Tonsler	  Park	  (2017),	  for	  Balsom,	  an	  expanded	  form	  of	  the	  observational	  documentary,	   in	  particular,	  may	   re-­‐establish	   the	  experience	  of	   reality	   and	  be	  a	  means	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  “cinema	  as	  window,	  however	  dirty	  and	  distorting	  its	  panes	  may	  be”	  (Balsom,	  2017).	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Another	  fitting	  example	  would	  be	  Johan	  Grimonprez’s	  Kobarweng	  or	  Where	  
is	   Your	  Helicopter?	   (Grimonprez,	   1992).	  Kobarweng	  or	  Where	   is	   Your	  Helicopter?	  assembles	  archive	   footage	  of	  a	   remote	  people	   from	  the	  highlands	  of	  New	  Guinea	  coming	  into	  first	  contact	  with	  an	  expedition	  of	  scientists	  including	  anthropologists.	  The	  film	  presents	  an	  absurdist	  ethnographic	  commentary	  in	  order	  to	  critique	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  observed	  by	  the	  observer.	  	  Indeed,	   clear-­‐cut	   definitions	   of	   these	  works	   as	   either	   documentary	   or	   art	  may	   be	   difficult	   to	   uphold.	   But	   it	   is	   equally	   difficult	   to	   ignore	   that	   undermining	  documentary	   conventions	   by	   design	   is	   the	   core	   critical	   function	   of	   the	  aforementioned	   films.	   Critical	   readings	   about	   how	   these	   works	   function,	   and	  assessments	   of	   their	   ethics,	  may	   then	   vary	  depending	  on	   the	   field	   in	  which	   they	  circulate.	  In	  2004,	  Steyerl	  summarised	  the	  status	  of	  documentary	  in	  art	  as	  follows:	  	  Since	   the	   early	   nineties	   there	   has	   been	   a	   succession	   of	   various	   waves	   of	  adaptations	   of	   documentary	   techniques	   in	   art,	   drawing	   on	   the	   fields	   of	  earlier	  photographic,	  film	  and	  textual	  documentarist	  styles	  (…)	  An	  interest	  in	   the	   formal	   specific	   characteristics	   of	   the	   documentary	   form	   in	   the	   art	  field	   has	   only	   recently	   begun	   (…)	   but	   has	   hardly	   taken	   place	   yet	   at	   the	  theoretical	  level.	  (Steyerl,	  2004:	  122)	  	  At	   the	   point	   of	   this	   “documentary	   turn”	   then,	   between	   the	  mid-­‐1990s	   and	   early	  2000s,	  as	  interest	  intensified	  both	  at	  the	  theoretical	  level	  and	  at	  the	  level	  of	  artistic	  production,	   a	   delineation	   seemed	   desirable	   in	   order	   to	   divorce	   the	   artistic	  reception	   of	   these	   works	   from	   the	   reception	   of	   documentaries	   in	   the	   wider	  broadcast	   media	   context	   and	   its	   historically	   fraught	   scientific-­‐truth-­‐claiming	  tradition.	  And	  this	   is	  where	  we	  seem	  to	  have	  settled	  with	  the	  term	  “artist’s	   film”,	  used	   predominantly	   in	   the	   UK	   (“artist-­‐made	   film”	   in	   the	   US)	   –	   a	   disciplinary	  practice	  which	  increasingly	  includes	  practitioners	  working	  with	  documentary	  as	  a	  critical	  practice.	  	  However,	  the	  naming,	  and	  the	  categorisation	  of	  these	  films	  remains	  context	  dependent,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   funding	   and	   of	   acquisition	   and	   distribution.	   For	  example,	  another	  of	  Grimonprez’s	  works,	  dial	  H-­‐I-­‐S-­‐T-­‐O-­‐R-­‐Y	  (Grimonprez,	  1997),	  is	  referenced	  as	  a	  documentary	  by	  Other	  Cinema,	  which	  later	  came	  to	  distribute	  the	  film	  through	  their	  Other	  Cinema	  Digital	  label;	  a	  video	  montage	  by	  the	  Tate,	  which	  acquired	  it	   for	  their	  collection	  (as	  did	  a	  number	  of	  other	  major	  arts	   institutions);	  and	  a	  video	  essay	  by	  the	  International	  Documentary	  Film	  Festival	  Amsterdam,	  one	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of	   the	  many	  documentary	   festivals	   the	   film	   screened	   at.	  Under	   the	   leadership	   of	  Catherine	  David,	   documenta	   X	   helped	   finance	   the	   completion	   of	   the	  work,	   along	  with	  Centre	  Georges	  Pompidou,	  where	   the	   film	  premiered.	  Additionally,	   the	   film	  was	  broadcast	  by	  major	  European	  channels,	  and	  by	  NBC	  Universal	  in	  the	  US.	  18	  	  But	   of	   course,	   however	   named,	   these	   ‘documentary-­‐like’	   works	   now	  circulating	  in	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  exhibition	  and	  distribution	  modes	  have,	  it	  can	  be	  argued,	  a	  much	  wider	  history,	   stretching	   for	   instance	   from	  the	  experimental	   film	  practices	  of	  the	  1920s	  through	  to	  the	  film	  coop	  movement	  in	  the	  1980s.	  We	  could	  arguably	   reach	   as	   far	   back	   as	   the	   very	   beginning	   of	   film	   history	   for	   earlier	  examples	  from	  which	  current	  adaptations	  of	  documentary	  techniques	  draw	  from.	  As	   Erika	   Balsom	   and	   Hila	   Peleg	   point	   out	   in	   their	   essay	   “The	   Documentary	  Attitude”,	  when	  looking	  beyond	  the	  so-­‐called	  documentary	  turn	  at	  documentary’s	  far	   reaching	   history,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   documentary	   did	   not	   require	   contemporary	  artists	   to	   “teach	   it	   creativity	   and	   reflexivity”	   (Balsom	   &	   Peleg,	   2016:	   18).	   And	  crucially,	   as	  Balsom	  and	  Peleg	   state,	  documentary	   is	  not	   a	   category	   legislated	  by	  “correct	   and	   incorrect	   definitions”,	   but	   it	   is	   a	   critical	   artistic	  method	   (Balsom	  &	  Peleg,	  2016	  :	  18).	  I	  will	  now	  turn	  to	  two	  examples,	  both	  of	  which	  demonstrate	  documentary’s	  historical	   relationship	   to	   art,	   regardless	   of	   their	   field	   specific	   categorisation	   or	  their	  terming.	  One	  is	  Louis	  Lumière’s	  1895	  A	  Boat	  Leaving	  Harbour	  [Barque	  sortant	  















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  See:	  http://www.winkleman.com/exhibitions/760/works/20079	  [accessed	  02.05.2016]	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THE LATENT FUTURE IN A NOTIONAL BEGINNING: 
A	  Boat Leaving Harbour [Barque sortant du port] (1895) 
 Documentary	  theorist	  Brian	  Winston	  once	  observed	  that	  documentary	  acquired	  its	  status	  and	   its	  naming	  as	  a	   ‘new’	   form	  –	  supposedly	  distinct	   from	  that	  of	   fiction	  –	  only	  when	  filmmaker	  Robert	  Flaherty	  began	  to	  structure	  the	  footage	  he	  filmed	  in	  a	  way	   that	  would	   satisfy	   the	   age-­‐old	  want	   for	   a	   beginning,	  middle,	   and	   end.	  19	  But	  what	  we	  understand	  a	  documentary	  to	  be,	  he	  says,	  precedes	  its	  naming,	  because	  at	  the	   inception	   of	   film	   history,	   cinema	   only	   had	   documentary	   material	   to	   screen.	  	  Since	   viewers,	   Winston	   claims,	   soon	   tired	   of	   purely	   observational	   reels	   of	   film	  (trains	  coming	   into	  stations;	  workers	  exiting	   factories;	  et	  al.),	  narrative	  structure	  was	   introduced.	   “But	   the	   need	   for	   structure	   implicitly	   contradicts	   the	   notion	   of	  unstructured	   actuality.	   The	   idea	   of	   documentary,	   then	   and	   now,	   is	   sustained	   by	  simply	   ignoring	   this	   contradiction”	   (Winston,	   1988:	   21).	   Additionally,	   this	  contradiction	  is	  complicated	  by	  contested	  views	  on	  when	  and	  how	  cinema	  became	  art.	  20	  One	   such	  very	  early	  work	  of	   cinema,	  Louis	  Lumière’s	  work	  A	  Boat	  Leaving	  
Harbour,	  represents	   –	   for	   some	  –	   the	  notional	  beginning	  of	  documentary;	   others	  cite	   it	   as	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   film	   arts	  more	   generally.	   As	  we	  will	   see,	   the	   film	  contains	  the	  contradiction	  present	  in	  “unstructured	  actuality”,	  as	  Winston	  puts	  it.	  To	   start	   with	   the	   form	   of	   A	   Boat	   Leaving	   Harbour,	   Lumière’s	   interest	   in	  actuality,	  the	  recording	  of	  real	  life	  from	  a	  static,	  fixed	  camera	  position,	  for	  instance,	  on	  closer	  investigation	  “reveals	  something	  more	  profound	  than	  mere	  technological	  limitation	  […].	  Form	  and	  content	  are	  inseparable”	  (Grimshaw,	  2001:	  18).	  The	  film	  depicts	  a	  group	  of	  men	  rowing	  a	  small	  boat	  out	   to	  sea	  past	  a	   jetty	  occupied	  by	  a	  group	   of	   onlookers.	   Two	   instances	   indicate	   to	   the	   viewer	   the	   participants’	  awareness	   of	   the	   camera,	   and	   this	   may	   be	   what	   qualifies	   the	   film,	   for	   some	  viewers,	  as	  a	  documentary	  rather	  than	  a	  work	  of	  fiction.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  The	  coining	  of	  the	  word	  “documentary”	  is	  generally	  credited	  to	  John	  Grierson,	  when	  referring	  to	  Flaherty’s	  film	  Moana	  as	  having	  “documentary	  value”	  in	  his	  review	  of	  the	  film	  for	  the	  New	  York	  Sun	  in	   1926.	   See	   B.	  Winston,	   “Documentary:	   I	   Think	  We	   Are	   in	   Trouble”,	   in	   A.	   Rosenthal	   (Ed.),	  New	  
Challenges	  for	  Documentary	  (Berkley;	  Los	  Angeles;	  London:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1988),	  p.	  21.	  	  	  20	  For	   a	   historical	   survey,	   see A.L. Rees,	  A	  History	  of	  Experimental	  Film	  and	  Video	   (London:	   BFI,	  1999).	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  Fig.	  1:	  A	  Boat	  Leaving	  Harbour	  [Barque	  sortant	  du	  port],	  1895,	  screenshot.	  	  First,	   a	  man	  at	   the	   tiller	  end	  of	   the	  boat,	  with	  his	  back	   to	   camera,	   looks	  over	  his	  shoulder.	   The	   second	  occurs	  when	  one	   of	   the	  women	  on	   the	   jetty	   turns	   around,	  and	   also	   appears	   to	   look	   towards	   the	   camera.	   Whether	   or	   not	   the	   scene	   is	  performed	  for	  the	  camera	  is	  not	  of	  interest	  to	  the	  discussion	  here,	  but	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  fifty-­‐odd	  second	  film,	  the	  rowers	  are	  overcome	  by	  the	  force	  of	  waves	  pushing	  them	  back	  towards	  the	  harbour.	  The	  film	  ends	  there.	  Though	  this	  example	  of	  early	  cinema	  may	  have	  been	  intended	  by	  Lumière	  as	  narrative	  fiction,	  because	  of	  the	  unintended	  outcome	  of	  the	  force	  of	  the	  waves,	  it	  ended	  up	  becoming	   something	  other	   than	  actions	   staged	   for	   the	   camera.	  As	   film	  editor	  and	  writer	  Dai	  Vaughan	  puts	  it:	  “What	  is	  different	  about	  A	  Boat	  Leaving	  the	  
Harbour	   is	   that,	  when	   the	   boat	   is	   threatened	   by	   the	  waves,	   the	  men	  must	   apply	  their	   efforts	   to	   controlling	   it;	   and,	   by	   responding	   to	   the	   challenge	   of	   the	  spontaneous	   moment,	   they	   become	   integrated	   into	   its	   spontaneity”	   (Vaughan,	  1999:	  5).	  By	  illustrating	  the	  “invasion	  of	  the	  spontaneous	  into	  the	  human	  arts”	  the	  film,	  I	  argue	  with	  Vaughan,	  accounts	  for	  one	  of	  the	  first	  instances	  of	  	  ‘documentary’	  coming	  to	  existence	  (Vaughan,	  1999:	  6).	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But	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   why	   our	   fascination	   with	   A	   Boat	   Leaving	  
Harbour	   has	   not	   diminished	   in	   over	   a	   hundred	   years	   since	   its	   making	   and	  exhibition,	  Vaughan	  proposes	  that	  we	  think	  of	  it	  not	  as	  “a	  notional	  first	  moment	  [of	  documentary,]	   but	   […]	   the	   future	   already	   latent”	   (Vaughan,	   1999:	   6).	   Vaughan	  speculates	   that	   the	   shock	   early	  moving-­‐picture	   audiences	  may	  have	   experienced	  was	  not	  due	  to	  the	  surprise	  of	  mechanical	  reproduction,	  but	  to	  the	  “invasion	  of	  the	  spontaneous”	   assuming	   the	   “character	   of	   a	   threat	   […	   to]	   the	   whole	   idea	   of	  controlled,	   willed,	   obedient	   communication”	   (Vaughan,	   1999:	   6).	   If,	   as	   Vaughan	  speculates,	  the	  unexpected	  ‘real’	  was	  indeed	  the	  source	  of	  the	  discomforting	  threat	  early	   cinema	   viewers	   experienced,	   I	  would	   like	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   attraction	   to	  documentary	  as	  ‘art’	  today	  is	  precisely	  the	  potential	  communicative	  disobedience	  has	  to	  engage	  viewers	  through	  its	  unsettled	  form.	  	  So	   far,	   I	   have	   discussed	   the	   diverse	   historical	   perceptions	   of	   what	   a	  documentary	  is	  and	  what	  a	  documentary	  does,	  its	  contentious	  categorisation,	  and	  its	   naming	   and	   assumed	   socio-­‐political	   purposes	   in	   order	   to	   illustrate	   the	  foundation	   on	   which	   contemporary	   perceptions	   of	   documentary	   resides.	  Additionally,	   I	   have	   begun	   to	   show	   that	   disobedient	   communication	   as	   artistic	  method	  was	  a	  core	  element	  of	  documentary	  already	  present	  at	   the	   foundation	  of	  film	  history.	  We	  may	  then	  have	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  strategies	  of	  resistance	  to	  the	  assumptions	  of	  objectivity	  and	  resistance	  to	  truth	  seeking	  are	  not	  an	  invention	  of	  recent	   artistic	   practices.	   Documentary	   from	   the	   outset	   destabilised	   assumptions	  about	  the	  real	  containing	  order,	  continuity,	  structure.	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  discuss	  how	   the	   objectification	   of	   the	   real	   can	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   one	   such	   form	   of	  disobedient	   communication.	   I	   then	  move	  on	   to	   the	  discomfort	  produced	   through	  the	  confrontation	  with	  such	   ‘disobedience’	  as	  a	   form	  of	  productive	  ethical	   labour	  on	  the	  part	  of	  filmmakers	  and	  viewers	  alike.	  With	  Stan	  Brakhage’s	  The	  Act	  of	  Seeing	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DOCUMENTARY AS DISOBEDIENT COMMUNICATION: 
The Act of Seeing with one’s own eyes (1971) 
 Perhaps	   surprisingly,	   Stan	   Brakhage	   considered	   his	   films	   to	   be	   documentaries,	  even	   though	   his	   body	   of	   work	   is	   otherwise	   more	   widely	   discussed	   and	   termed	  under	   the	   rubric	   of	   experimental	   and	   avant-­‐garde	   film.	   “I	   think	   of	   my	   films	   as	  documentaries.	   I	  never	   fantasize	   […].	   I	  am	  always	  struggling	   to	  get	  an	  equivalent	  on	  film	  to	  what	  I	  actually	  see”	  (Brakhage,	  1983:	  199–203).	  	  Much	   less	   frequent	   in	  his	  oeuvre	  however	  are	   films	  such	  as	  Wonder	  Ring	  (1955)	  and	  The	  Pittsburgh	  Documents	  (also	   referred	   to	   as	  The	  Pittsburgh	  Trilogy).	  These	  films	   can	   reasonably	   be	   classified	   under	   the	   term	   documentary,	   because	   their	  subject	  matter	  is	  the	  actual,	  visible	  world	  (Renov,	  2007b).	  To	  give	  an	  example,	  one	  of	  the	  three	  films	  in	  Brakhage’s	  Pittsburgh	  Trilogy,	  The	  Act	  of	  Seeing	  with	  one’s	  own	  
eyes	   (1971)	   is	   a	   graphic,	   meticulously	   observed,	   and	   at	   times	   anxious	  documentation	   of	   bodies	   undergoing	   autopsy.	  21	  The	  Act	  of	  Seeing	  with	  one’s	  own	  
eyes	  runs	  just	  over	  30	  minutes	  and	  is	  silent.	  Much	  of	  the	  film	  is	  framed	  in	  close-­‐up,	  so	   there	   are	   only	   very	   few	  occasions	  when	   the	   identity	   of	   a	   body,	   or	   that	   of	   the	  personnel	   performing	   the	   autopsy,	   is	   at	   risk	   of	   being	   recognised.	   Brakhage	   is	  attentive	   to	  bodily	  details,	   and	   significantly	   to	  procedure.	   For	   example,	   he	  keeps	  returning	   to	   the	   image	   of	   the	   cut	   facial	   tissue	   folded	   over	   the	   head	   section	   of	  various	  bodies.	  There	  are	  reoccurring	  depictions	  of	  male	  genitalia,	  too.	  Hands,	  both	  of	   the	   dead	   being	   autopsied	   and	   of	   live	   ones	   handling	   the	   bodies,	   also	   feature	  prominently.	   The	   white-­‐coated	   staff	   in	   the	   autopsy	   room	   are	   shown	   weighing,	  measuring,	   examining	   the	   materiality	   of	   body	   parts.	   Brakhage’s	   meticulous	  observation	   of	   the	   various	   procedures	   during	   autopsy,	   his	   focus	   on	   particular	  details,	   the	   objectification	   of	   the	   real	   present	   in	   this	   meticulous	   observation	   of	  materiality,	   invites	   us	   to	   reflect	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   life,	   on	   identity,	   and	   on	  responsibility.	   These	   reflections	   arise	   from	   the	   choice	   of	   framing	   and	   in	   the	  repetition	  of	   images.	  The	  repetitions	  may	  be	   read	  as	  an	   invitation	   for	  viewers	   to	  see	   and	   think	   with	   Brakhage.	   What	   I	   see	   in	   Brakhage’s	   images,	   in	   his	   way	   of	  ‘seeing’,	   is	   astonishment,	   or	   perhaps	   surprise.	   His	   images	   appear	   curious,	   as	  Brakhage	  searches	  for	  the	   ‘spontaneous’	  that	  characterises	  documentary.	  I	  would	  argue	  then	  that	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  that	  this	  film	  is	  a	  form	  of	  disobedient	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The	   other	   two	   films	   in	   the	   trilogy	   are	  Eye	   and	  Deus	  Ex.	   All	   three	   films	   document	   institutional	  apparatuses:	  police	  work,	  hospital	  activities,	  and	  the	  autopsy	  room,	  and	  they	  were	  all	  shot	  in	  1971.	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communication:	   the	  often	   ‘abstracted’	   closeness	  with	  which	  Brakhage	   frames	  his	  images,	   the	  unsteady	   camera,	   the	   repetition,	   the	  absence	  of	   any	   sound	  elements,	  and	  most	  significantly,	  the	  refusal	  to	  explain.	  The	  Act	  of	  Seeing	  with	  one’s	  own	  eyes	  is	  mute,	  yet	  its	  silence	  is	  eloquent.	  This	  makes	  room	  for	  and	  invites	  the	  viewer	  to	  participate	  by	  making	  their	  own	  connections.	  	  Questions	  about	  why	  viewers,	  or	  indeed	  Brakhage	  himself,	  regard	  the	  work	  as	  art	  or	  as	  documentary	  become	  secondary	  to	  the	  significant	  connections	  made	  in	  the	  formal	  construction	  between	  the	  duty	  of	  care	  when	  recording	  the	  real,	  and	  the	  handling	   of	   bodies	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   pathologists.	   A	   comparison	   between	  Brakhage’s	   detailed	   observation	   and	   the	   pathologists’	   measuring	   becomes	  inevitable.	   To	   whom	   we	   are	   responsible	   (in	   our	   measuring	   and	   documenting)	  becomes	  magnified	  through	  the	  status	  of	   the	  autopsied	  bodies	  as	  non-­‐being.	  And	  with	  that,	  the	  screen’s	  contract	  with	  its	  viewer	  begins	  to	  take	  precedence.	  	  	  Talking	   generally	   about	   the	   agency	   of	   film,	   Hollis	   Frampton	   proposes	   to	  consider	   “film	   not	   from	   the	   outside,	   as	   a	   product	   to	   be	   consumed,	   but	   from	   the	  inside,	  as	  a	  dynamically	  evolving	  organic	  code	  directly	  responsive	  and	  responsible,	  like	  every	  other	  code,	  to	  the	  supreme	  mediator:	  consciousness”	  (Frampton,	  2009:	  155).	   A	   beautifully	   worded	   letter	   from	   Frampton	   to	   Brakhage	   contains	   both	   a	  critical	  charge	  and	  an	  insightful	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  The	  
Act	  of	  Seeing	  with	  one’s	  own	  eyes:	  	  	   […]	   for	   the	   camera	   would	   seem	   the	   perfect	   Eidetic	  Witness,	   staring	   with	  perfect	   compassion	  where	  we	  can	   scarcely	  bear	  a	   glance.	  What	  was	   to	  be	  done	   in	   that	   room,	  Stan?	  And	   then,	   later	  with	   the	   footage?	   I	   think	   it	  must	  have	  been	  mostly	  to	  stand	  aside;	  to	  ‘clear	  out’,	  as	  much	  as	  possible,	  with	  the	  baggage	  of	  your	  own	  expectations,	  even,	  as	  to	  what	  a	  work	  of	  art	  must	  look	  like;	  and	  to	  see,	  with	  your	  own	  eyes,	  what	  coherence	  might	  arise	  within	  a	  universe	  for	  which	  you	  could	  decree	  only	  the	  boundaries.	  […]	  this	  film	  is	  the	  first	  completely	  clear	  enunciation	  (to	  my	  hearing)	  of	  the	  ‘family’	  name	  of	  a	  process	  within	  thought	  that	  may	  have	  other	  ‘given’	  names.	  […]	  Decades	  ago,	  Ezra	  Pound	  wrote	   that	   the	  most	   intense	   criticism	   is	   in	  new	  composition.	   I	  think	  this	  work	  merits	  intense	  criticism;	  and	  that	  is	  what	  we	  shall	  all	  of	  us,	  willy-­‐nilly,	  have	  to	  undertake.	  (Frampton,	  2009:	  158)	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  Fig.	  2:	  The	  Act	  of	  Seeing	  with	  one’s	  own	  eyes,	  1971,	  film	  strip.	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  Fig.	  3:	  The	  Act	  of	  Seeing	  with	  one’s	  own	  eyes,	  1971,	  film	  strip.	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If	  the	  task	  of	  criticism	  for	  film	  viewers	  and	  filmmakers	  alike	  is	  to	  be	  responsive	  to	  and	   through	   new	   composition,	   then	   both	   co-­‐inhabit	   the	   space	   of	   responsibility.	  Bringing	  into	  question	  the	  effect	  The	  Act	  of	  Seeing	  with	  one’s	  own	  eyes	  would	  have	  on	  surviving	  relatives	  of	  the	  autopsied	  persons,	  Bill	  Nichols	  writes:	  	  	   The	  camera	  gazes.	   It	  presents	  evidence	  destined	   to	  disturb.	  This	  evidence	  cries	   out	   for	   argument,	   some	   interpretive	   frame	   within	   which	   to	  comprehend	   it.	  Nowhere	   is	   this	  need	  more	  acutely	   felt	   than	   in	  a	   film	   that	  refuses	  to	  provide	  any	  explanatory	  commentary	  whatsoever	  (though	  it	  does	  have	  a	  perspective	  and	  style):	  Stan	  Brakhage’s	  The	  Act	  of	  Seeing	  with	  one’s	  
own	  eyes.	  (Nichols,	  1991:	  81)	  	  I	   would	   argue	   that	   the	   “argument”,	   the	   questions	   the	   work	   raises,	   and	   its	  “interpretive	  frame”,	  are	  all	  embedded	  in	  the	  audio-­‐visual	  scheme	  of	  the	  film,	  in	  its	  perspective	  as	  well	  as	  its	  style.	  The	  lack	  of	  commentary,	  the	  non-­‐diegetic	  silence	  of	  the	  work	  (there	   is	  no	  audio),	  may	  be	  designed	  to	  put	   this	   interpretive	   frame,	   the	  responsibility	  to	  respond,	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  viewer.	  The	  film	  therefore	  enables	  a	  collective	   questioning,	   with	   Brakhage,	   with	   the	   work,	   with	   oneself	   and	   other	  viewers,	   as	   an	   open-­‐ended	   process	   –	   a	   way	   of	   thinking	   through	   questions	   of	  identity,	  procedure,	  and	  responsibility	  together.	  Brakhage’s	  refusal	  to	  provide	  any	  commentary,	   let	   alone	   an	   explanatory	   frame	   by	   which	   to	   guide	   the	   viewer	   is,	   I	  argue,	  a	  form	  of	  disobedient	  communication	  that	  for	  some	  may	  be	  discomforting,	  unethical	   even,	   but	   which	   for	   me	   provides	   exactly	   the	   “clear	   enunciation”	  Frampton	   speaks	   of:	   sitting	   in	   silence	   I	   can	   hear	   myself	   think.	   Albeit,	   under	  discomforting	   conditions.	  The	  weight	  of	   this	  discomfort	  with	  what	   I	   ‘hear’	   of	  my	  thoughts	   in	   the	  presence	  of	  muteness	  and	   in	  response	  to	  what	   I	   too	  see	  with	  my	  own	   eyes	   is,	   I	   argue,	  my	   responsibility	   as	  much	   as	   it	   is	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	  filmmaker.	  To	  summarise	  what	  has	  been	  discussed	  so	   far,	   the	  development	  of	  critical	  discussions	   in	   the	   categorisation	   of	   documentary	   (its	   naming	   and	   its	   ideological	  function)	  demonstrate	  documentary’s	  historical	  and	  continuing	  relationship	  to	  art.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  discussion	  of	  documentary,	  like	  its	  companion	  term	  ‘truth’,	  or	  indeed	   the	   term	   ‘real’,	   turns	  out	  on	   closer	   inspection	   to	  be	   troubled	  by	   a	   lack	  of	  consensus	  or	  agreement	  as	  to	  what	  the	  term	  actually	  means,	  what	  it	  is	  constituted	  of,	   what	   is	   permissible	   for	   its	   qualification.	   Consequently,	   a	   variety	   of	   other	  reformulations	   have	   been	   sought	   by	   documentary	   theorists,	   such	   as	   “non-­‐fiction	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film”	   by	   Michael	   Renov,	   or	   “docmedia”	   by	   Peter	   Wintonick.	   In	   the	   art	   context,	  “documentary-­‐style	  works”	  is	  also	  spoken	  of,	  and	  more	  recently,	  the	  term	  “artists’	  documentary”	   has	   made	   an	   appearance	   in	   curatorial	   statements	   and	   press	  releases.	  Films	  have	  been	  described	  as	  having	  documentary	  value	  (Grierson,	  1966:	  13),	   documentary	   quality	   (Amor,	   1997;	   Aufderheide,	   2007;	   Bruzzi,	   2006a),	   or	   a	  documentary	   impulse	   (Bruzzi,	   2006b;	   Gunning,	   1999;	   Nichols,	   2001a,	   2017;	  Renov,	   1993;	   Rosler,	   2010).	   The	   problem	   with	   defining	   documentary,	   I	   would	  argue,	  resides	  in	  part	  with	  the	  larger	  problem	  of	  language	  and	  naming	  as	  a	  means	  of	   providing	   epistemological	   certainty.	   And	   it	   is	   perhaps	   through	   the	   study	   of	  documentary	   in	   the	   art	   field	   that	   the	   question	   of	   epistemology	   has	   been	   able	   to	  emerge	  anew,	  through	  a	  re-­‐questioning	  of	  truth,	  power,	  ethics,	  and	  reality	  (Steyerl,	  2005).	  	  Finally,	   I	  want	   to	   take	   Brakhage’s	   insistence	   on	   referring	   to	   his	  works	   as	  documentaries	  as	  a	  guiding	  reason	  to	  propose	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  to	  encompass	  artistic	  practices	   that	   include	   the	  real,	  or	   reality	  objects,	  as	  part	  of	  their	   formal	   and	   expressive	   filmic	   construction,	   regardless	   of	   the	   term’s	   historic	  baggage,	   or	   the	   context	   in	   which	   a	   work	   is	   seen.	   This	   is	   because	   I	   see	   in	   the	  difficulty	   of	   naming,	   and	   in	   conflicting	   ideations	   of	   what	   a	   documentary	   is,	   the	  discursive	  potential	  to	  continuously	  reformulate	  what	  documentary	  does,	  or	  ought	  
to	   do,	   in	   either	   field.	   Ontological	   assumptions	   may	   continuously	   be	   unsettled	  through	  new	  composition,	  and	  through	  the	  cross-­‐pollination	  from	  one	  field	  to	  the	  other.	   Consequently,	   in	   this	   unsettled	   status,	   documentary	   as	   a	   method	   has	   the	  potential	   to	   continuously	   renew	   its	   critical	   perspective	   on	   truth,	   power,	   and	  crucially	  on	  ethics,	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  contemporary	  moment	   in	  which	   it	  operates.	  Having	   built	   my	   argument	   so	   far	   on	   the	   value	   of	   the	   unclassifiable,	   and	   on	  disobedient	  communication	  as	  a	  critical	  potential	  for	  documentary,	  I	  want	  to	  now	  consider	  objectification	   in	  documentary	  and	  examine	   the	  value	  of	   the	  discomfort	  generated	  as	  a	  form	  of	  productive	  ethical	  labour.	  In	  this	  next	  section,	  I	  analyse	  two	  films:	  Land	  Without	  Bread	  (1933)	  and	  Episode	  III:	  Enjoy	  Poverty	  (2008).	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  objectification	  is	  central	  to	  the	  critical	  method	  of	  both	  works.	  They	  solicit	  an	  ethical	   response	   in	   the	   viewer	   through	   the	   production	   of	   discomfort	   with	  objectification.	   The	   process	   of	   soliciting	   and	   causing,	   as	   well	   as	   engaging	   and	  responding	  to	  discomfort,	  amounts	  to	  what	  is	  here	  called	  “ethical	  labour”.	  I	  argue	  that	  since	  both	   filmmakers	  and	  viewers	  come	  to	  engage	  and	  confront	  each	  other	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through	  ethical	  labour,	  this	  process	  is	  productive.	  And	  this	  is	  the	  central	  purpose	  of	  the	  works	  analysed	  here.	  	  
 
PART II 	  
ON DISCOMFORT AND ETHICAL LABOUR:  
Land without Bread (1933) & Episode III: Enjoy Poverty (2008) 	  Documentary	  practice	  deals	  with	  the	  social	  world,	  live	  situations,	  ‘real’	  things.	  The	  process	  of	  objectifying	  the	  real,	  as	  I	  formulate	  it,	  pertains	  to	  thinking	  of	  the	  social	  world	  as	  an	  object	  and	  putting	  it	  in	  the	  service	  of	  artistic	  activity.	  This	  can	  create	  an	  ethical	  challenge.	  Indeed	  thinking	  of	  the	  ‘real’	  as	  an	  ‘object’,	  and	  of	  documentary	  material	   as	   a	   resource,	   can	   be	   discomforting.	   As	   noted	   earlier,	   beyond	  documentary’s	   status	   in	   the	   market	   place	   as	   an	   art	   object,	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  documentary	  film	  can	  manifest	  as	  an	  object	  through	  the	  objectification	  process	  are	  challenging	  to	  pinpoint.	  It	  can	  be	  experienced	  affectively	  however;	  it	  can	  be	  felt.	  Sometimes	  visible,	  sometimes	  implied,	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  an	   ‘object	  relation’	  becomes	  palpable	  is	  in	  the	  relationship	  that	  creates	  the	  work.	  As	  viewers,	  where	  a	  discomforting	   relation	   is	   detected,	   we	   tend	   to	   address	   such	   occasions	   as	  ‘problematic’.	  The	  first	  problem,	  it	  could	  be	  suggested,	  arises	  with	  the	  designation	  of	   value	  when	  defining	   an	   object	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   a	   subject.	   For	   example,	   in	   an	   effort	   to	  designate	  value	  through	  language,	  we	  normally	  speak	  of	  documentary	  subjects,	  not	  documentary	  objects.	  As	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  second	  problem	  arises	  with	  what	  exactly	   is	  meant	  by	   the	  word	   ‘documentary’.	  Whether	   regarded	  as	  art	  works	   or	   documentaries,	   I	   propose	   that	   one	   paradigm	   by	   which	   to	   study	   the	  critical	  stance	  of	  the	  films	  discussed	  here	  is	  to	  consider	  how	  the	  relationship	  of	  the	  filmmakers	   to	   both	   the	   material	   and	   the	   viewer	   is	   manifest	   in	   the	   works	  themselves.	  	  Two	  well-­‐known	  examples	   that	   lend	   themselves	   very	  well	   to	   the	   study	  of	  the	  ethical	  aspect	  of	  discomfort	  include	  Luis	  Buñuel’s	  Land	  Without	  Bread	  (1933)	  and	  Renzo	  Marten’s	  Episode	  III:	  Enjoy	  Poverty	  (2008).	  Both	  films	  are	  discomforting	  to	   watch,	   because	   of	   the	   apparently	   dissociative,	   or	   unsympathetic	   ways	   with	  which	  the	  filmmakers	  appear	  to	  be	  dealing	  with	  the	  systemic	  conditions	  of	  poverty	  each	   of	   the	   films	   examine.	   The	   empathic	   treatment	   as	   dramatic	   plotting	   that	  viewers	   are	   oftentimes	   accustomed	   to	   in	   social-­‐issue	   documentaries,	   and	   that	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present	   those	   affected	   by	   economic,	   political,	   or	   social	   injustices,	   is	   intentionally	  omitted	  in	  both	  of	  these	  films.	  	  What	  Buñuel	  himself	  describes	  as	  a	  “filmed	  essay	  in	  human	  geography”	  22	  is	  a	  surreal	  take	  on	  documentary	  or	  ethnographic	  travelogues	  of	  the	  time.	  Formally,	  the	  film	  mirrors	  the	  kind	  of	  documentary	  that	  features	  tales	  of	  distant	  places,	  and	  mysterious,	  unknown	  peoples,	  accompanied	  by	  a	  distanced,	  matter-­‐of-­‐fact,	  voice-­‐of-­‐god	  narration.	  23	  	  
Land	  Without	  Bread	   [Las	  Hurdes],	  was	   shot	   in	   the	   remote	  western	  part	   of	  Spain	   in	   1932.	   It	   chronicles	   the	   social	   conditions	   of	   its	   time,	   the	   welfare	   of	   its	  people	  neglected,	  and	  how	  they	  fend	  for	  themselves	  in	  the	  inhospitable	  mountain	  region	   without	   adequate	   government	   subsidies	   or	   educational	   and	   health	   care	  provisions.	  24	  Their	  poverty	  is	  so	  great,	  “bread	  was	  unknown”	  in	  the	  region	  “until	  recently”	   (1933).	  25	  Given	   that	  variants	  of	  bread	   formed	  part	  of	   the	  staple	  diet	  of	  many	   early	   civilisations,	   this	   part	   of	   the	   narration	   made	   early	   in	   the	   film,	   that	  bread	  was	  unknown,	  may	  initially	  arouse	  the	  viewer’s	  suspicion	  as	  to	  the	  narrator’s	  reliability.	  It	  is	  very	  possible	  that	  bread	  may	  have	  been	  scarce,	  or	  unavailable,	  but	  for	  bread	  to	  be	  unknown	  seems	   improbable.	  The	  narrator	  seems	  unreliable.	  This	  lack	   of	   reliability	   then	   forms	   a	   vital	   part	   of	   the	   film’s	   critical	  method	   (Sobchack,	  1998).	   In	  ethnographic	   criticism,	  opinions	  are	  divided.	  Whilst	   some	  scholars	   like	  James	   Clifford	   advocate	   fragmentation	   and	   juxtapositions	   that	   jeopardise	   an	  explanatory	   unity	   of	   the	   real	   (Clifford,	   1981),	   anthropologist	   and	   historian	  Nicholas	   Thomas	  warns	   that	   “ethnographic	   surrealism	  will	   fetishize	   the	   strange	  and	   bizarre	   to	   the	   point	   of	   denigration”	   (Thomas,	   1994:	   26).	   Buñuel’s	   satirical	  objectification	  of	   the	   real	  may	   indeed	  be	  discomforting	   to	   some	  viewers,	   and	   for	  Thomas,	  Land	  Without	  Bread	  maintains	  a	  colonial	  stance	  in	  its	  reductive	  portrayal	  of	  the	  people	  it	  depicts	  (Thomas,	  1994).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Luis	  Buñuel,	  Land	  Without	  Bread	  (1933).	  Quoted	  from	  on-­‐screen	  caption.	  	  23	  The	   film	  was	   originally	   silent,	   but,	   according	   to	   Francisco	  Aranda,	   during	   its	   first	   screening	   in	  Madrid	  in	  1933,	  it	  was	  accompanied	  by	  live	  music	  with	  Buñuel	  reciting	  the	  narration.	  See	  F.	  Aranda,	  
Luis	  Buñuel:	  A	  Critical	  Biography,	  trans.	  David	  Robinson	  (London:	  Secker	  and	  Warburg,	  1975),	  p.	  93.	  24	  For	  a	  very	  insightful	  historical	  look	  into	  the	  cultural	  and	  political	  framework	  of	  Spain	  and	  the	  Las	  Hurdes	   region	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   work,	   see	   Jordana	   Mendelson,	   Documenting	   Spain:	   Artists,	  
Exhibition	  Culture,	  and	  the	  Modern	  Nation	  1929–1939	   (Pennsylvania:	   Penn	  State	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  pp.	  65–92.	  25	  The	  quote	  is	  from	  the	  film’s	  voiceover	  narration	  at	  07:25	  min.	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  Fig.	  4	  &	  5:	  Land	  Without	  Bread	  [Las	  Hurdes],	  1933,	  film	  stills.	  	  	  
	  	   51 
An	   introductory	   speech	   by	   Buñuel	   made	   at	   the	   film’s	   initial	   screening	   in	  1933	  provides	  however	  another	  perspective.	  26	  Buñuel	  spoke	  of	  being	  attracted	  to	  the	  “terrible	  poetry”	  of	  human	  beings	  “fighting	  against	  a	  hostile	  environment	  and	  that	   they	   were	   doing	   it	   without	   hope	   to	   succeed.”	  27	  Far	   from	   considering	   the	  situation	   in	   the	   Las	   Hurdes	   region	   an	   “embarrassment”	  28	  to	   Spain,	   Buñuel	   –ostensibly,	  but	  not	  literally,	  the	  narrator	  of	  the	  film	  –	  it	  seems	  believed	  its	  peoples’	  resilience	  to	  their	  adverse	  conditions,	  and	  their	  persistence	  to	  remain	  there,	  to	  be	  “mysterious”.	  29	  His	   admiration	   is	   evident	   in	   the	  wording	   of	   his	   speech.	   The	   film	  was	   initially	  banned	  by	  the	  Spanish	  government.	   It	  was	   later	  dubbed	  into	  French	  and	   English	   under	   Buñuel’s	   supervision,	   screening	   both	   in	   Paris	   and	   London	   in	  1936	  (Pavlović	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  	  Whilst	  these	  are	  the	  versions	  of	  the	  film	  available	  to	  us	   today,	   I	   am	   suggesting	   that	   the	   character	   and	   tone	   of	   the	   piece	   was	   already	  present	  in	  the	  silent	  version,	  through	  Buñuel’s	  introductory	  reading.	  His	  choice	  of	  words,	   the	   juxtaposing	  of	   “terrible”	  with	   “poetry”,	   for	   example,	   in	  describing	   the	  conditions	   of	   life	   for	   the	   Hurdanos	   –	   though	   dramatically	   expressed	   –	   point	  nonetheless	  towards	  a	  relationship	  borne	  of	  respect.	  One	  could	  be	  tempted	  to	  say	  that	  viewers,	  uninitiated	  to	  surrealist	  humour	  and	  documentary	  or	  ethnographic	  criticism,	  may	  be	  forgiven	  for	  not	  picking	  up	  on	  Buñuel’s	  sympathetic	  attitude	  towards	  the	  Hurdanos	  when	  encountering	  the	  film	  itself.	  Without	  his	  explanatory	  speech,	  the	  voice	  over	  narration	  appears	  cruel	  in	  its	  voiced	   description	   of	   the	   images.	  30	  There	   is	   a	   perplexing	   discord	   between	   the	  images	   and	   sound,	  which	   are	   discomforting	   in	   their	   contradiction,	   exaggeration,	  and	  purposeful	  disregard	  for	  linguistically	  expressed	  social	  manners	  –	  both	  speech	  related	   and	   filmic	   language.	   For	   example,	   set	   to	   Brahms’s	   Fourth	   Symphony,	   we	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  A	  copy	  of	  Buñuel’s	   text	   is	  dated	  1940	  by	  Filmoteca	  Española,	  Madrid.	  Elsewhere,	   the	  speech	   is	  referenced	  as	  being	  read	  by	  Buñuel	  in	  Madrid	  in	  1933	  and	  also	  at	  the	  MacMillan	  Academic	  Theater	  in	   New	   York,	   18	   March	   1940.	   See	   V.	   Sobchack,	   Synthetic	   Vision:	   The	   Dialectical	   Imperative	   of	  
Buñuel’s	  Las	  Hurdes,	  MFJ	  No.7/8/9	  (Fall/Winter	  1980–81),	  pp.	  140–50.	  And	  I.	  Gibson,	  Luis	  Buñuel,	  
la	  forja	  de	  un	  cineasta	  universal	  1900–1938	  (Madrid:	  Aguilar,	  2013).	  27	  From	   an	   original	   document	   in	   Spanish	   sourced	   from	   the	   Archivo	   Buñuel,	   Filmoteca	   Española,	  Madrid.	  Land	  without	  Bread,	  Archivo	  Buñuel/1486,	  Filmoteca	  Española,	  Madrid.	  	  See:	   http://catalogos.mecd.es/RAFI/cgi-­‐rafi/abnetopac/O14088/IDb6959bc8/NT3	   [accessed	  15.11.2015].	  	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  Andrea	  Márquez	  for	  providing	  me	  with	  an	  English	  translation	  of	  this	  text,	  and	  to	  Luciano	  Zubillaga	  for	  a	  second	  opinion	  of	  the	  translation.	  An	  English	  translation	  of	  the	  text	   exists	   at	   Filmoteca	  Española,	   but	   the	   archive	   is	   unable	   to	   confirm	   the	   author.	   In	   places,	   this	  translation	  is	  slightly	  different	  to	  the	  ones	  quoted	  herein.	  28	  Ibid.	  29	  Ibid.	  30	  I	  am	  referring	  here	  to	  the	  English	  voice-­‐over	  version.	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hear:	  “At	  the	  entrance	  of	  the	  town	  we	  are	  welcome	  by	  a	  quire	  of	  idiots.	  Most	  of	  the	  inhabitants	   are	   sick	   and	   live	   in	   misery.”	   Commenting	   on	   the	   presumably	   worn	  appearance	  of	  a	  breast-­‐feeding	  woman,	  who	  is	  seen	  smiling,	  and	  looking	  directly	  at	  the	   camera:	   “This	  woman	   is	   not	   yet	   32	   years	   old”.	   These	   statements	   are	   briskly	  delivered.	  Within	   the	   first	   three	  minutes	   of	   the	   film	   the	  word	   “barbaric“	   is	   used	  twice.	  Once	  referring	  to	  the	  beheading	  of	  a	  rooster	  in	  a	  ritual	  performed	  for	  newly-­‐weds,	   and	   again	  when	   referring	   to	   Christian	   pendants	   decorating	   an	   infant	   that	  remind	  the	  narrator	  of	  the	  “barbaric	  tribes	  in	  Africa	  and	  Oceania”.	  	  Throughout	   the	   film,	   the	   linguistic	   choices	   and	   observations	   that	   narrate	  the	  images	  lead	  to	  a	  suspicion	  that	  the	  filmmaker	  is	  intentionally	  jeopardising	  the	  viewer’s	   trust.	   I	   believe	   this	   ‘effect’	   is	   irrespective	   of	   the	   context,	   or	   historical	  moment	  of	  the	  film’s	  screening,	  or	  the	  critical	  schooling	  of	  its	  viewer.	  The	  critical	  position	   from	  which	   the	   filmmaker	   is	   speaking	   reveals	   itself	   in	   the	   language	  and	  delivery,	   exposing	   its	   artifice	   through	   radical	   parody,	   which	   we	   may	   not	  immediately	   know	   how	   to	   interpret.	   We	   become	   distanced	   because	   the	  objectification	   we	   are	   confronted	   with	   in	   the	   film	   circumvents	   our	   ‘pleasure’	   to	  perceive	   ourselves	   as	   ‘subjects’	   who	   ‘act’	   by	   producing	   empathy.	   Therefor,	   the	  objectification	  functions	  by	  creating	  a	  distancing	  from	  empathic	  identification	  with	  suffering.	  To	  return	  to	  the	  discord	  between	  sound	  and	  image	  in	  Land	  Without	  Bread	  that	   obliquely	   reveal	   the	   intentions	   of	   the	   unreliable	   narrator:	   the	   ‘documentary	  lie’,	   or	   “ethnofiction”	   as	   it	   is	   referred	   to	   elsewhere,	   is	   evident	   in	   a	   number	   of	  scenes.	   For	   example,	   Buñuel	   depicts	   a	   group	   of	   people	  with	   learning	   difficulties	  (“midgets	  and	  cretins”).	  While	  the	  voiceover	  informs	  us	  that	  	  “some	  are	  dangerous	  and	  will	  either	  flee	  from	  strangers,	  or	  attack	  them	  with	  stones”,	  they	  appear	  happy	  and	   cooperative.	  Another	  often	   cited	   scene	   shows	  a	   goat	   tumbling	  down	  a	   steep	  mountainside.	  We	  are	  told	  mountain	  goats	  are	  not	  usually	  eaten	  unless	  they	  come	  to	  a	  natural	  death,	  for	  example	  “when	  the	  hills	  are	  steep	  and	  there	  are	  loose	  stones	  on	  the	  footpath”.	  But	  the	  smoke	  of	  a	  gun	  at	  the	  edge	  of	  the	  frame	  is	  clearly	  visible,	  indicating	  the	  goat	  came	  to	  anything	  but	  a	  natural	  death.	  Overall	  then,	  the	  critical	  stance	  of	   the	   film	  towards	  documentary	  truth	  appears	  to	  reside	   in	   its	   intentional	  documentary	  lie.	  	  If	  viewers	  are	  intentionally	  led	  to	  disbelief,	  would	  it	  not	  follow	  then	  that	  we	  should	  also	  disbelieve	  the	  object-­‐relation	  displayed	  by	  the	  filmmaker	  in	  regards	  to	  
	  	   53 
his	  relationship	  to	  the	  Hurdanos	  people?	  Should	   it	  not	   follow	  that	  the	  distancing,	  the	  objectification,	  is	  purposeful?	  	  The	  following	  section	  in	  Vivian	  Sobchack’s	  “Synthetic	  Vision:	  The	  Dialectical	  Imperative	  of	  Luis	  Buñuel’s	  Las	  Hurdes”,	  would	  seem	  to	  support	  this	  view:	  	  	   What	  we	  conventionally	  see	  documented	  by	  the	  camera	  is	  misery,	  poverty,	  illness,	  and	  death.	  But	  what	  the	  film	  also	  documents	  –	  what	  it	  shows	  us	  and	  unconventionally	  makes	  us	  aware	  of	  in	  its	  unfolding	  –	  is	  the	  documenting	  of	  the	  Hurdanos,	  the	  turning	  them	  into	  objects	  from	  which	  films	  are	  made.	  The	  accurate	  portrait	   of	   social	   relations	  we	   see	   and	  hear	   in	  Las	  Hurdes	   is	   that	  relationship	  established	  between	  the	  ‘objects’	  which	  are	  the	  Hurdanos	  and	  the	   ‘subject’	  who	   is	   the	  narrator.	   Indeed,	   if	  we	  are	  able	   to	   look	  at	   the	   film	  clearly	  and	  unconventionally	  –	  as	  neither	   ‘horrific’	   travelogue	  nor	   ‘liberal’	  documentary	  expose	  –	  we	  must	  reject	  the	  narrator	  as	  our	  surrogate	  (…).	  In	  this	  regard,	  Las	  Hurdes	   is	  deeply	  political	   (rather	   than	  merely	  partisan)	   in	  that	   its	   primary	   aim	   is	   to	   cause	   the	   viewer	   to	   question	   the	   very	   bases	   of	  perception	  itself.	  (Sobchack,	  1998:	  73)	  	  Beyond	   the	   film’s	   invitation	   to	   question	   the	   very	   basis	   of	   perception,	   and	   by	  making	   visible	   to	   us	   the	   process	   of	   objectification	   (the	   Hurdanos	   turned	   into	  “objects	  from	  which	  films	  are	  made	  of”),	  the	  film,	  I	  would	  argue,	  forcefully	  puts	  the	  viewer	  on	  par	  with	  the	  narrator.	  	  Since	  our	  empathic	  register	  for	  the	  Hurdanos	  is	  deactivated	  by	  the	  strategic	  discord	   of	   sound	   and	   image,	   and	   we	   find	   ourselves	   confronted	   with	   the	  discomforting	  objectification,	  we	  are	  left	  with	  no	  escape	  route.	  As	  Sobchak	  points	  out,	  what	  we	  see	  and	  hear	  is	  a	  portrait	  of	  the	  social	  relations	  “established	  between	  the	  ‘objects’,	  which	  are	  the	  Hurdanos,	  and	  the	  ‘subject’,	  who	  is	  the	  narrator”.	  Like	  the	   narrator,	   we	   are	   distanced,	   unaffected	   observers	   –	   we	   are	   consumers	   of	  suffering.	  From	  this	  vantage	  point	  then,	  it	  may	  become	  necessary	  as	  the	  viewer	  to	  revaluate	  one’s	  own	  complicity	  in,	  or	  complacency	  towards,	  the	  wider	  organisation	  of	  life	  presented,	  of	  ‘documentary	  reality’.	  The	  very	  discomforting	  thing	  that	  Land	  
Without	   Bread	   point	   towards	   is	   our	   complicity	   in	   any	   number	   of	   structural	  inequalities	  beyond	  the	  frame	  of	  cultural	  or	  artistic	  production.	  But,	  perhaps	  most	  significantly,	  the	  profoundly	  political	  aspect	  of	  the	  film	  is	  the	  discomfort	  generated	  in	   the	   viewer’s	   inescapable	   confrontation	   with	   the	   very	   conditions	   of	  objectification,	   in	   which	   he/she	   is	   implicated	   by	   the	   very	   act	   of	   viewing.	   The	  objectification	   viewers	   witness	   in	   the	   film,	   I	   argue,	   functions	   to	   produce	  discomfort.	  Discomfort	  then	  replaces	  empathy	  as	  a	  form	  of	  ethical	  labour.	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  Fig	  6	  &	  7:	  Episode	  III:	  Enjoy	  Poverty,	  2008,	  film	  stills.	  	   In	   a	   similar	   vein,	   Renzo	   Martens’	   Episode	   III:	   Enjoy	   Poverty	   (2008)	   also	  appears	  to	  circumvent	  the	  possibility	  of	  empathic	  identification	  with	  suffering	  as	  a	  redemptive	   act	   for	   its	   viewer.	  Enjoy	  Poverty	  documents	  Martens’	   journey	   in	   The	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo,	  the	  mission	  of	  which	  is	  to	  ‘teach’	  the	  Congolese	  how	  to	   capitalise	   on	   their	   greatest	   ‘resource’:	   their	   poverty.	   The	   film	   charts	  Martens’	  “emancipatory	   programme”31	  through	   which	   the	   Congolese	   would	   themselves	  economically	   benefit	   from	   the	   production	   and	   sale	   of	   images	   of	   their	   suffering,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  This	   phrase	   is	   used	   in	   the	   film’s	   synopsis.	   See:	   http://www.renzomartens.com/episode3/film	  [accessed	  17.08.2016]	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their	   poverty,	   from	   images	   of	   war	   and	   disaster.	   Enjoy	   Poverty	   documents	   the	  process	  of	  this	  artistic	  intervention,	  which	  includes	  Martens	  sending	  down	  river	  a	  barge	  with	  a	  large	  neon	  sign	  that	  reads	  “Enjoy	  Poverty	  Please”.	  	  	  In	   an	   early	   scene	   of	   the	   film	  we	   observe	   that	   in	   order	   to	   accomplish	   this	  artistic	  intervention,	  Martens	  enlists	  helpers,	  which	  comprise	  the	  local	  community.	  Along	   the	   way,	   he	   documents	   the	   plight	   of	   plantation	   workers,	   including	   the	  economic	  injustices	  they	  are	  subjected	  to	  and	  their	  harsh	  living	  conditions.	  This	  is	  underscored	  by	  footage	  of	  life	  in	  refugee	  camps	  showing	  the	  organisational	  pathos	  of	   the	   aid	   industry	   as	   comparable	   to	   the	   foreign	   planation	   owners’	   exploitative	  treatment	   of	   the	   local	   labour	   force.	  What	  we	   see	   transpire	   is	   this:	   the	   corporate	  structure	   of	   the	   aid	   industry	   is	   organised	   in	   such	   a	   way	   so	   as	   to	   sustain	   and	  privilege	   their	   own	   internal	   operational	   and	   administrative	   structures	   over	   and	  above	   the	  actual	  aid	   they	  deliver.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	   film	  exposes	   that	  a	  greater	  proportion	  of	   funds	  are	  spent	  on	  organising	  the	  aid,	  economically	  benefitting	  the	  international	  aid	  industry,	  than	  on	  the	  aid	  itself.	  Various	  scenes	  in	  the	  film	  relating	  to	  journalistic	  coverage	  of	  the	  region	  demonstrate	  the	  same	  principle	  as	  applying	  to	   the	   news	   media.	   These	   scenes	   show	   that	   the	   sale	   of	   images	   of	   starvation,	  malnutrition,	  and	  death	  are	  products	  that	  economically	  benefit	  only	  those	  who	  are	  part	   of	   that	   industry.	   In	   formally	   complex	  ways,	   but	   summarised	   here	   in	   simple	  terms,	   Enjoy	   Poverty	   highlights	   a	   twofold	   exploitation	   of	   the	   Congolese	   people.	  First	   as	   a	   labour	   force	   mining	   resources	   for	   export,	   and	   then	   poverty	   itself	   is	  ‘harvested’	   as	   goods,	   or	   products	   for	   another	   market	   –	   the	   aid	   and	   media	  industries.	   The	   very	   discomforting	   aspect	   of	   the	   viewing	   experience	   is	   that	  Martens	  mirrors	  these	  structural	   inequalities	  in	  the	  narrative	  plotting	  of	  the	  film.	  This	   is	   done	   in	   a	   number	   of	   ways,	   including	   through	   the	   ‘performance’	   of	   his	  relationship	  with	  the	  Congolese.	  He	  situates	  himself	  as	  the	  ‘subject’	  organising	  the	  ‘objects’,	   the	   Congolese,	   and	   makes	   visible	   his	   process	   of	   objectification.	   More	  specifically,	   the	  external	  structure	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  relations	  between	  us	  (the	   viewers	   and	   consumers	   of	   African	   resources)	   and	   the	   local	   population,	   is	  mirrored	  in	  the	  internal	  relation	  between	  Martens	  and	  the	  Congolese.	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  Fig	  8	  &	  9:	  Episode	  III:	  Enjoy	  Poverty,	  2008,	  film	  stills.	  	   Martens	  depicts	  himself	  in	   ‘colonial’	  attire,	  straw	  hat	  included.	  His	  luggage	  containing	  the	  dissembled	  parts	  of	  the	  neon	  sculpture	  is	  being	  ‘Sherpa-­‐ed’	  across	  a	  waterlogged	  forest	  area,	  whilst	  he	  films	  himself	  self-­‐consciously	  performing	  a	  sing-­‐along.	  The	  close	  resemblance	  to	  Klaus	  Kinski	  in	  Werner	  Herzog’s	  film	  Fitzcarraldo	  (1982)	   has	   been	   pointed	   out	   by	   multiple	   commentators.	   Like	   the	   fictional	  Fitzcarraldo’s	  grand	  mission	  to	  bring	  opera	  to	  a	  small	  town	  in	  the	  Amazon	  Basin	  of	  Peru,	  Martens	  makes	  his	  self-­‐assigned	  mission	  very	  clear	   from	  the	  outset:	  he	  has	  come	  there	  to	  teach	  the	  Congolese	  to	  ‘own’	  their	  poverty.	  The	  neon	  sign	  is	  just	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  Martens	  demonstrates	  his	  missionary	  task.	  	  
	  	   57 
One	  example	  of	  the	  futility	  of	  his	  mission	  is	  reflected	  in	  his	  attempt	  to	  teach	  a	   group	   of	   young	   locals	   the	   logics	   of	   the	   news	  media	  market	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  image	  sales.	  Images	  of	  death	  and	  starvation,	  he	  demonstrates	  in	  a	  classroom-­‐type	  situation,	   bring	   an	   economic	   advantage	   greater	   than	   their	   existing,	   much	   less	  lucrative,	   occupation	   as	   wedding	   and	   party	   photographers.	   With	   a	   group	   of	   his	  ‘students’,	  Martens	  visits	  a	  Médecins	  Sans	  Frontières	  official,	  where	   they	  hope	   to	  be	  granted	  access	  to	  take	  pictures	  at	  Médecins	  Sans	  Frontières	  managed	  hospitals.	  Prompted	  by	  a	  question	   raised	  earlier	  by	  one	  of	   the	  young	  men	   in	  his	   company,	  Martens	   probes	   the	   official	   as	   to	   why,	   unlike	   international	   photographers,	   local	  ones	   are	   excluded	   from	   deriving	   an	   income	   from	   pictures	   of	   children	   suffering	  malnutrition,	   raped	   women,	   and	   war	   casualties.	   The	   official	   explains	   that	   the	  international	  photographers	  are	   there	   to	  make	  news,	  not	  money.	  Probed	   further,	  the	  Médecins	  Sans	  Frontières	  official	  says,	  “This	  is	  not	  to	  humiliate	  you	  […].	  Making	  an	  image	  is	  more	  than	  pushing	  a	  button”.	  The	  scene	  is	  discomforting.	  The	  opposing	  desires	  and	  points	  of	  view	  on	   the	  subject	  of	  privileged	  access	   to	  markets,	   and	   to	  education,	   is	   palpable	   not	   just	   in	   the	   verbal	   exchange	   between	  Martens	   and	   the	  official,	  but	  more	  importantly	  in	  the	  reaction	  shots	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  group	  in	  the	  room,	  which	  includes	  the	  local	  photographers.	  So	  the	  palpable	  power	  of	  critique	  is	  not	   just	   in	  what	   is	  said,	  but	   in	  what	  remains	  unsaid,	   in	  the	  silent	  gaps	  and	   in	  the	  faces	   of	   the	   local	   photographers.	   Anything	   but	   mute	   their	   expressions	   are	   a	  register	  of	  discontent.	   In	   the	  parting	  scene	  outside	   the	  Médecins	  Sans	  Frontières	  compound	   Martens	   declares,	   self-­‐consciously	   framed	   on	   camera,	   that	   he	   thinks	  their	  mission	   to	  photograph	   and	  make	   a	   living	   from	   their	   poverty	  will	   fail.	   They	  may	  continue	  with	  their	  party	  photography.	  The	  young	  men	  part	  without	  a	  word.	  So,	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  group’s	  mission	  is	  built	  into	  the	  scheme	  of	  the	  film	  in	  order	  to	  reflect	   on	   a	   micro-­‐scale	   the	   larger	   failure	   of	   the	   international	   community	   and	  viewing	  public.	  	  But	   the	   relationship	   between	   Martens	   and	   the	   Congolese,	   the	  objectification,	   seems	   constructed.	   There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   subtle	   ways	   in	   which	  another	   interpretation	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   Martens	   and	   the	   people	   he	  encounters	  is	  manifest.	  For	  one,	  this	  relationship	  is	  palpable	  in	  shots	  that	  linger	  on	  the	   faces	   of	   the	   Congolese	   when	   they	   react	   to	   Martens’	   repeated	   advocacy	   for	  adapting	   to	   the	   logics	   of	   new	   markets:	   fishing	   is	   not	   lucrative	   enough,	   nor	   is	  wedding	  photography.	  His	  suggestions	  are	  met	  with	  perplexity,	  disbelief,	  resigned	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silence,	  or	  disappointment	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  local	  photographers	  in	  the	  scene	  that	  concludes	   the	  Médecins	  Sans	  Frontières	  visit	  described	  above.	  Martens’	   editorial	  choice,	  the	  lingering	  on	  the	  reactions	  of	  the	  men,	  leads	  us	  into	  a	  different,	  an	  other-­‐wise	  relationship.	   It	  reveals	  that	  what	  we	  read	  as	  an	   intolerable	  objectification	  is	  constructed	  for	  us.	  	  
	  Reflecting	   on	   the	   discomforting	   objectification	   Enjoy	   Poverty	   willingly,	   self-­‐consciously,	   and	  most	   significantly,	   as	   I	   read	   the	   film,	   performatively	   engages	   in	  brings	  to	  light	  the	  paradox	  between	  ethical	  principles	  and	  ethical	  behaviour.	  Enjoy	  
Poverty	  disrupts	  our	  expectation	  of	  ethical	  behaviour	  as	  it	  ‘ought’	  to	  be	  enacted	  in	  documentary	   practice.	   The	   film	   therefore	   produces	   a	   stark	   reminder	   of	   the	  complex	   nature,	   and	   inefficacy,	   of	   ethical	   principles,	   as	   well	   as	   our	   habitual	  foregrounding	  of	  those	  principles	  in	  our	  reactions	  to	  the	  viewing	  experience.	  The	  discomforting	   aspect	   of	   the	   film	   does	   not	   allow	   us	   to	   forego	   the	   self-­‐reflective	  critique	  of	  our	  consumption	  practices	  beyond	  the	  immediate	  framework	  of	  art	  or	  culture,	  which	  are	  very	  much	  tied-­‐in	  with	  the	  extractions	  of	  Congolese	  labour	  and	  Congolese	  resources	  sketched	  out	  in	  the	  film.	  	  The	  viewer’s	  belief	  in	  documentary	  or	  art’s	  efficacy	  in	  facilitating	  economic	  or	   political	   transformation	   is	   further	   challenged	   in	   the	   confrontation	   with	   the	  following	  scene.	  Displaying	  the	  neon	  sign,	  “Enjoy	  Poverty	  (Please)”,	  at	  what	  looks	  like	  a	  closing	  party	  with	  locals,	  a	  discomforting	  dialogue	  ensues.	  Martens	  tells	  the	  locals	   that	   they	   better	   accept	   the	   condition	   of	   their	   lives,	   their	   suffering,	   and	   be	  happy:	  “If	  you’re	  going	  to	  wait	  for	  your	  salary	  to	  grow	  so	  you	  can	  be	  happy,	  you’ll	  be	   unhappy	   your	   whole	   lives.”	   To	   which	   a	   man	   responds,	   “We’ll	   gladly	   accept	  whatever	   you	   can	   do	   for	   us	   when	   you	   get	   back.”	   Martens:	   “There	   is	   nothing	  prepared”.	   If	   we	   shift	   away	   from	   the	   painful	   speech	   act,	   we	  may	   see	   expressive	  facial	   reactions	   and	   body	   language	   ranging	   from	   distaste,	   perplexity,	   and	  knowledge	   of	   the	   intended	   provocation.	   Someone	   asks:	   “Why	   did	   you	   come?”	  Martens:	   “To	   tell	   you,	   you	   better	   enjoy	   poverty,	   rather	   than	   fight	   it	   and	   be	  unhappy”.	   Another	   respondent:	   “Will	   you	   project	   the	   film	   here?”	   Martens:	   “The	  film	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  Europe,	  not	  here”.	  With	  a	  pained	  expression	  of	  distaste,	  with	  a	   discomfort	   that	   requires	   no	   translation,	   cultural	   or	   otherwise,	   the	   young	  man	  asking	   turns	   away	   simply	   saying:	   “Thank	   you”.	   There	   is	   no	   pretence	   in	   that	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relation;	  no	  pretence	  in	  the	  ‘realness’	  of	  the	  situation.	  It	  is	  ‘real’	  insofar	  as	  it	  leaves	  no	  room	  for	  the	  viewer’s	  indulgence	  in	  escapist	  saviour	  fantasies.	  	  	  In	   its	  most	   basic	   function,	   I	   suggest	   that	  Martens’	   film	  contests	   the	   historically-­‐assumed	  political	   agency	  of	  documentary	   film.	  The	   film	  acts	  as	   the	  by	  now	  well-­‐known	   but	   still	   apparently	   hard-­‐hitting	   reminder	   of	   the	   role	   of	   documentary	   in	  primarily	   carrying	   “information	   about	   a	   group	   of	   powerless	   people	   to	   another	  group	  addressed	  as	  socially	  powerful”	  (Rosler,	  2004:	  179).	  But	  the	  information	  the	  film	   carries,	   its	   charge,	   is	   addressed	   directly	   to	   its	   “socially	   powerful”	   viewer.	  Simply	  put,	  in	  its	  undertones	  the	  film	  says,	  Africa	  knows,	  and	  wasn’t	  it	  about	  time	  that	  we,	  the	  international	  community,	  acknowledged	  that	  we	  too	  know	  that	  Africa	  knows.	  32	  Awareness	  of	  Africa	  ‘knowing’	  is	  evidenced	  throughout	  the	  film	  both	  by	  the	   filmmaker’s	  wilful	  über-­‐realism,	   that	  may	  come	  across	  as	   cruelty,	   and	  by	   the	  locals	   themselves	   in	   responses	   of	   disbelief,	   disappointment,	   astonishment,	  ambivalence,	   nervous	   tension,	   perplexity,	   and	   knowingness.	   Our	   attention	   and,	  dare	  I	  say,	  responsibility	  as	  viewers	  is,	  I	  argue,	  better	  invested	  in	  the	  reading	  of	  the	  often	   non-­‐verbal	   acts	   of	   the	   Congolese.	   The	   above	   described	   scene	   ends	   with	  clapping	  after	  the	  locals	  agree	  to	  accept	  their	  suffering	  and	  Martens	  has	  told	  them	  that	  experiencing	  their	  suffering	  has	  made	  him	  a	  better	  person.	  “You	  really	  helped	  me.	  Thank	  you.”	  Though	  seemingly	  mundane	  as	  a	   speech	  act,	   there	   is	   something	  very	  powerful	  in	  the	  culmination	  of	  that	  scene,	  and	  the	  visible	  discomfort,	  followed	  by	  the	  benevolent	  but	  meaningless	  words	  “thank	  you”,	   first	  uttered	  by	  the	  young	  local,	  and	  later	  by	  Martens	  himself.	  	  	  The	   performance	   of	   the	   filmmaker’s	   position	   as	   the	   one	   who	   goes	  plundering	  for	  “documentary	  gold”	  33	  and	  comes	  away	  having	  contributed	  nothing	  in	   the	   way	   of	   economic	   help,	   or	   transformative	   potential,	   is	   reinforced	   by	   the	  Congolese’s	   knowing	   participation	   in	   the	   film.	   Whether	   expressed	   by	   looks	   of	  surprise,	   dismissal,	   ambivalence,	   or	   collusion	   with	   Martens’	   performance,	   one	  thing	   I	   contend	   is	   very	   clearly	   articulated	   in	   this	   film:	   the	   Congolese	   know.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  I	   take	   the	   expression	   “Africa	   knows”	   from	   Joshua	  Wanyama	   and	   Sheila	  Ochugboju,	  who	   run	   a	  commercial	  stock	  photo	  agency	  in	  Nairobi	  by	  the	  same	  name.	  The	  expressed	  purpose	  of	  their	  photo	  agency	  is	  to	  “re-­‐brand”	  Africa.	  	  33	  “Documentary	  gold”	  is	  an	  expression	  used	  informally	  in	  the	  UK’s	  broadcast	  documentary	  sector.	  It	  names	  the	  dramatic	  value	  of	  a	  situation,	  person,	  issue,	  or	  event.	  The	  conditions	  of	  its	  existence	  is	  hoped	   to	   guarantee	   the	   filmmaker,	   production	   company,	   or	   broadcaster	   capital	   returns.	   These	  returns	   are	   not	   limited	   strictly	   to	   financial	   ones,	   but	   also	   include	   increased	   viewer	   ratings,	   or	  increased	  chances	  at	  landing	  future	  commissions	  for	  the	  filmmaker	  or	  production	  company.	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discomforting	   predicament	   Martens	   presents	   shakes	   the	   foundation	   of	   our	  understanding	   of	   ethics;	   that	   is,	   the	   ethical	   principle,	   our	   expectation	   that	   the	  filmmaker	  ought	   to	  demonstrate,	  and	  show	  allegiance	  with,	   the	  other.	  This	   is	   set	  against	  the	  viewer’s	  suggested	  allegiance	  with	  the	  brute,	  colonial	  figure	  of	  Martens	  himself.	  We	  are	  after	  all	  the	  consumers	  of	  the	  resources	  leading	  to	  the	  Congolese	  exploitation	  and	  suffering.	  Not	  able	  to,	  or	  not	  wishing	  to	  identify	  with	  this	  image,	  we,	   the	  viewers,	  are	   left	   in	  “uncomfortable	  suspension”	  (Tobing	  Rony,	  1996:	  17).	  Our	  discomfort	  as	  viewers	  with	  the	  ordeal	  that	  Martens	  entangles	  us	  in	  is,	  I	  argue,	  the	  core	  political	  strategy	  of	  the	  film.	  	  	  Whilst	  Buñuel’s	  formal	  strategy	  of	  undermining	  how	  Land	  Without	  Bread	  is	  perceived	  through	  incongruous	  juxtapositions	  that	  cause	  us	  to	  question	  the	  nature	  of	   the	   film,	  Martens	  goes	  beyond	  the	   limits	  of	   irony,	  arriving	  at	  what	  he	  calls	   the	  “bitterly	   real”	   (Demos	   &	  Martens,	   2012:	   101).	   Unlike	   Buñuel’s	   early	   example	   of	  self-­‐referential	  critique	  of	  the	  documentary	  travelogue,	  Martens’	  film	  is	  no	  parody.	  Both	   films	   in	   their	   own	   way	   are	   primarily	   a	   challenge	   to,	   and	   critique	   of,	   the	  viewer’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  film	  object	  as	  a	  replication	  or	  mirror	  of	  wider	  systemic	  inequalities.	   Both	   films	   circumvent	   a	   radical	   “postcolonial	   subject	   position”	  (Russell,	   1999:	   28)	   through	   the	   very	   compounding	   of	   colonial	   ‘objectivity’	   and	  therefore	   constitute	   critiques	   of	   colonialism.	   And	   I	   would	   suggest	   that	   the	  incorporation	   and	   adoption	   of	   the	   very	   same	   methods	   they	   are	   critiquing	   then	  qualifies	   them	   for	   a	   different	   kind	   of	   reading	   in	   regard	   to	   the	   objectification	   the	  films	   are	   implicated	   in.	   This	   type	   of	   objectification	   insists	   on	   the	   viewer’s	  investment	  of	  ethical	   labour	   through	   the	  production	  of	  discomfort	   that	   is	  painful	  and	  not	  in	  empathy	  that	  is	  redemptive.	  Martens	  explains:	  	   I	  think	  the	  film	  breaks	  one	  clear	  rule:	  that	  audiences	  should	  be	  exempt	  from	  the	  pain	   that	  half	   the	  world’s	  population	  experiences	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  We	  can	  watch	   it,	  but	  we	  should	  not	  be	  made	  part	  of	   it.	  Or	   if	   it	   should	  happen	  that	   a	   work	   reveals	   our	   part	   in	   it	   anyway,	   through	   some	   economic	   or	  political	  systems	  that	  we	  support	  or	  benefit	  from,	  then	  we	  are	  exempt	  from	  the	  pain,	  because	  it	  is	  assumed	  that,	  since	  we	  are	  willing	  to	  watch	  the	  piece,	  we	  are	  contributors	  to	  the	  critical	  mass	  that	  will,	  one	  day,	  undo	  the	  harm.	  This	   rule	   therefore	   paints	   an	   inaccurate	   picture	   of	   reality,	   and	   of	   the	  audience’s	  relationship	  to	   it.	  We	  either	  don’t	  see	  the	  pain,	  or	  we’re	  part	  of	  its	   solution.	  Episode	  3	   is	   so	   tailored	   that	  watching	   it	  makes	   you	   complicit	  with	   its	   production.	  Obviously	   that’s	   not	   fun,	   and	   some	  viewers	   think	   I’m	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out	   to	   trick	   them.	   Episode	   3	   deals	   with	   pain,	   but	   then	   doesn’t	   offer	   the	  audience	  a	  way	  out.	  (Demos	  &	  Martens,	  2012:	  91)	  	   Whether	  we	  regard	  Episode	  III:	  Enjoy	  Poverty	  and	  Land	  Without	  Bread	  as	  art	  works	   or	   documentaries,	   ethnographic	   films,	   interventionist	   art,	   or	   institutional	  critique,	   one	   could	   argue	   that	   they	   function	   like	  horror	   films.	   They	   illustrate	   the	  ‘monstrous’	   aspects	   in	   which	   viewers	   are	   implicated.	   Their	   critical	   focus	   is	   on	  maximising	   discomfort	   in	   the	   viewing	   experience.	   But	   our	   capacities	   as	   viewers	  vary	  as	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  horror	  we	  are	  willing	  to	  endure.	  I	  may	  hold	  the	  view	  that	  since	   it	   is	   not	   a	   horror	   made	   of	   fantasy,	   but	   a	   horror	   made	   of	   reality,	   it	   is	   our	  obligation	   to	   ‘endure	   it’.	   But	   it	   is	   of	   equal	   importance	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   such	  enduring	  does	  not	   resolve	   the	  problem.	   It	   only	   functions	   in	  making	  us	   ‘painfully	  aware’;	  that	  is,	  remaining	  cognisant	  of	  the	  problem	  through	  the	  painful	  horror	  we	  are	  witnessing.	  Martha	  Rosler	  also	   reminds	  us	   that	  documentaries	  are	   similar	   to	  horror	   films,	   for	   they	   put	   “a	   face	   on	   fear	   and	   transform	   threat	   into	   fantasy,	   into	  imagery.	  One	  can	  handle	  imagery	  by	  leaving	  it	  behind.	  (It	  is	  them,	  not	  us.)	  One	  may	  even,	   as	   a	   private	   person,	   support	   causes”	   (Rosler,	   2004:	   179).	   Enjoy	   Poverty,	   I	  would	  argue,	  confronts	  us	  with	  images	  not	  easily	  left	  behind	  because	  the	  film	  is	  not	  about	  them.	  It	  is	  about	  us.	  The	  ethical	  labour	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  invest	  as	  viewers	  is	  a	  direct	   confrontation	  with	  ourselves.	  Therein,	   I	   argue,	   lies	   the	  productive	   force	  of	  discomfort.	  	  More	  could	  be	  said	  about	  horror,	  or	   its	   close	  relation,	   the	  monstrous,	  and	  their	  potential	  in	  expressing	  an	  ethics.	  For	  instance,	  scholar	  Patricia	  MacCormack,	  leaning	   on	   philosophers	   Rosi	   Braidotti,	   Gilles	  Deleuze,	   and	   Félix	   Guattari,	   states,	  “[in]	  being	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  deviation	  from	  the	  phantasy	  of	  human	  consistency,	  the	   monstrous	   is	   everything	   else,	   limitless	   and	   excessive	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   the	  human”	   (MacCormack,	   2012:	   86).	  MacCormack	   expands	   the	  monstrous	   from	   the	  limitless	   excess	   of	   human	   consistency	   further,	   extending	   it	   into	   the	   concept	   of	  “becoming	  monster”.	  And	  it	  is	  there	  that	  MacCormack	  finds	  the	  potency	  in	  creating	  “new	   corporeal	   and	   communicative	   ethics”	   (MacCormack,	   2012:	   86).	   But	   this	  includes	  a	  kind	  of	  “monstrous	  activism”	  that	  MacCormack	  sees	  being	  contested	  in	  theoretical	   debates.	   I	   would	   propose	   that	   in	   his	   filmic	   role	   as	   advocate	   of	   self-­‐objectification	   –	   both	   of	   himself	   as	   a	   missionary	   documentarian	   and	   as	   one	  advocating	   that	   the	   Congolese	   exploit	   their	   own	   poverty	   as	   an	   viable	   economic	  resource	   –	  Martens	   demonstrates	   a	   kind	   of	   “monstrous	   activism”.	  He	   repels	   and	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likewise	  arouses	  curiosity.	  On	  the	  prospective	  necessity	  of	  the	  monstrous	  Braidotti	  writes:	  	  the	  fantasmagoric	  diversity	  of	  monstrous	  beings	  points	  the	  way	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  line	  of	  becoming	  which	  our	  crisis-­‐afflicted	  culture	  badly	  needs	  (…).	  [T]he	  human	  is	  now	  displaced	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  glittering	  range	  of	  post-­‐human	  variables,	   however	   painful	   this	   may	   be	   to	   the	   collective	   hubris	   we	   –	  including	   Western	   feminists	   –	   have	   inherited	   from	   centuries	   of	   codified	  Western	  humanism.	  (Braidotti,	  2000:	  172)	  In	   the	   documentary	   context,	   the	   ‘monstrous’	   activism	   Martens,	   Brakhage,	   and	  Buñuel	  display	   through	   their	  overtly	  objectifying	   form	  of	  expression	  may	  be	   just	  what	  our	  always	  already	  crisis-­‐afflicted	  culture	  continues	  to	  need.	  	  Having	   taken	   this	   cursory	   excursion	   into	   considering	   what	   the	   ethical	  potential	  of	  horror	  might	  be,	  I	  propose	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  activating	  the	  viewer’s	   empathic	   register	   through	   politically	   motivated	   works	   versus	   putting	  them	   through	   the	   pain	   of	   horror,	   may	   be	   that	   sympathy	   engages	   one	   only	  temporarily,	  whereas	  horror	  produces	  a	  pain	  not	  easily	  forgotten.	  Relatedly,	  on	  the	  dangers	  of	  empathic	  identification,	  and	  of	  imagining	  a	  proximity	  to	  suffering,	  Susan	  Sontag	  writes:	  	  	  Sentimentality,	  notoriously,	  is	  entirely	  compatible	  with	  a	  taste	  for	  brutality	  and	   worse.	   […]	   The	   states	   described	   as	   apathy,	   moral	   or	   emotional	  anesthesia,	  are	   full	  of	   feelings;	   the	   feelings	  are	  rage	  and	   frustration.	  But	   if	  we	  consider	  what	  emotions	  would	  be	  desirable,	  it	  seems	  too	  simple	  to	  elect	  sympathy.	  The	  imaginary	  proximity	  to	  the	  suffering	  inflicted	  on	  others	  that	  is	  granted	  by	  images	  suggests	  a	  link	  between	  the	  faraway	  sufferers	  (…)	  and	  the	   privileged	   viewer	   that	   is	   simply	   untrue,	   that	   is	   yet	   one	   more	  mystification	  of	  our	  real	  relations	  to	  power.	  (Sontag,	  2004:	  102)	  Of	  course,	  as	  Sontag	  points	  out,	  one	  can	  become	  habituated	  to	  horror	   in	  real	   life,	  just	  as	  one	  can	  become	  habituated	  to	  horrific	  images.	  But,	  she	  likewise	  adds,	  “there	  are	  pictures	  whose	  power	  does	  not	  abate,	  in	  part	  because	  one	  cannot	  look	  at	  them	  often”	  (Sontag,	  2004:	  83).	  	  Relatedly,	   I	   would	   argue	   that	   the	   greater	   value	   and	   potency	   of	   the	   films	  described	  resides	  not	  so	  much	  in	  the	  horrific	  images	  that	  we	  are	  compelled	  to	  look	  away	  from	  (an	  indeed	  reasonable	  response,	  and	  a	  testament	  to	  their	  potency),	  but	  in	  confronting	  us	  with	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  we	  are	   implicated	   in	   the	  production	  of	  the	   suffering	   we	   choose	   to	   turn	   a	   blind	   eye	   to:	   our	   consumption	   of	   Congolese	  resources	   for	   instance,	   from	  palm	  oil	   to	  gold	  to	  coltran,	  down	  to	  the	   inefficacy	  of	  our	  charitable	  giving.	  The	  discomfort	  that	  arises	  from	  this	  confrontation	  then	  has	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NON-HIERARCHICAL, DE-POLEMICISED: On Shado’man (2014) 	  The	  cases	  discussed	  so	  far	  solicit	  discomfort	  to	  produce	  a	  response.	   I	  have	  called	  this	  process	  ethical	  labour.	  But	  as	  another	  form	  of	  meta-­‐critique,	  the	  objectification	  impulse	  can	  also	  look	  towards	  and	  highlight	  more	  egalitarian	  modes	  of	  production	  to	   say	   something	   about	   community,	   responsibility,	   working	   together,	   and	  solidarity.	  This	  mode	  of	  objectification	   is	  different	   from	   the	  aforementioned	  one.	  Less	  interested	  in	  producing	  a	  response	  through	  discomfort,	  these	  films	  can	  take	  a	  sculptural	  approach	  in	  working	  with	  the	  materiality	  of	  bodies,	  privileging	  physical	  encounters	   in	   the	   now;	   the	   present	   moment	   of	   filming.	   We	   could	   say	   that	   the	  approach	   in	   these	   films	   is	   to	   sculpt	   the	   social	   as	  malleable	  material	  whilst	  being	  observant	  of	  the	  character,	  logic,	  customs,	  or	  rules	  that	  produce	  it.	  Some	  examples	  of	   this	   would	   be	   Charlotte	   Gainsborg’s	   Melior	   Street	   (2011),	   Andrea	   Luka	  Zimmerman’s	  Estate,	  a	  Reverie	  (2015),	  or	  Boris	  Gerrets’	  Shado’man	  (2014).	   I	  will	  concentrate	  now	  on	  the	  latter	  example.	  	  In	   Shado’man	   (Gerrets,	   2014),	   Boris	   Gerrets	   seeks	   to	   foreground	   the	   “dignity	   of	  humans	  surviving	  under	  inhumane	  conditions”.	  34	  Shot	  in	  Sierra	  Leone,	  the	  film	  is	  a	  portrait	   of	   disabled	   people	   living	   in	   the	   streets	   of	   Freetown,	   shaped	   by	   Gerrets’	  desire	   to	   seek	   closeness.	   As	   Gerrets	   puts	   it,	   “to	   concentrate	   on	   understanding”	  those	  he	  encounters	  “physically,	  rather	  then	  psychologically	  or	  biographically”.	  	  At	  night	  in	  Freetown,	  under	  street	   lamps,	   in	  darkness,	  or	  aided	  by	  passing	  cars	  and	  motorcycle	  headlights,	  Gerrets	  spends	  time	  with	  those	  whose	  lives	  have	  been	   ones	   of	   social	   exclusion:	   the	   blind,	   the	   physically	   challenged,	   the	   rough	  sleepers.	  At	  no	  time	  is	  the	  political	  history	  of	  Sierra	  Leone,	  the	  war,	  or	  the	  personal	  circumstances	   leading	   to	   their	   lives	   in	   the	   streets,	   or	   their	   disabilities,	   made	  explicit.	   Instead,	   Shado'man	   depicts	   the	   fabric	   of	   a	   social	   ecosystem	   not	   too	  dissimilar	   in	   its	   expression	   of	   desire	   to	   the	   expressions	   of	   those	   who	   are	   able-­‐bodied	  and	  privileged:	  the	  desire	  for	  tenderness,	  partnership,	  and	  sexual	  intimacy,	  anxieties	   about	   the	   future	   of	   an	   unborn	   child,	   how	   to	   acquire	   funds	   for	   a	   loved	  one’s	  education,	  or	  the	  struggle	  to	  build	  a	  home	  with	  limited	  resources.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  All	  following	  text	  set	  in	  quotation	  marks	  is	  taken	  from	  Gerrets’	  statements	  on	  http://www.shadoman-­‐film.com	  [accessed	  19.06.2014].	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  Fig.	  10:	  Shado’man,	  2014,	  film	  still.	  	  	  Gerrets’	  way	  of	  looking	  and	  seeing	  speaks	  not	  of	  sorrow	  or	  injustice,	  but	  of	  dignities	  found	  in	  being	  together.	  He	  sees	  the	  camera	  as	  a	  tool	  that	  creates	  a	  social	  dynamic	   between	   him	   and	   his	   “protagonists”.	   In	   the	   documentary	   field,	   people	  appearing	   in	   films	   are	   oftentimes	   referred	   to	   as	   subjects,	   or	   as	   contributors.	  Gerrets	  avoids	  such	  terminology:	  	  	   I	  hate	  the	  word	  subject	  because	  I	  wouldn’t	  want	  to	  be	  a	  subject	  myself.	  But	  I	  wouldn’t	  want	  to	  be	  an	  object	  either.	  A	  subject	  is	  an	  object	  of	  study	  not	  of	  empathetic	  exchange.	  [It	  implies	  that	  there	  can	  be	  a	  detached	  observer	  but	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  detached	  observer].	  That’s	  why	  the	  word	  subject	  is	  less	  suitable	  for	  me.	  35	  	  The	  term	  protagonist	  is	  more	  commonly	  used	  in	  the	  dramatic	  arts,	  in	  theatre,	  but	  also	  in	  narrative	  film	  and	  in	  literature.	  It	  denotes	  the	  central	  character	  or	  actor	  in	  a	  story.	   In	   the	   documentary	   context,	   Gerrets’	   deliberate	   word	   choice	   is	   slightly	  provocative,	  he	  admits,	  but	  it	  stems	  from	  the	  way	  he	  works	  with	  people:	  	  	   I	  see	  them	  acting	  in	  their	  own	  lives	  –	  acting	  as	  to	  act,	  creating	  act	  –	  but	  with	  the	   added	   consciousness	   of	   being	   in	   front	   of	   a	   camera.	   So	   it’s	   a	   balance	  between	   playing	   oneself	   and	   acting	   –	   as	   acting	   in	   life.	   It	   may	   not	   feel	  obvious	  to	  the	  viewer	  where	  one	  ends	  and	  the	  other	  begins,	  but	  it	  mirrors	  life,	  as	  we	  all	  act	  in	  social	  situations.	  The	  camera	  however	  creates	  a	  greater	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Recorded	  Skype	  conversation	  with	  Boris	  Gerrets	  (19	  August	  2017).	  All	  quotations	  that	  follow	  are	  taken	  from	  a	  transcript	  of	  the	  recording.	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intensity	   or	   perhaps	   a	   heightened	   consciousness	   of	   the	   situation.	   The	  camera	  being	  there	  is	  –	  and	  needs	  to	  be	  –	  always	  very	  obvious.	  The	  camera	  does	  change	  the	  reality	  in	  front	  of	  it	  and	  I	  want	  to	  acknowledge	  that.	  That’s	  why	  I	  prefer	  the	  word	  protagonist.	  	  	  For	   Gerrets,	   film	   and	   filmmaking	   is	   a	   “phenomenological	   space”,	   or	   a	   “biotopic”	  exploration	  as	  he	  calls	  it.	  36	  This	  approach,	  or	  attitude	  to	  the	  filmmaking	  process,	  is	  made	   to	  be	   felt	  by	  viewers	   in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  There	   is	   a	   sculptural	  quality	   to	  
Shado’man	  that	   takes	  shape	   in	   its	   form.	   It	   is	  expressed	   in	   the	  way	  Gerrets	  works	  with	  people,	  which	  is	  made	  visible	  in	  aesthetic	  terms.	  Even	  without	  knowledge	  of	  Gerrets’	  own	  biography,	  the	  care	  and	  humility	  of	  his	  physical	  encounter	  with	  those	  whom	  he	   films	   comes	   through	   in	   the	   film	  by	  way	   of	   its	   sculptural	   form.	   Gerrets	  trained	  as	  a	  visual	  artist,	  studying	  sculpture	  at	  Kunstakademie	  Düsseldorf,	  whose	  notable	   alumni	   include	   Joseph	   Beuys,	   Andreas	   Gursky,	   and	   Gerhard	   Richter.	  Gerrets	  then	  became	  involved	  in	  performance	  art	  and	  physical	  theatre	  in	  Paris	  at	  the	   end	   of	   70s,	   working	   both	   as	   a	   dancer	   and	   choreographer.	   Later,	   having	  acquired	   technical	   knowhow	   through	   making	   video	   art,	   his	   first	   steps	   in	  documentaries	  were	  as	  an	  editor.	  	  An	   obvious	   way	   to	   speak	   of	   the	   sculptural	   quality	   of	   Shado’man	   would	   be	   to	  reference	   its	   visual	   composition,	   its	   aesthetics.	   Immaculately	   composed,	   both	  visually	   as	  well	   as	   in	   its	   sound	   design,	   the	   entire	   film	   is	   shot	   at	   night	   requiring	  inventive	  low-­‐tech	  lighting	  solutions.	  I	  could	  also	  speak	  of	  its	  structure,	  of	  the	  way	  scenes	   are	   plotted	   through	   editing.	   For	   instance,	   a	   significant	   number	   of	   scenes	  start	   with,	   or	   pivot	   on,	   questions	   that	   the	   protagonists	   ask	   one	   another.	   These	  questions	   set	   the	   tone	   and	   the	   content	   of	   respective	   scenes,	   determining	   the	  themes	   of	   their	   struggles.	   The	   grounds	   of	   their	   understanding	   for	   one	   another,	  their	  hopes,	  are	  built	  on	  observations	  of	  their	  conversational	  exchanges	  that	  never	  feel	   externalised.	   Instead	   the	   observations	   we	   witness	   acquire	   a	   self-­‐reflexive	  interiority	  through	  Gerrets	  cutting	  technique	  starting	  scenes	  with	  the	  protagonist’s	  questions	  as	  described.	  	  In	   one	   scene,	   a	   couple	   –	   Sarah	   Koroma	   and	   Sherif	   Mohamed	   Abu	   Kanu	  (Shero,	   as	   his	   friends	   call	   him	   in	   the	   film)	   –	   discuss	   the	   naming	   of	   their	   unborn	  child.	   The	   precise	   context	   that	   would	   explain	   the	   specific	   cultural	   practice	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Taken	  from	  Gerrets’	  statement	  on	  http://www.shadoman-­‐film.com	  [accessed	  19.06.2014].	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naming	  children	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  is	  missing.	  When,	  how,	  who	  gets	  to	  name	  a	  child	  according	   to	   local	   custom,	   is	   not	  made	   explicit.	   But	   it	   does	   come	   through	   in	   the	  subtle	  tension	  of	  their	  conversation.	  The	  scene	  starts	  with	  Shero	  asking	  Sarah	  why	  she	   feels	   he	   has	   to	   pay	   her	   in	   order	   to	   get	   to	   name	   their	   child.	   The	   discussion	  unfolds	   from	   there,	   emoting	   the	   power-­‐relation	   between	   the	   couple	   and	   their	  conflicting	  desires	  in	  establishing	  the	  grounds	  for	  their	  relationship.	  	  Later,	  another	  scene	  articulates	  the	  physical	  struggles	  of	  living	  in	  the	  streets	  to	  astonishingly	  lucid	  effect	  while	  not	  lacking	  in	  visual	  poetry.	  With	  their	  backs	  to	  camera,	  we	  see	   two	  men,	  Alfred	  on	  crutches	  and	  Shero	   in	  his	  wheelchair,	   slowly	  making	  their	  way	  down	  a	  street	  at	  night.	  The	  question	  around	  which	  the	  slow-­‐drip	  scene	  pivots	  is:	  “Alfred,	  you	  know	  I	  can’t	  dream	  right?”	  –	  “Why	  is	  that?”	  “It’s	  the	  life	  we	  lead.	  […]	  You	  never	  get	  a	  chance	  to	  dream	  if	  you	  can’t	  sleep.	  How	  can	  you	  find	  happiness?	  That’s	  the	  thing.”	  	  I	   had	   wondered	   if	   this	   specific	   method	   of	   starting	   scenes	   with	   questions	  that	  were	  posed	  by	  the	  people	   in	   the	   film	  to	  each	  other	  was	  a	  structuring	  device	  Gerrets	  had	  planned.	  But	  as	  he	  explains:	  	   They	  initiated	  everything	  that	  happened.	  As	  I	  was	  interacting	  with	  them,	  we	  had	   many	   discussions,	   and	   talked	   about	   life.	   One	   example:	   Sarah	   was	  pregnant,	   so	   I	   asked	   if	   she	   had	   a	   name	   for	   the	   child.	   She	   said	   no.	   The	  question	  was	   of	  mutual	   interest	   and	   I	   thought	   finding	   a	   name	   could	   be	   a	  scene.	  The	  reason	  that	  she	  didn’t	  have	  a	  name	  for	  the	  child	  is	  cultural.	  You	  give	  a	  name	  one	  week	  after	  the	  child	  is	  born	  because	  you	  don’t	  know	  if	  it’s	  going	   to	  survive.	  Then	  there	   is	   the	  name-­‐giving	  ceremony.	  And	   it	   is	  also	  a	  custom	   that	   the	   father	  determines	   the	  name	  of	   the	  child,	   so	  as	   to	   confirm	  the	   male	   bloodline.	   This	   establishes	   his	   relationship,	   his	   rights	   and	  obligations	  to	  the	  child	  and	  also	  –	  very	  importantly	  –	  the	  obligations	  of	  the	  child	  towards	  the	  father.	  	  	  Another	  example,	   this	  one	  provoked	  by	   the	   immediate	   circumstances:	   the	  scene	  towards	  the	  end	  where	  Lama	  is	  talking	  to	  his	  guide,	  a	  young	  boy.	  My	  question	  to	  Lama	  was	  about	  the	  child’s	  future,	  now	  that	  he	  was	  responsible	  for	  him.	  But	   then	  out	  of	   the	  blue	  a	   strong	  wind	  came	  up	  and	   it	   started	   to	  rain	  heavily	  –	  very	  unusual	   for	  the	  dry	  season.	  So	  I	  asked	  them	  where	  the	  wind	  came	  from	  and	  this	  led	  to	  a	  discussion	  that	  circled	  around	  questions	  of	  how	   clouds	   come	   to	  be	   and	   about	   rain,	   about	   an	   imaginary	   iron	   coat	   and	  who	  can	  withstand	  the	  cold	  better,	  a	  child	  or	  an	  adult.	  Everything	  came	  out	  of	   the	   conversational	   dynamic	   that	  was	   set-­‐up	   between	  me	   and	   this	   little	  community.	  My	  camera	  established	   the	  space	   for	   this	  dynamic	   to	  occur	   in	  this	  particular	  way.	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  Fig.	  11	  &	  12:	  	  Shado’man,	  2014,	  film	  stills.	  	  	  Gerrets’	  sculpting	  of	  what	   I	  might	  call	  an	   inter-­‐objective	  encounter,	  comes	  through	   in	   his	   specific	   approach	   of	   encountering	   others	   physically,	   relating	   to	  people	   in	   the	   now	   –	   the	   present	   moment	   of	   filming	   –	   rather	   than	   through	  explanatory	  contextualising	  of	  their	  personal	  histories.	  Left	  out	  are	  the	  biographies	  of	   the	   people	   he	   encounters	   in	   Freetown,	   Gerrets’	   own	   biography,	   and	   his	  relationship	   to	   Sierra	   Leone.	   What	   then	   are	   the	   material	   ways	   in	   which	   the	  relationship	   between	   Gerrets	   and	   his	   “protagonists”	   manifest	   in	   the	   film?	   How	  does	  that	  relationship	  make	  itself	  visible?	  Shado’man,	  I	  suggest,	  may	  be	  an	  example	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of	  what	  an	  “aesthetic	  of	  ethics”	  looks	  like	  (Beshty,	  2015).	  But	  the	  way	  the	  ethics	  of	  a	  material	  encounter	  manifests	  in	  Shado’man	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  pinpoint.	  	  Aside	   from	   the	   elements	   of	   the	   structure	   already	   discussed,	   in	   aesthetic	  terms,	   the	  way	   Gerrets	   frames	   reality,	   or	   the	  way	   he	  works	  with	   available	   light	  sources,	   the	   sculpting	   of	   material	   encounters	   is	   made	   visible	   in	   the	   detailed	  observations	  of	  the	  physical	  effort	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Gerrets’	  protagonists	  to	  do	  simple	  things.	  For	  example,	  the	  effort	   involved	  in	  a	  blind	  person	  making	  a	  phone	  call,	  or	  the	  effort	  of	  a	  person	  with	  no	   legs	  climbing	  a	  staircase.	  There	  are	   two	  particular	  scenes	  that	  stand	  out	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  In	  the	  first,	  the	  opening	  shot,	  we	  see	  a	  large	  assembly	  of	  disabled	  people	  at	  night	   moving	   from	   the	   distance	   of	   an	   empty	   street	   towards	   the	   camera.	   The	  entirety	   of	   this	   large	   group	   is	   named	   in	   the	   closing	   credit	   sequence	   of	   the	   film.	  From	   this	  we	   gather	   that	   the	   scene	   did	   not	   come	   about	   in	   a	   chance	  moment	   of	  observational	   filming.	  But	   even	  prior	   to	   confirming	   this	   through	   the	   end	   credits,	  we	  can	  locate	  Gerrets’	  sculpting	  in	  the	  composition	  of	  both	  image	  and	  sound.	  The	  opening	   scene	   is	   a	   static	   wide	   shot;	   the	   street’s	   downhill	   gradient	   lending	   itself	  well	  to	  the	  framing	  of	  a	  large	  group.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  sound	  track	  we	  hear	  a	  detailed,	  almost	  musical,	  cacophony	  of	  metal	  sounds	  hitting	  the	  asphalt	  surface.	  	  	   The	   opening	   scene	   was	   one	   initiated	   by	   me,	   in	   order	   to	   establish	   the	  narrative	  terrain	  of	  the	  film.	  I	   thought	   it	  would	  be	  powerful	  because	  there	  are	  five	  people	  in	  the	  film	  who	  are	  the	  main	  protagonists.	  But	  the	  reality	  is	  that	   there	   are	   a	   huge	   number	   of	   disabled	   people	   living	   in	   the	   streets	   [of	  Freetown].	  So	  I	  wanted	  to	  make	  the	  viewer	  understand	  that	  it’s	  not	  just	  the	  five	   people	   [in	   the	   film]	   but	   there	   is	   a	   bigger	   problem.	   It	   was	   quite	   a	  logistical	  challenge:	  to	  get	  all	  these	  people	  to	  come	  over	  the	  hill	  in	  the	  empty	  street.	  We	  could	  only	  do	  it	  once.	  There	  was	  no	  way	  you	  could	  get	  all	  these	  people,	  who	  are	  all	  disabled,	  to	  go	  back	  and	  do	  it	  again.	  	  	  In	   another	   scene	   –	   the	   concluding	   part	   of	   the	   film	   –	   Shero’s	   exerted	  movements	   on	   crutches	   in	   the	   expanse	   of	   a	   street	   at	   night	   are	   observed.	   He	   is	  dancing.	  This	  scene	  is	  intercut	  with	  the	  haunting	  sound	  of	  a	  piano	  originating	  from	  someone	  playing	  in	  the	  street.	  	  	  I	  had	  seen	  people	  play	  piano	  in	  the	  street,	  but	  the	  unity	  of	  time	  and	  space	  in	  the	   film	   is	   very	   limited.	   Everything	   is	   happening	   on	   one	   street	   corner.	  People	   gather	   there	   because	   it	   is	   where	   the	   only	   functioning	   streetlights	  are.	  So	  I	  had	  to	  get	  the	  piano	  there	  instead	  of	  filming	  the	  scene	  in	  the	  place	  where	  I	  had	  seen	  people	  play.	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  Fig.	  13:	  Shado’man,	  2014,	  film	  still.	  	  	   Before	  that,	  I	  had	  seen	  Shero	  dancing,	  so	  I	  wanted	  to	  film	  it.	  To	  me	  his	  dance	  sums	  up	  the	  feeling	  I	  got	  from	  the	  whole	  process	  –	  that	  however	  bad	  things	  may	  get,	  this	  becomes	  the	  new	  reality.	  And	  in	  some	  way,	  even	  though	  they	  are	  living	  under	  very	  inhumane	  conditions,	  they	  preserve	  their	  humanity	  in	  it.	  This	  may	  be	  a	   contentious	   thing	   to	   say,	  but	   I	  didn’t	   feel	   that	   they	  were	  unhappier	   than	  other	  people.	  The	   issues	   that	   they	  have	  are	  many.	  But	   the	  main	  stress	   factors	  didn’t	  stem	  from	  the	  physical	  aspect	  of	   their	  disability	  but	  rather	  from	  their	  social	  environment	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  opportunities.	  On	  a	  societal	   level	   they	   have	   to	   cope	   with	   neglect	   and	   discrimination.	   On	   the	  level	  of	   the	  extended	   family,	   they	  have	   to	  meet	  many	  responsibilities.	  The	  weight	  is	  sometimes	  unbearable.	  They	  live	  in	  the	  city	  and	  their	  families	  live	  in	  the	  countryside,	  and	  expect	  to	  be	  sent	  money	  because	  they	  think	  they	  are	  rich	  and	  don’t	  understand	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  living	  in	  the	  street.	  A	  lot	  of	  the	   money	   they	   received	   for	   working	   on	   the	   film	   went	   to	   their	   families,	  paying	  for	  a	  relative’s	  education	  or	  helping	  their	  mother	  or	  father	  instead	  of	  building	  a	  house	  for	  themselves	  –	  which	  one	  person	  did.	  	  	  What	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  about	  Gerrets’	  approach	  is	  learning	  that	  he	  built	  into	  the	  production	  of	  the	  film	  an	  economic	  feedback	  system.	  His	  protagonists	  also	   formed	  part	  of	  his	   crew	  and	   they	   received	  an	   income.	  Gerrets	   speaks	  of	   the	  financial	  compensation	  for	  contributors	  –	  a	  grey	  area	  in	  documentary	  practice	  –	  in	  new	   terms	   of	   engagement.	   In	   other	   words,	   hiring	   his	   protagonists	   as	   his	  crewmembers	   is	   a	   form	   of	   engagement	   that	  makes	   an	   active	   step	   towards	  what	  might	  to	  some	  extent	  be	  considered	  an	  egalitarian	  approach	  to	  artistic	  practice	  and	  to	  collaboration.	  If	  not	  entirely	  true	  in	  financial	  terms,	  in	  communitarian	  terms,	  all	  involved	   were	   on	   an	   equal	   plain	   as	   a	   social	   group.	   As	   Gerrets	   states,	   his	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protagonists	   applied	   their	   imagination	   in	   their	   contributions	   to	   the	   film,	   so	   they	  must	  be	  paid	  as	  crew	  members.	  	   There	  was	   a	   core	   group	   of	   about	   five	   people	  who	  worked	   in	   front	   of	   the	  camera,	  and	  a	  couple	  of	  others	  who	  were	  helping	  me	  [behind	  the	  camera].	  The	   only	   other	   outsider	   apart	   from	   me,	   meaning	   from	   outside	   of	   Sierra	  Leone,	  was	  Rosalie	  [Gerrets’	  daughter]	  who	  was	  doing	  sound.	  The	  idea	  was	  to	   create	   a	   small	   economic	   unit.	   Everyone	   was	   paid	   –	   including	   the	  protagonists	   –	   according	   to	   a	   protocol	   that	   we	   had	  worked	   out	   together.	  This	  was	  important	  because	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  people	  are	  really	  surviving	  on	  very	  little,	  money	  coming	  in	  can	  be	  very	  divisive.	  So	  we	  needed	  to	  have	  a	  system	  that	  satisfied	  everyone.	  Whenever	  I	  was	  filming,	  everyone	  was	  paid	  by	  the	  day,	  even	  those	  who	  were	  not	  in	  the	  scene.	  	  So	  everyone	  got	  the	  same	  fee,	   which	   by	   the	   way	   was	   the	   amount	   they	   had	   asked	   for.	   The	   idea	   of	  course	  was	  that,	  first	  of	  all	  I	  am	  using	  their	  imagination	  in	  the	  film,	  so	  they	  need	  to	  get	  paid	  for	  their	  intellectual	  property.	  Secondly,	  once	  the	  film	  was	  made,	  I	  wanted	  them	  to	  have	  an	  opportunity	  to	  make	  a	  step	  in	  their	   lives;	  that	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  change	  their	  situation.	  	  Working	  in	  reality	  means	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  whole	  social	  structure	  that	  is	   constantly	   present.	   People	   have	   brothers	   and	   sisters	   and	   uncles	   and	  friends	  and	  neighbours.	  And	  in	  the	  case	  of	  these	  people	  living	  in	  the	  streets,	  their	  credibility	  in	  their	  own	  community	  is	  at	  stake.	  They	  were	  saying	  ‘look	  if	  you	  would	  not	  have	  paid	  us,	  everyone	  would	  say:	  This	  white	  man,	  he	   is	  not	   paying	   you,	   you	   are	   crazy’.	   So	   the	  money	  was	   also	   a	   token	  of	   respect	  towards	   them	   that	   was	   seen	   by	   the	   others	   and	   in	   turn	   made	   them	  respectable	  in	  their	  eyes	  as	  well.	  For	  me	  it	  was	  important	  to	  find	  a	  way	  to	  accommodate	  that	  dynamic	  and	  that	  complexity.	  	  Gerrets’	  commitment	   to	   this	  approach	  sits	  comfortably	  alongside	  his	  need	  to	   exercise	   authorial	   control.	   In	   “The	   Social	   Turn:	   Collaboration	   and	   Its	  Discontents”,	  art	  historian	  and	  critic	  Claire	  Bishop	  points	  out	  the	  political	  desire	  of	  participatory	   art,	   and	   its	   desire	   to	   counter	   the	   instrumentalising	   and	   alienating	  effects	   of	   global	   capitalism’s	   privileged	   social	   bonds.	   Bishop	   recognises	   the	  political	  desire	  of	  resistance	  to	  those	  privileged	  bond	  as	  an	  artistic	  gesture.	  But	  she	  argues	   that	   it	   is	   likewise	   important	   to	  critique	  a	  work	   for	   its	  artistic	  quality.	   She	  emphasises	   this	   critical	   task	   as	   especially	   crucial	   in	   the	   context	   of	   what	   was	  Britain’s	   New	   Labour	   rhetoric	   of	   cultural	   policies	   aimed	   at	   social	   inclusion.	  “Reducing	  art	   to	   statistical	   information	  about	   target	   audiences	  and	   ‘performance	  indicators,’	  the	  government	  prioritizes	  social	  effect	  over	  considerations	  of	  artistic	  quality”	   (Bishop,	   2006:	   180).	   Countering	   key	   texts	   such	   as	   Nicolas	   Bourriaud’s	  
Relational	  Aesthetics	   (1998),	   or	  Grant	  H.	  Kester’s	  Conversation	  Pieces:	  Community	  
and	   Communication	   in	   Modern	   Art	   (2004),	   and	   citing	   examples	   such	   as	   Artur	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Zmijewski’s	  The	  Singing	  Lesson	  1	  (2001),	  Phil	  Collins’	  they	  shoot	  horses	  (2004),	  and	  Jeremy	  Dellers’	  The	  Battle	  of	  Orgreave	  (2001),	  Bishop	  advocates	  for	  works	  that	  join	  a	   “tradition	   of	   highly	   authored	   situations	   that	   fuse	   social	   reality	   with	   carefully	  calculated	   artifice”.	   Because	   aesthetics,	   the	   social	   and	   the	   political,	   she	   argues,	  should	  be	  thought	  through	  along	  side	  each	  other,	  rather	  than	  absorbing	  all	  within	  the	  ethical	  and	  into	  “exemplary	  gestures”	  (Bishop,	  2006:	  183).	  	  While	  Shado’man	  does	  not	  fall	  strictly	  under	  the	  cannon	  of	  participatory	  or	  socially	   engaged	   art	   –	   though	   all	   documentaries	   to	   some	   extent	   could	   –	   Gerrets’	  film,	  as	   well	   as	   a	   number	   of	   other	   recent	   documentary	   works,	   some	   of	   which	   I	  mentioned	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   this	  section,	  fulfils	  both	  the	  political	  urgency	  of	  an	  egalitarian	  social	  encounter	  alongside	  the	  production	  of	  a	  highly	  authored	  work.	  In	  other	  words,	  Gerrets’	  aesthetic	  vision	  does	  not	  stand	  in	  conflict,	  or	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way,	   is	   not	   compromised,	   by	   his	   commitment	   to	   a	   production	   process	   that	  accommodates	   a	   wider	   social	   dynamic	   than	   that	   of	   the	   immediate	   community	  formed	  around	   the	  making	  of	   the	   film.	  Quite	   to	   the	   contrary,	   his	   commitment	   to	  implementing	   a	   financial	   feedback	   system	   as	  well	   as	   his	   sensitivity	   towards	   the	  larger	  framework	  of	  his	  protagonists’	  lives,	  seems	  to	  have	  positively	  impacted	  the	  artistic	   quality	   of	   his	   work.	   This	   particular	   way	   of	   working	   does	   not	   appear	   to	  compromise	  distinct	  authorship.	  	  To	  extrapolate	  the	  process	  I’m	  speaking	  of	  with	  another	  example	  of	  the	  far-­‐reaching	   implications	  of	   the	  “social	   turn”,	  one	  could	  cite	  artists’	   initiatives,	  which	  reach	  beyond	  art	  production	  and	  become	  more	  akin	  to	  on	  the	  ground,	  pragmatic	  social	   intervention.	   For	   instance,	   the	   Rebuild	   Foundation	   initiated	   by	   Theaster	  Gates,	  a	  Chicago	  born	  artist	  and	  educator	  whose	  practice	   includes	  object	  making,	  performance,	   and	   the	   development	   of	   housing	   and	   cultural	   spaces.	   The	   project	  involves	   the	   purchase	   and	   renovation	   of	   abandoned	   spaces	   in	   under-­‐resourced	  neighbourhoods	   of	   Chicago,	   as	   well	   as	   apprenticeship	   programmes,	   community	  service	  activities,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  buildings	  to	  house	  a	  library,	  a	   listening	  room,	  and	  a	  cinema.	  Of	  this	  project,	  Gates	  says:	  “While	  I	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  change	  the	  housing	  market	  or	  the	  surety	  of	  gentrification,	  I	  can	  offer	  questions	  within	  the	  landscape.	  To	  question,	  not	  by	  petitioning	  or	  organizing	  in	  the	  activist	  way,	  but	  by	  building	  and	  making	  good	  use	  of	  the	  things	  forgotten”	  (Gates,	  n.d.).	  	  Although	   the	   relationship	   between	   economics	   and	   ethics	   in	   art	   is	   beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  my	  research,	  I	  will	  briefly	  outline	  another	  example	  in	  order	  to	  further	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extrapolate	   the	   communitarian	   objectives	   of	   projects	   like	  Gerrets’	  Shado’man,	   or	  Theaster	  Gates’	  Rebuild	  Foundation.	  The	   Institute	   of	   Human	   Activities	   (IHA)	   is	   a	   research	   project	   initiated	   by	  Renzo	   Martens	   and	   developed	   at	   The	   Royal	   Academy	   of	   Fine	   Arts	   (KASK),	  University	   College	   Ghent,	   with	   Delphine	   Hesters	   and	   Jacobus	   Koster.	   37 	  The	  ambitious	   aim	   of	   the	   project	   is	   to	   “prove	   that	   artistic	   critique	   on	   economic	  inequality	   can	   bypass	   it	   –	   not	   symbolically,	   but	   in	   material	   terms”	   (Martens	   &	  KASK,	  n.d.).	  Through	  the	  organisation	  of	  exhibitions,	  presentations,	  and	  seminars	  involving	   both	   writers,	   critical	   theorists,	   and	   cultural	   institutions	   operating	  amongst	   the	   global	   elite,	   alongside	   the	   formation	   of	   The	   Cercle	   d’Art	   des	  
Travailleurs	   de	   Plantation	   Congolaise	  (CATPC)	   founded	   near	   Lusanga	   in	   The	  Democratic	   Republic	   of	   the	   Congo,	   Martens	   aims	   to	   reverse	   the	   flow	   of	   capital	  away	   from	  the	  global	  centres	  of	  art	  and	   inject	  a	  culture	  of	  critical	  art	  production	  locally.	  The	  on-­‐going	  IHA	  project	  (since	  2012)	   is	  both	  a	  self-­‐confessed	  attempt	  at	  gentrifying	   a	   part	   of	   the	   Congo,	   as	   well	   as	   an	   attempt	   at	   developing	   a	   “new	  economic	  programme”	  38	  through	   the	  production	  and	  sale	  of	  art	  works	  produced	  by	   plantation	   workers.	  39	  But	   not	   unlike	   Renzo	   Martens’	   film	   Episode	   III:	   Enjoy	  
Poverty,	  the	  IHA	  project	  may	  be	  in	  greater	  parts	  intervention	  as	  performance.	  The	  efficacy	  of	  the	  economic	  intervention	  may	  not	  be	  measurable	  for	  years	  to	  come,	  if	  ever.	  	   About	   a	   scene	   in	   Enjoy	   Poverty	   that	   depicts	   an	   art	   exhibition	   where	   a	  plantation	  owner	  buys	  black	  &	  white	  documentary	  photos	  depicting	  his	  workers,	  T.J.	  Demos	  writes:	  	  More	   than	   a	   matter	   of	   local	   ethical	   scandal,	   this	   scene	   dramatizes	   a	  widespread	   paradox	   of	   contemporary	   art,	   particularly	   that	   of	   video	   and	  photography.	  It	  occurs	  when	  ‘concerned’	  documentary	  images,	  intended	  to	  alleviate	  poverty	  or	  ‘work	  for	  peace’,	  actually	  operate	  as	  commodity	  objects	  and	   are	   purchased	   by	   those	   who	   encourage	   or	   benefit	   from	   the	   very	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  According	   to	   the	   KASK	   School	   of	   Arts	   Ghent	   website,	   there	   are	   three	   researchers	   named.	  According	  to	   IHA’s	  own	  site,	   the	  project	  was	   initiated	  by	  Martens,	  but	  neither	  Hesters	  nor	  Koster	  appear	  in	  the	  staff	  list	  [both	  accessed	  10.07.2016].	  38	  See:	  http://www.humanactivities.org/circulation/	  [accessed	  21.05.2016].	  39 	  For	   a	   detailed	   critical	   commentary	   of	   the	   project	   see	   T.J.	   Demos,	   “Gentrification	   After	  Institutional	   Critique:	   On	   Renzo	   Martens’	   Institute	   for	   Human	   Activities,”	   Afterall,	   40	  (Autumn/Winter	  2015):	  pp.	  76-­‐89.	  And,	  Vivian	  Ziherl,	  “Renzo	  Martens	  and	  the	  Institute	  for	  Human	  Activities’	   ‘A	   New	   Settlement’,”	   art-­‐agenda	   (May	   27,	   2015),	   http://www.art-­‐agenda.com/reviews/renzo-­‐martens-­‐and-­‐the-­‐institute-­‐for-­‐human-­‐activitiess-­‐a-­‐new-­‐settlement/	  [accessed	  21.06.2016]. 
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industries	   of	   inequality	   and	   exploitation	   against	   which	   concerned	  documentarians	   justify	   their	   practice.	   […]	   This	   situation	   expresses	   a	   false	  proximity	   to	   the	   victimized	   that	   grants	   spectators	   distance	   from	   their	  complicity	   in	   the	  wider	   situation	   of	   generalized	   economic	   inequality.	   The	  problem	  is	  of	  course	  not	  new.	  (Demos,	  2013:	  109)	  
 Demos	  counters	  Hito	  Steyerl’s	  advocacy	  for	  an	  examination	  of	  localised	  art-­‐world	  politics	   that	   concern	   questionable	   conditions	   of	   production	   and	   circulation,	  believing	  it	  to	  be	  the	  wrong	  choice.	  Instead,	  Demos	  advocates	  for	  a	  critical	  merging	  of	   global	   (art	   world)	   politics	   with	   the	   local	   “as	   overlapping	   spheres	   of	   complex	  entanglements”	  (Demos,	  2013:	  111)	  and	  cites	  the	  significance	  of	  Martens’	  work	  as	  operating	  on	  both	   fronts:	   the	  critique	  of	  a	  global	   image	  economy	  enmeshed	  with	  wider	   systems	  of	   inequality,	  whilst	   also	  offering	  himself	  up	   for	   critical	   review	  as	  the	  artist/documentarian	  benefitting	  from	  the	  same	  system.	   
 So	   far,	   we	   have	   taken	   a	   look	   at	   objectification	   in	   documentary	   as	   a	   form	   of	  disobedient	   communication,	   and	   examined	   the	   value	   of	   discomfort	   as	   ethical	  labour	  in	  order	  to	  consider	  critically	  forms	  of	  objectification,	  which	  do	  not	  always	  equate	   to	   something	   negative.	   A	   contextual	   review	   of	   the	   ambiguity	   which	  surrounds	  the	  term	  documentary	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  historically	  conflicted	  ideas	  of	  documentary’s	   socio-­‐political	   role	   served	   as	   the	   foundation	   to	   extrapolate	   the	  myriad	   ways	   a	   discussion	   of	   ethics,	   and	   of	   objectification	   in	   particular,	   are	  conflicted.	   Nonetheless,	   I	   have	   advocated	   for	   the	   continued	   use	   of	   the	   word	  documentary	   to	   encompass	   film	   works	   that	   use	   documentary	   material	   in	   their	  construction,	   regardless	   of	   the	   form	   this	   takes,	   and	   which	   field	   works	   are	  circulating.	   I	   feel	   it	   has	   been	   productive	   to	   do	   so,	   because	   continuing	   to	   draw	  attention	  to	  the	  widening	  of	  the	  parameters	  of	  what	  we	  understand	  documentary	  to	   be	   can	   only	   be	   helpful	   in	   expanding	   our	   approaches	   to	   the	   ethics	   of	  documentary	  in	  both	  fields.	  Running	  up	  against	  the	  limits	  of	  what	  a	  documentary	  can	   be	   or	   can	   do	   in	   either	   field	   –	   I	   feel,	   will	   in	   the	   long	   run	   further	   aid	   the	  disintegration	   of	   divisions	   between	   the	   two	   fields	   of	   practice	   where	   ethical	  consideration	   are	   concerned.	   Issues	   surrounding	   the	   ethics	   of	   documentary	   –	  which	   have	   been	   articulated	   from	   the	   70s	   onwards	   –	   can	   be	   reframed	   and	   can	  cross-­‐pollinate	  and	  extend	  into	  the	  art	  field.	  To	  contribute	  to	  this	  cross-­‐pollination	  is	  the	  particular	  aim	  of	  this	  research.	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I	  have	  given	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  particular	  moment	  in	  art	  history,	  referred	  to	  as	   the	   documentary	   turn,	   in	  which	   this	   study	   situates	   itself,	   and	  where	   the	   two	  fields	  come	  to	  meet,	  both	   in	  terms	  of	  an	   interest	   in	  the	   form,	  and	   in	  terms	  of	   the	  characteristics	  of	  documentary.	  The	  documentary	  turn	  is	  also	  a	  confluence	  point	  of	  the	  two	  fields	  at	  the	  theoretical	   level,	  extending	  critical	  reflections	  on	  the	  politics	  and	  ethics	  of	  documentary.	  Arguments	  have	  been	  presented	  through	  the	  analysis	  of	  film	  works	  that	  adopt	  objectification	  as	  a	  formal	  strategy	  to	  discomforting	  effect.	  I	  have	  claimed	  that	  objectification	  is	  purposeful	  in	  those	  cases,	  and	  that	  it	  functions	  as	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  assumed	  political	  agency	  of	  the	  documentary	  medium.	  	  I	   have	   also	   touched	   upon	   how	   objectification	   considered	   as	   ‘monstrous’	  activism	  can	  help	  reframe	   idealised	  discussions	  of	  ethics.	  This	  has	  been	   followed	  by	  an	  example	  where	  objectification	   is	  not	  a	   strategy	   to	  produce	  discomfort,	  but	  where	   the	   formal	  appearance	  of	  objectification	  sits	  comfortably	  alongside	  ethical	  relation-­‐building	   in	   the	   context	   of	   consensual	   collaboration,	   as	   well	   as	   through	  economic	  ‘feedback	  systems’.	  I	  have	  also	  touched	  upon	  the	  far-­‐reaching	  impact	  of	  the	   ‘social	   turn’	   and	   its	   relationship	   to	   the	   communitarian	   objectives	   with	   an	  analysis	   of	   Boris	   Gerrets’	   film	   Shado’man	   in	   addition	   to	   touching	   briefly	   on	   the	  relationship	  between	  economics	  and	  ethics	  in	  art.	  	  Regarding	   egalitarian	   production	   methodologies	   in	   documentary	   (e.g.	  contributors	  as	  crew	  members),	  I	  have	  elaborated	  on	  how	  this	  method	  plays	  out	  in	  
Shado’man	  with	  a	  specific	  analysis	  of	   film	  scenes	  and	  how	  this	  approach	   impacts	  aesthetics	  and	  authorship.	  Of	  particular	  interest	  has	  been	  questioning	  how	  Gerrets’	  physical	  encounter	  –	  rather	  than	  a	  psychological	  or	  biographical	  one	  –	  manifests	  in	  the	   construction	   of	   the	   film.	   I	   have	   clarified	   what	   I	   mean	   by	   objectification	  becoming	   ‘sculptural’,	   and	   have	   shown	   through	   specific	   examples	   from	   the	   film	  how	   this	   manifests.	   I	   did	   so	   in	   order	   to	   help	   enumerate	   the	   notion	   of	   non-­‐discomforting	   objectification,	   and	   so	   as	   to	   qualify	   the	   idea	   of	   “inter-­‐objective”	  encounters	  as	  one	  that	  can	  be	  both	  ethical	  and	  which	  can	  make	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  aesthetic	  qualities	  of	  a	  work.	  In	   what	   follows,	   I	   will	   explore	   ethics	   from	   two	   positions:	   one	   is	   the	  responsibility	  makers	  have	  to	  their	  documentary	  material.	  The	  other	  considers	  the	  responsibility	  of	  viewers.	  Critical	  theories	  on	  ethics	  from	  documentary	  studies	  are	  brought	   together	   with	   Levinas’	   conception	   of	   responsibility	   as	   a	   pre-­‐existent	  obligation,	   which	   for	   Levinas	   comes	   prior	   to	   the	   ontological	   question	   of	   being.	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  40	  On	  being	  a	  thing	  amongst	  other	  things,	  see	  Maurice	  Merleau-­‐Ponty,	  “Eye	  and	  Mind”,	  The	  Primacy	  
of	  Perception	  and	  Other	  Essays	  on	  Phenomenological	  Psychology,	   the	  Philosophy	  of	  Art,	  History,	  and	  
Politics,	  ed.	  James	  M.	  Edie,	  (Evanton:	  Northwestern	  University	  Press,	  1964),	  p.	  163.	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PART III 	  
DEXTERITY AS OMNIDIRECTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:  
We See Ourselves, We See Each Other (2015) 	  Since	  documentary	  deals	  with	   the	   social	  world	  and	  encompasses	   social	   relations	  and	  the	  voluntary	  contributions	  of	  others,	  the	  duty	  of	  care	  has	  historically	  required	  an	  ethical	  stance	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  relationships	  formed	  between	  those	  involved	  with	  the	  documentary.	  This	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  relationship	  of	  filmmakers	  to	  their	  material,	   and	   to	   the	   disciplines	   not	   only	   of	   production,	   but	   of	   distribution	   and	  exhibition	   as	   well.	   When	   considering	   the	   attitudes	   and	   motivations	   of	   artists	  working	  with	  documentary	  material,	   how	  does	   their	   relationship	   to	   the	  material	  emerge	   in	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   work?	   How	   does	   the	   relationship	   become	  visible?	  And	  what	  if	  the	  other	  is	  a	  non-­‐human	  entity,	  like	  elements	  of	  nature,	  a	  tree	  for	  instance,	  or	  historical	  elements	  such	  as	  found	  objects	  or	  archival	  photographs?	  In	  addition	  to	  responding	  to	  Walid	  Beshty’s	  question	  posed	  earlier	  of	  how	  “ethical	  relations	   create	   form”,	   I	  will	   further	   consider	  Beshty’s	   query	   by	   asking	  what	  we	  might	  mean	  when	  we	  speak	  of	  an	  “aesthetics	  of	  ethics”?	  (Beshty,	  2015:	  19).	  	  These	   questions	   are	   not	   new	   to	   the	   theoretical	   study	   and	   practice	   of	  documentary.	   Given	   that	   documentary	   has	   its	   foundation	   in	   assumptions	   of	  objectivity,	  ethical	  concerns	  have	  circled	  around	  the	  balancing	  of	  collective,	  social	  gains	  (general	  good)	  versus	  individual	  losses	  (the	  right	  to	  privacy)	  (Pryluck,	  1976).	  In	  the	  art	  context	  however,	  for	  instance	  in	  experimental	  practices,	  documentary,	  if	  thought	   of	   as	   figurative	   art,	   never	   needed	   to	   be	   subjected	   to	   the	   burden	   of	  objectivity.	  We	  assume	  such	  works,	  whether	  referred	  to	  as	  documentary	  or	  art,	  to	  be	   the	   individual	   expression	   of	   an	   artistic	   activity,	   as	   we	   do	   with	   painting,	   or	  sculpture,	  and	  so	   forth.	  Such	  works	  may	  be	  considered	   ‘personal’,	  or	   ‘subjective’.	  But	  tensions	  between	  (artistic)	  freedom	  and	  (moral)	  obligation	  remain	  at	  the	  core	  of	   ethical	   inquiries.	   The	   question	   remains	   whether	   these	   inquiries	   acquire	   a	  different	  status	  in	  art	  as	  they	  do	  in	  documentary?	  Theorist	  Bill	  Nichols	  observed	  long	  ago	  that	  the	  discourse	  of	  documentary	  ethics	   often	   falls	   on	   either	   side	   of	   the	   dividing	   line,	   between	   denouncing	   as	  unethical	  or	  supporting	  as	  ethical	  particular	  works	  in	  accordance	  with	  political	  or	  ideological	  belief	  systems	  of	  a	  given	  time,	  geography,	  or	  institution.	  Ethical	  debate	  he	   says	   can	  become	   “an	   arrested	   form	  of	   logic.	   It	   succumbs	   to	   a	  position	  wholly	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within	  an	  ideology	  of	  binary	  oppositions	  justified	  by	  the	  moral	  superiority	  of	  one	  term	   over	   another	   (good	   over	   evil,	   truth	   over	   falsehood,	   men	   over	   women,	  property	   rights	   over	   civil	   rights)”	   (Nichols,	   1991:	   102).	   Developments	   in	   critical	  thinking	  on	  documentary	   since	  Nichols’	   critique	  have	  offered	   a	  way	  out	   of	   these	  moral	  binaries	  by,	   for	  example,	  thinking	  through	  philosopher	  Emmanuel	  Levinas’	  ethics	   of	   responsibility	   towards	   the	   other,	   in	   particular	   through	   the	   face-­‐to-­‐face	  encounter	  (Aaron,	  2007,	  2014;	  Bergen-­‐Aurand,	  2014;	  Butler,	  2004;	  Cooper,	  2006;	  2007;	  Downing	  &	  Saxton,	  2010;	  Renov,	  2004;	  Saxton,	  2007).	  	  For	   Levinas,	   ethics	   precedes	   ontology.	   Levinas’	   “responsibility”	   is	   defined	  by	  both	  the	  recognition	  of	  separateness	  from	  the	  other,	  and	  of	  the	  radical	  alterity	  of	  the	  other.	  According	  to	  Levinas,	  this	  responsibility	  is	  not	  a	  conscious	  choice	  but	  an	   inherent	   obligation	   that	   comes	   before	   questions	   of	   self	   and	   being.	   Issues	  discussed	   amongst	   documentary	   theorists	   have	   concerned	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  cinema	  might	  expose	  us	  to	  an	  other	  without	  the	  other	  being	  reduced	  to	  an	  object	  of	  perception	   (Saxton,	   2007).	   But	   is	   an	   object	   of	   perception	   inherently	   at	   risk	   of	  subjugation?	   What	   about	   filmic	   expressions	   that	   are	   a	   register	   of	   reciprocal	  relations	   between	   objects?	   To	   site	   an	   example,	   for	   his	   short	   video	  work	  We	  See	  
Ourselves,	  We	   See	   Each	  Other	   (Martin,	   2015),	   Sheffield-­‐based	   artist	   Peter	   Martin	  chooses	   to	   pair	   very	   enigmatic,	   appropriated,	   vintage	   photographic	   images	  depicting	   disparate	   people	   in	   their	   daily	   lives	   with	   audio	   taken	   from	   a	   Learn	   A	  
Language	   In	   Your	   Car	   tape.	   He	   compiles	   phrases	   from	   that	   tape	   into	   an	  “authoritative,	   abstract	   prose”	   (Martin,	   n.d.).	   Both	   the	   sound	   objects	   and	  photographic	  artefacts	  are	  assembled	  much	   like	   I	   imagine	  a	  sculptor	  might	  work	  with	   wood,	   metal,	   or	   concrete.	   In	   the	   prose	   Martin	   constructs,	   he	   suggests	   a	  narrative	  of	   individual	  private	   lives,	  which	  nevertheless	  extends	  out	   to	  universal	  concerns,	  about	  war,	  commodities,	  memory,	  social	  customs.	  We	  See	  Ourselves,	  We	  
See	   Each	   Other	   begins	   as	   if	   preparing	   the	   viewer	   for	   a	   lesson.	   Amongst	   more	  mundane	   sound	   bites	   like,	   “Sit	   down,	   please”,	   are	   more	   loaded	   questions	   like,	  “What	  are	  you	  looking	  for?”,	   followed	  by	  statements	   like	  “Listen	  well”	  and	  “Don’t	  deceive	   yourselves.”	   From	   the	   outset	   there	   is	   a	   felt	   proximity	   by	   way	   of	   this	  address,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  ‘we’	  is	  implied.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  ‘we’	  are	  presented	  with	  otherwise	  unrelated	  photographs	  of	  strangers,	  the	  distant	  unrelated	  ‘other’.	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  Fig.	  14:	  We	  See	  Ourselves,	  We	  See	  Each	  Other,	  2015,	  film	  still.	  	  	  In	  Minimal	  Ethics	  for	  the	  Anthropocene,	   cultural	   theorist	   Joanna	  Zylinska	  reminds	  us	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   ethics	   and	   politics	   as	   being	   one	   in	  which	  we	   are	  already	   “involved,	   obligated,	   entangled”	   (Zylinska,	   2014:	   95).	   Why	   not	   then	   as	  objects	  amongst	  other	  objects?	  The	  proposal	  to	  shift	  from	  the	  subject	  position	  into	  that	   of	   the	   object	   could	   indeed	   be	   a	   fantasy	   that	   somehow	   imagines	   a	   more	  egalitarian,	   or	   more	   equitable,	   alignment	   of	   things	   amongst	   other	   things	   as	   a	  paradigm	  of	  a	  ‘better	  world’,	  or	  of	  better,	  more	  ethical	  or	  communitarian	  relations.	  But	   it	  could	  also	  simply	  be	  a	   thought	  experiment	  concerning	  dexterity.	   I	  propose	  the	   practice	   of	   this	   dexterity	   to	   involve	   an	   engagement	   with	   omnidirectional	  responsibility.	  	  I	  must	  here	  clarify	   that	   I	  am	  appropriating	   the	   term	  omnidirectional	   from	  its	   use	   in	   sound	   technology.	   An	   omnidirectional	   microphone	   differs	   from	   a	  unidirectional	  one	  in	  that	  it	  picks	  up	  sound	  equally	  from	  all	  directions,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  directional	  microphone	  that	  mostly	  picks	  up	  sound	  from	  the	  specific	  direction	  it	  is	  pointed	  at.	  The	  use	  of	  this	  particular	  term	  here	  is	  significant	  for	  my	  purposes	  as	   it	  puts	  at	   the	  centre	  the	  object	   that	   it	   is	  vital	   to	  get	  a	  recording	  of.	  Likewise,	   if	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translated	  into	  a	  situation	  of	  being	  a	  filmmaker,	  a	  viewer	  or	  a	  critic,	  each	  likewise	  takes	  a	  central	  position.	  Each	   is	  an	  object	  amongst	  another,	  and	   in	  ethical	   terms,	  each	   set	   of	   eyes	   and	   ears	   would	   do	   well	   to	   operate	   like	   an	   omnidirectional	  microphone	   does.	  What	   I	   am	   suggesting	   is	   that	   regardless	   of	   being	   a	   filmmaker,	  viewer	  or	  critic	  one’s	  primary	  obligation	  is	  to	  be	  mindful	  to	  the	  circular	  motion	  of	  responsibility	   that	   emanates	   outwards.	   This	   requires	   the	   dexterous	   corporal	   as	  well	  as	  conceptual	  engagement	  I	  have	  been	  calling	  ethical	   labour.	  And	  to	  be	  sure,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  my	  terminological	  use	  of	  the	  word	  object	  versus	  subject,	  I	  am	  not	  saying	   we	   would	   be	   better	   off	   as	   equal	   objects	   as	   opposed	   to	   equal	   subjects.	   I	  merely	  propose	   that	   a	   change	  of	   terminology	  brings	  out	   the	   flaws	  of	   the	   subject	  position.	  Who	   then	   is	   a	   subject?	  Where	   is	   she/he/it?	   And	  where	   or	   how	   do	  we	  locate	   the	  other?	  The	  aim	  here	   is	   to	   tease	  out	  and	  crystallise	   this	   conceptual	   flip	  between	   subject/object/other	   and	   the	   slippery	   ground	   each	   occupy.	   Contrary	   to	  maintaining	   the	   centrality	   of	   the	   subject	   position	   I	   propose	   the	   dispersal	   of	   this	  centrality	   by	   inaugurating	   a	   habit	   of	   thinking	   not	   about,	   or	   for	   the	   other,	   but	   by	  beginning	  to	  think	  as	  the	  other.	  	  But	   what	   does	   it	   mean	   to	   “think	   as	   the	   other”?	   The	   question	   arises	   how	  thinking	  as	  the	  other	  differs	  from	  thinking	  ‘in	  place	  of’,	   for	  or	  about	  the	  other.	  To	  think	  as	  the	  other	  would	  seem	  at	  first	  glance	  to	  be	  infused	  with	  an	  identification-­‐impulse.	  But	  here	  it	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  signal	  identification	  with	  the	  other	  as	  an	  act	  of	   surrogacy,	   or	   worse,	   an	   act	   of	   sovereignty	   over	   the	   other.	   The	   difference	  between	  the	  two	  modes	  –	  identifying	  with	  the	  other	  and	  thinking	  “as	  the	  other”	  –	  can	  perhaps	  be	  extrapolated	   through	  Levinas’	   idea	  of	   separation:	   I	   am	  obligated,	  and	  responsible	  in	  spite	  of,	  or	  precisely	  because	  of	  our	  separateness.	  Philosopher	  Philippe	  Nemo	  explains:	  “The	  responsibility	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  other	  is,	  for	  Levinas,	  precisely	  the	  inordinate	  responsibility,	  the	  Infinite	  responsibility	  of	  being-­‐for-­‐the-­‐other	  before	  oneself	  –	  the	  ethical	  relation”	  (Lévinas	  &	  Nemo,	  1985:	  12).	  	  There	   is	   also	   shared	   ground	   between	   Levinas’	   commitment	   to	   the	  recognition	  of	  alterity	  and	  separation	  with	  philosopher	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy’s	  thinking	  on	  “being	  with”	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘being	  alone	  together’,	  a	  singularity	  manifest	  alongside	  other	  singularities	  (Nancy,	  2000).	  “Com-­‐passion”	  he	  says	  “is	  not	  altruism,	  nor	  is	  it	  identification;	   it	   is	   the	   disturbance	   of	   violent	   relatedness”	   (Nancy,	   2000:	   XIII).	  “Being	  is	  singularly	  plural	  and	  plurally	  singular”,	  and	  this	  speaks	  of	  a	  relatedness	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that	   designates	   “an	   originary	   unity	   and	   its	   division”	   (Nancy,	   2000:	   29–41;	  emphasis	  added).	  Likewise,	  the	  expression	  “as	  the	  other”	  is	  intended	  to	  designate	  an	   ontological	   unity	   that	   acknowledges	   a	   plurality	   of	   simultaneous	   and	   separate	  agencies.	  Thinking	  as	  the	  other,	  then,	   intentionally	  omits	  some	  syntax	  and	  means	  thinking	   as	   well	   as	   the	   other.	   In	   its	   condensed	   form	   the	   expression	   brings	   into	  relief	  the	  problems	  inherent	  in	  thinking	  “for”	  or	  “about”	  the	  other.	  Both	  of	  which,	  in	   my	   estimation,	   privilege	   the	   subject	   who	   speaks.	   So	   thinking	   as	   the	   other	  expresses	   a	   coalition	   of	   singularities	   denoting	   both	   proximity	   and	   distance:	   an	  expression	   of	   ontological	   closeness	   that	   “emphasizes	   the	   distancing	   it	   opens	   up”	  (Nancy,	  2000:	  5).	  	  	  One	  of	   the	  most	   striking	  moments	   in	  Peter	  Martin’s	  We	  See	  Ourselves,	  We	  
See	   Each	   Other	   is	   a	   faded	   picture	   of	   a	   couple	   standing	   in	   front	   of	   their	   home,	  adorned	  with	  British	  flags.	  The	  woman	  is	  holding	  an	  infant,	  and	  this	  is	  paired	  with:	  “She	  did	  not	  fall	  in	  love	  with	  him”	  (Martin,	  2015).	  The	  projections	  we	  are	  invited	  to	  make	   through	   the	   organisation	   of	   the	   material	   may	   to	   some	   extent	   be	  discomforting.	  The	  distance	  of	  the	  abstract	  prose	  combined	  with	  the	  proximity	  of	  a	  familiar	   cultural	   scene,	   or	   a	   shared	   sense	   of	   familial	   relations	   that	   we	   might	  recognise	   from	   our	   own	   lives,	   can	   produce	   a	   response	   that	   moves	   in	   several	  directions	   at	   once.	   One	   might	   feel	   confused	   by	   the	   distant	   associations	   or	  uncomfortable	  about	  the	  objectification.	  How	  would	  the	  unknown	  woman,	  or	  the	  unknown	  man	  in	  the	  picture,	  feel	  about	  such	  a	  supposition?	  The	  material	  presence	  of	   the	   piece	   comes	   to	   the	   fore	   as	   a	   counter	   point	   to	   their	   actual	   lives.	   The	  compromised	   ontological	   dignity	   of	   the	   people	   inhabiting	   the	   images	   is	   brought	  into	  question	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  reflex	  –	  an	  ethical	  demand.	  How	  do	  we	  reconcile	  the	  discomfort	  we	  may	   feel	   in	   knowing	   that	   the	  material	   has	   been	   organised	   by	   the	  artist	  as	  an	  assembly	  of	  objects	  (without	  permission,	  and	  without	  considering	  the	  originating	   context),	   alongside	   our	   interest	   in	   the	  wider	   commentary	   emanating	  from	  the	  film	  about	  the	  world	  we	  recognise	  as	  one	  that	  we	  are	  a	  part	  of?	  What	  is	  the	  artists’	  obligation	  towards	  the	  image?	  Is	  the	  woman	  ‘real’?	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  Fig.	  15	  &	  16:	  We	  See	  Ourselves,	  We	  See	  Each	  Other,	  2015,	  film	  stills.	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But	  another	  direction	  one’s	  response	  may	  move	  in	  is	  one	  that	  I	  mentioned	  earlier:	  that	  of	  com-­‐passion	  as	  a	  counterpoint	  to	  violent	  relatedness	  (Nancy,	  2000).	  This	  other-­‐wise	  direction,	   from	  the	  one	  of	  discomfort,	   I	  would	  argue,	  arises	   from	  the	  repetitions	   that	  Martin	  sets	  up	   in	   the	   film’s	  structure.	  These	  repetitions	   form	  segments	  including	  questions,	  statements,	  and	  instructions	  that	  repeat	  a	  word,	  and	  from	   the	   repetition	   of	   naming	   actions	   like	   “to	   walk”,	   “to	   sense”,	   “to	   touch”.	   For	  instance,	  an	   image	  of	  a	  man	  pointing	  towards	  something	  undetermined	  sets	  off	  a	  sequence	   structured	   around	   questions	   including	   the	   word	   “where”,	   like	   “Where	  are	   you	   going?”.	   Another	   sequence	   circles	   around	   statements,	   or	   instructions	  featuring	   the	   word	   “one”.	   “One	   cannot	   change	   that”	   or	   “One	   gets	   used	   to	  everything”	  –	  referring	  to	  an	  undetermined	  self	  –	  become	  expressions	  of	  evasion,	  “an	  emptying	  out	  of	  what	  is	  closest”	  (Nancy,	  2000:	  8).	  The	  thing	  that	  is	  ‘closest’	  is	  the	  speaker,	   in	  this	  case	  Martin	  himself.	  The	  form	  his	  expressions	  take	  eventuate	  an	   object-­‐on-­‐object	   relation,	   that	   is,	   Martin	   becoming	   an	   undetermined	   object	  alongside	   other	   objects.	   This	   is	   how:	   the	   address	   of	   the	   prose	   that	   sequences	  advance	  through	  never	  settles.	  The	  address	  moves	  with	  a	  flow	  of	  images	  between	  “I”,	  “we”,	  “you”,	  “they”.	  Other	  word	  repetitions	  include	  “rest	  and	  resting”,	  “I”,	  “she”,	  “remember”	  for	  example.	  Like	  a	  metronome	  setting	  a	  beat,	  these	  are	  matched	  with	  corresponding	  everyday	  representations.	  The	  sequence	  on	  “we”	  that	  ends	  with	  the	  statement	  “We	  are	  against	   the	  war”	   followed	  by	  “We	  are	   interested	   in	  her”	   leads	  into	   the	   “she”	   sequence,	   bringing	   together	   a	   disparate	   collection	   of	   mundane	  vintage	   photographs	   of	   women	   in	   their	   daily	   lives	   punctuated	   by	   loaded	  statements	   like	  the	  one	  mentioned	  earlier:	  “She	  did	  not	  fall	   in	   love	  with	  him”.	  An	  everyday	  picture,	  Nancy	  writes,	  simultaneously	   reveals	   singularity,	   banality,	   and	   our	   curiosity	   about	   one	  another.	   The	   principle	   of	   indiscernibility	   here	   becomes	   decisive.	  Not	   only	  are	   all	   people	   different	   but	   they	   are	   also	   all	   different	   from	   one	   another.	  They	   do	   not	   differ	   from	   an	   archetype	   or	   a	   generality.	   The	   typical	   traits	  (ethnic,	   cultural,	   social,	   generational,	   and	   so	   forth),	   whose	   particular	  patterns	   constitute	   another	   level	   of	   singularity,	   do	   not	   abolish	   singular	  differences;	  instead,	  they	  bring	  them	  into	  relief.	  (Nancy,	  2000:	  8)	  	  These	  singular	  differences	   that	  do	  not	  stem	  from	  a	  generality	  are	  brought	  into	   relief	   in	  We	  See	  Ourselves,	  We	   See	  Each	  Other	   through	   the	   shifts	   of	   address	  from	  you,	  we,	   I,	   them.	   The	   subject	   position	   is	   completely	   dispersed	   in	   a	  manner	  that	  may	  be	  reminiscent	  of	  Sergei	  Tret’iakov’s	  decentred	  hero	  in	  “The	  Biography	  of	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the	  Object”.	  Whilst	  there	  is	  a	  singular	  player	  at	  work,	  Martin,	  the	  film	  does	  include	  a	  plurality	  of	  singularities	  that	  may	  make	  up	  the	  ‘originary	  unity’	  Nancy	  speaks	  of.	  For	  the	  attentive	  viewer,	  this	  produces	  a	  proximity	  that	  is	  present	  in	  separateness	  as	   well	   as	   in	   a	   kind	   of	   shared	   historical	   strangeness.	   On	   this	   very	   feeling	   of	  strangeness	  Nancy	  writes:	  [The]	   very	   humble	   layer	   of	   our	   everyday	   experience	   contains	   another	  rudimentary	  ontological	  attestation:	  what	  we	  receive	  (rather	  than	  what	  we	  perceive)	  with	   singularities	   is	   the	  discreet	   passage	   of	   other	   origins	   of	   the	  world.	   What	   occurs	   there,	   what	   bends,	   leans,	   twists,	   addresses,	   denies	   –	  from	  the	  newborn	  to	  the	  corpse	  –	  is	  neither	  primarily	  "someone	  close,"	  nor	  an	  "other,"	  nor	  a	  "stranger,"	  nor	  "someone	  similar."	   It	   is	  an	  origin;	   it	   is	  an	  affirmation	  of	   the	  world,	  and	  we	  know	  that	   the	  world	  has	  no	  other	  origin	  than	  this	  singular	  multiplicity	  of	  origins.	  (Nancy,	  2000:	  8–9)	  	   My	  question	  has	  been,	  in	  art,	  what	  role	  can	  objectification	  as	  a	  methodology	  play	   in	   making	   visible,	   in	   affirming,	   this	   “singular	   multiplicity	   of	   origins”?	   Can	  objectification	  as	  a	  method	  serve	  to	  bring	  into	  relief	  the	  condition	  of	  life	  described	  by	  Nancy	  as	  “being	  singular	  plural”?	  For	  me	  this	  expression	  speaks	  to	  the	  dispersal	  of	  centrality	   just	  as	  much	  as	   it	  speaks	  of	  unity.	  And	  so,	   in	   its	  most	  basic	   function,	  can	   objectification	   in	   art	   for	   instance	   serve	   as	   a	   strategy	   for	   decentring	   the	  assumed	  political	  agency	  of	  documentary	  practice,	  rooted	  in	  the	  hegemonic	  control	  Steyler	  calls,	  “documentality”?	  	  It	   is	   necessary	   to	   now	   clarify	   that	   my	   contestation	   with	   the	   assumed	  political	   agency	   of	   documentary	   is	   that	   it	   puts	   the	   filmmaker	   at	   the	   centre	   as	  subject;	   he/she	   who	   acts	   politically.	   Additionally,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   evoke	   anew	  Steyerl’s	  notion	  of	  documentality.	  It	  names	  a	  condition	  or	  stance	  that	  can	  be	  both	  complicit	  with,	  as	  well	  as	  critical	  of,	  “dominant	  forms	  of	  a	  politics	  of	  truth”	  (Steyerl,	  2003a;	   2003b;	   2006).	   The	   question	   remains	   whether	   objectification	   can	   –	   as	  rudimentary	   countenance	   or	   as	   a	   complex	   one	   –	   be	   considered	   an	   aesthetics	   of	  ethics.	   Or	   would	   this	   claim	   run	   risk	   of	   manifesting	   itself	   as	   another	   “politics	   of	  truth”?	  Worse,	  is	  any	  one	  formulation	  of	  documentary	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  aesthetics	  of	   ethics,	   irrespective	   of	   the	   field	   in	   which	   it	   is	   practiced,	   forever	   stuck	   in	   a	  relativist	   loop	   of	   “truth”	   assertions	   for	   individual	   ends	   –	   be	   that	   of	   the	   artist,	  filmmaker,	  curator,	  institution,	  or	  critic?	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Nancy’s	   singular	  plural	   idea	  of	  being	   incorporates	  a	   flow	  of	   “all	   things,	   all	  beings,	   all	   entities,	   everything	   past	   and	   future,	   alive,	   dead,	   inanimate,	   stones,	  plants,	  nails,	  gods	  –	  and	  ‘humans,’”	  in	  an	  inter-­‐related	  circulation	  that	  moves	  in	  all	  directions	   at	   once	   (Nancy,	   2000:	   3).	   We	   might	   call	   this	   ethical	   stance	   an	  omnidirectional	   responsibility.	   In	   ways	   similar	   to	   Nancy,	   Karen	   Barad	   extends	  Levinas’	  human-­‐centred	  thoughts	  on	  our	  responsibility	  to	  non-­‐human	  entities:	  	  if	   responsibility	   is	  not	  a	  commitment	   that	  a	   subject	   chooses	  but	   rather	  an	  incarnate	   relation	   that	   precedes	   the	   intentionality	   of	   consciousness,	   "an	  obligation	   which	   is	   anachronistically	   prior	   to	   every	   engagement,"	   then	   it	  seems	   we	   cannot	   ignore	   the	   full	   set	   of	   possibilities	   of	   alterity	   –	   that	  “having-­‐the-­‐other-­‐in-­‐one's-­‐skin”	   includes	   a	   spectrum	   of	   possibilities,	  including	   the	   “other	   than	   human”	   as	   well	   as	   the	   “human”.	   (Barad,	   2007:	  392) Barad	   asserts	   further	   that	   “humanist	   ethics	   won't	   suffice	   when	   the	   ‘face’	   of	   the	  other	   that	   is	   ‘looking’	   back	   at	   me	   is	   all	   eyes,	   or	   has	   no	   eyes,	   or	   is	   otherwise	  unrecognizable	  in	  human	  terms.	  What	  is	  needed	  is	  a	  posthumanist	  ethics,	  an	  ethics	  of	  worlding”	  (Barad,	  2007:	  392).	  But	  before	  exploring,	  in	  Part	  IV,	  approaches	  that	  future	   ethical	   thinking	   may	   incorporate,	   I	   will	   next	   outline	   questions	   initially	  raised	   about	   the	   ethics	   of	   documentary	   in	   the	   documentary	   field	   in	   order	   to	  critically	   reflect	   on	  historical	   debates.	   For,	   I	   believe	   these	  questions	   are	   relevant	  and	   transferable	   to	   the	   art	   field.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   basic	   and	   central	   question	  about	  the	  outcome	  of	  our	  artistic	  activity	  remains	  the	  same	  in	  either	  field:	  to	  what	  end?	  To	  whose	  end?	  	  
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS ENACTED IN DOCUMENTARY:  
Grey Gardens (1975)	  What	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  shown	  so	  far	  is	  how	  formal	  innovation	  in	  both	  documentary	  and	   in	   art	   can	   bring	   into	   relief	   and	   motivate	   the	   rethinking	   of	   ethics	   and	  responsibility.	  The	  impact	  of	  aesthetic	  developments	  on	  ethical	  relations,	  and	  vice	  versa,	  continues	  to	  be	  of	  particular	  interest	  here.	  What	  I	  hope	  to	  attest	  is	  that	  the	  cross-­‐pollination	  of	  practitioners	  between	  the	  documentary	  and	  the	  art	  fields,	  and	  discussions	   raised	   in	   an	   interdisciplinary	   context,	   can	   help	   invigorate	   ethical	  debates.41	  In	  addition,	  by	  reframing	  the	  meeting	  point	  between	  films,	  practitioners,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  The	  move	  from	  the	  broadcast	  sector	  towards	  the	  art	  field	  may	  be	  due	  to,	  amongst	  other	  things,	  discontent,	   formal	   restrictions,	   regulatory	   stipulations,	   and	   inhospitable	   working	   conditions	   in	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and	   viewers	   in	   ethical	   terms,	   I	   hope	   to	   open	   up	   the	   possibility	   for	   an	   expanded	  sense	  of	  ethical	  practice.	  All	  the	  while,	  acknowledging	  that	  this	  expressive	  freedom	  may	  also	  push	  the	  boat	  further	  out	  to	  sea	  in	  regards	  to	  ethical	  challenges.	  Before	  enumerating	  on	  this	  further	  I	  will	  now	  provide	  a	  contextual	  overview	  of	  historical	  debates	  on	  ethics	  in	  the	  documentary	  field.	  	  In	  his	  1976	  essay	  “Ultimately	  We	  Are	  All	  Outsiders”,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  critical	  reflections	  on	  the	  ethics	  of	  documentary	  practice,	  Calvin	  Pryluck	  provides	  a	  useful	  clue	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics.	  Considering	  the	  aesthetic	  (formal,	  perceptible)	  developments	  of	  the	  time,	  and	  relating	  to	  the	  Direct	  Cinema	   movement,	   he	   asks:	   “If	   the	   aesthetic	   assumptions	   of	   documentary	   have	  changed,	   can	   it	   be	   merely	   stipulated	   that	   the	   ethical	   relationships	   remain	  unchanged?”	   (Pryluck,	   1976:	   24–25).	   His	   answer	   to	   this	   question	   is	   negative.	  Ethical	   assumptions,	   he	   says,	   “have	   aesthetic	   consequences,	   and	   aesthetic	  assumptions	  have	  ethical	  consequences“	  (Pryluck,	  1976:	  22).	  	  Documentary	  filmmaker	  Alan	  Rosenthal	  presents	  specific	  case	  studies	  in	  his	  essay	   collection	  The	  Documentary	  Conscience	   (1980).	  As	   eloquently	   suggested	  by	  the	   title,	   amongst	   other	   documentary	   related	   topics,	   interviews	   with	   fellow	  filmmakers	   circle	   around	   ethical	   consciousness.	   The	   topics	   discussed	   are:	  exploitation	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  ‘general	  good’;	  the	  public’s	  right	  to	  know	  versus	  an	   individual’s	   right	   to	   privacy;	   implications	   and	   long-­‐term	   consequences	   for	  participants;	  informed	  consent	  (Rosenthal,	  1980).	  	  Of	   continuing	   resonance	   to	   this	   study	   here	   is	   a	   conversation	   with	   Ellen	  Hovde,	  one	  of	  the	  editors	  of	  Grey	  Gardens	  (Maysles	  &	  Maysles,	  1975).	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  filmmakers	  stood	  accused	  of	  what	  some	  critics	  felt	  was	  a	  humiliating	  portrayal	  of	   the	   film’s	   two	   main	   characters,	   Little	   Edie	   (Edith	   Beale)	   and	   Big	   Edie	   (Edith	  Bouvier	   Beale),	   formerly	   of	   considerable	   social	   standing	   as	   the	   relations	   of	  Jacqueline	   Onassis	   (prev.	   Jacqueline	   Bouvier,	   later	   Jackie	   Kennedy).	   The	  mother	  and	  daughter	  pair	  we	  encounter	  in	  the	  film	  are	  but	  a	  shadow	  of	  their	  upper	  class	  status	  and	  appear	  in	  flamboyant	  squalor,	  living	  a	  secluded	  life	  in	  their	  dilapidated	  mansion	   in	   the	   Hamptons,	   New	   York.	   Everyday	   challenges	   like	   poverty,	   social	  isolation,	   and	   mother-­‐daughter	   co-­‐dependence	   often	   come	   to	   performative	  expression	  in	  the	  film.	  Stripped	  from	  the	  privilege	  of	  privacy	  and	  social	  status,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  broadcast	  TV.	   For	   a	  discussion	  on	   the	  balancing	  of	   free	   expression	  and	   content	   regulation	   in	   the	  context	  of	   factual	   television	  programming,	   see	  Brian	  Winston,	  Lies,	  Damn	  Lies	  and	  Documentaries	  (London:	  BFI,	  2000).	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women’s	   vulnerability,	   some	   critics	   claimed,	  was	   exploited	   by	   the	   filmmakers.	  42	  Calvin	  Pryluck	  for	  instance	  focused	  his	  critique	  on	  the	  ethical	  complexities	  of	  Grey	  
Gardens.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  the	  film	  gives	  access	  to	  audiences	  seeing	  places,	  people,	  and	  conditions	  otherwise	  obscured	  from	  view.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  he	  points	  out	  the	  indignities	  of	  being	  seen	  (Pryluck,	  1976).	  Another	  critic,	  Renee	  Epstein,	  writing	  for	  the	  Soho	  Weekly	   in	  1976,	  also	  seems	  troubled	  by	  the	   indignity	  of	  being	  seen.	  She	  quotes	   feminist	  critic	  Molly	  Haskell,	  who	  called	   the	   film	  an	  “ethical	  and	  aesthetic	  abomination”	  and	  the	  women	  “travesties”	  (McElhaney,	  2010:	  94–95).	  43	  	  But	   it	   can	   also	   be	   argued,	   as	   Ellen	   Hovde	   does	   in	   The	   Documentary	  
Conscience,	   that	   the	   critiques	   are	   rooted	   in	   the	   viewer’s	   discomfort	   with	   facing	  themselves	  (Rosenthal,	  1980).	  Meaning,	  as	  viewers,	  we	   impose	  our	  own	  sense	  of	  dignity	  about	  how	  we	  want	  to	  be	  seen,	  what	  is	  private	  and	  what	  is	  public,	  on	  the	  film’s	  participants.	  But	  would	  it	  not	  be	  more	  significant	  to	  interrogate	  instead	  our	  own	   identification-­‐impulse	   as	   an	   act	   of	   misplaced	   ‘surrogacy’	   over	   the	  documentary	   image	   and	   the	   object	   of	   study	   itself?	   The	   Beales	   consented	   to	   be	  filmed,	  and	  their	  consent	  has	  bearing	  on	  how	  questions	  of	  ethical	  behaviour	  on	  the	  part	  of	   the	   filmmakers	  are	  evaluated.	  Besides	  questioning	   the	   filmmakers	  on	   the	  existence	  of	   signed	   consent	   forms	   that	   have	   legal	   standing,	   such	   an	   evaluation,	   I	  contend,	  also	  needs	  to	  arise	  out	  of	  a	  given	  consent	  that	  is	  visible	  in	  the	  film.	  	  From	   this	   point	   of	   view,	   it	   becomes	   necessary	   to	   direct	   the	   question	   of	  ethics	   or	   responsibility	   away	   from	   the	   filmmaker	   and	   towards	   the	   viewer.	   	   As	   a	  viewer,	   it	   becomes	   decisive,	   then,	   to	   ask:	   from	   what	   constitutive	   position	   am	   I	  doing	   the	   looking?	   This	   may	   lead	   to	   re-­‐evaluating	   my	   feelings	   for,	   and	   attitude	  towards,	  alterity.	  Before	  elaborating	  on	   the	  ways	   the	  Beales’	   consent	   is	   inherent,	  making	  itself	  visible	  in	  the	  film,	  a	  closer	  look	  is	  needed	  to	  explain	  what	  I	  mean	  by	  an	  act	  of	  misplaced	  ‘surrogacy’.	  Thinking	  through	  Levinas	  will	  be	  helpful	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  problem	  with	  ‘stomaching’	  one’s	  confrontation	  with	  Grey	  Gardens	  lies	  not	  only	  in	  our	  inability	  to	  face	  ourselves,	  as	  Hovde	  and	  Rosenthal	  suggested,	  but	  more	  significantly	  in	  our	  inability	  to	  openly	  face	  and	  truly	  privilege	  the	  “radical	  alterity”	  of	  the	  other,	  their	  separateness	  and	  their	  agency.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Meanwhile,	  the	  film	  has	  acquired	  due	  respect	  as	  an	  exemplary	  work	  in	  documentary	  history.	  43	  For	  key	  texts	  chronicling,	  in	  part,	  the	  film’s	  negative	  critical	  reception	  at	  the	  time	  of	  its	  release,	  see	   Jonathan	  Vogels,	  The	  Direct	  Cinema	  of	  David	  and	  Albert	  Maysles	  (Carbondale:	  Southern	   Illinois	  University	   Press,	   2005),	   p.	   146–147,	   and	   Joe	   McElhaney,	   Albert	   Maysles	   (Urbana	   and	   Chicago:	  University	  of	  Illinois	  Press,	  2009),	  p.	  94–95.	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There	   is	   a	   famous	   scene	   in	   the	   pink	   room,	   a	   pivotal	  moment	   in	   the	   film,	  when	  Little	  Edie	   recalls	  her	  hopes	  of	   another	   life	  being	   severed	  by	  her	  mothers’	  rejection	  of	  a	  suitor.	  When	  she	   first	   tells	   the	  story,	  she	  does	  so	   in	  a	   light-­‐hearted	  manner.	  The	  second,	  almost	  identical	  recollection	  of	  this	  life	  event,	  told	  later	  on	  in	  the	   film,	   is	   evoked	  with	   performative	   sorrow.	   It	   can	   be	   argued,	   Edith	   is	   not	   just	  aware	  of	  what	  she	   is	   ‘revealing’,	   she	   is	  also	   in	   touch	  with	  her	  emotional	  range	   in	  relation	   to	   the	   recollection.	   But	   perhaps	   more	   significantly,	   through	   her	  performativity	  as	  a	   ‘character’	   in	  the	  film,	  one	  also	  gets	  a	  sense	  that	  Edith	  has	  an	  awareness	  of	  what	  might	  be	  needed	  for	  the	  film	  in	  terms	  of	  dramaturgy.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  one	  could	  argue,	  she	  is	  collaborating,	  or	  at	  least	  willingly	  cooperating	  with	  being	  an	  object	  of	  study.	  	  A	   number	   of	   scenes	   suggest	   that	   Little	   Edie	   enjoys	   the	   company	   of	   the	  filmmakers	   and	   being	   part	   of	   the	   filming	   process.	   	   One	   of	   these	   scenes,	   which	  occurs	   towards	   the	   end	   of	   the	   film,	   has	   Edith	   perform	   a	   dance	   for	   the	   camera,	  flamboyantly	  dressed	  as	  she	  is	  throughout	  the	  film,	  and	  waving	  a	  small	  American	  flag.	   The	   scene	   culminates	   in	   her	   joyous	   pronouncement,	   with	   reference	   to	   the	  filmmakers	   and	   the	   camera:	   “David,	   where	   have	   you	   been	   all	   my	   life!”.	   But	   the	  relationship	   between	   her	   and	   the	   filmmakers,	   the	   co-­‐creating	   Edith	   so	   evidently	  felt	  a	  party	  to,	  and	  so	  wholeheartedly	  enjoys,	  is	  established	  for	  viewers	  within	  the	  first	   five	   minutes	   of	   the	   film.	   Appearing	   in	   a	   jungle	   of	   green	   space	   outside	   the	  house,	  Edith	  presents	  her	  “costume	  for	  the	  day”.	  As	  she	  explains	  the	  intricacies	  of	  her	  DIY	  outfit,	  consisting	  of	  garments	  creatively	  draped	  around	  her	  body,	  we	  can	  hear	  one	  of	  the	  Maysles	  brothers	  say	  “mhm”	  and	  “ok”	  in	  a	  manner	  reminiscent	  of	  “don’t	  really	  mind	  what	  you	  wear”.	  	  A	  bemused	  frown	  escapes	  from	  Edith’s	  face	  at	  the	  complacency	  of	  the	  Maysles’	  minimal	  expressions,	  and	  she	  says	  in	  response,	  “I	  have	  to	  think	  these	  things	  up!”.	  The	  scene	  also	  establishes	  her	  mother’s	  collusion	  in	  the	  co-­‐creating	  process.	  Whispering,	  she	  says,	  “Mother	  wanted	  me	  to	  come	  out	  in	  a	  kimono.	   So	   we	   had	   quite	   a	   fight”.	   This	   conversational	   interaction	   is	   briskly	  followed	   with	   inquiries	   on	   what	   has	   been	   filmed	   so	   far	   (Brooks,	   the	   gardener,	  cutting	  grass)	   and	   instructive	  questions	   like,	   “What	  do	  you	  want	   to	  do	  now?	   […]	  You	  want	  to	  go	  up	  and	  photograph	  from	  the	  top	  porch?”.	  She	  then	  shouts	  out	  to	  the	  gardener,	  “I	  got	  to	  photograph	  from	  the	  top	  now	  Brooks”.	  The	  “I”	  clearly	  indicates	  her	  feelings	  of	  agency	  over	  the	  filming	  process.	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  Fig.	  17:	  Albert	  and	  David	  Maysles	  with	  Edith	  Beale	  &	  Edith	  Bouvier	  Beale,	  Grey	  Gardens,	  1975.	  	   There	  are	  other	   scenes	   too	   that	   establish	  Edith’s	   active	   collaboration,	   and	  her	  awareness	  of	  documentary	  representation.	  A	  scene	  filmed	  on	  the	  upper	  deck	  circling	   around	   Brooks’	   payment	   for	   his	   gardening	   service	   is	   entangled	   with	   a	  discussion	   between	   mother	   and	   daughter	   about	   Edith’s	   personal	   freedom,	   her	  wanting	  to	  “get	  away”,	  and	  the	  financial	  constraints	  of	  “being	  supported”.	  During	  a	  small	  dispute	  over	  the	  spelling	  of	  Brooks’	  surname	  and	  the	  date	  of	  the	  cheque	  just	  issued,	  Edie	  Sr.	  threatens	  to	  get	  up	  to	  complete	  the	  task	  in	  the	  house.	  Her	  daughter	  reminds	  her	   that	   she	   is	  barely	  dressed.	   “I’m	  going	   to	   get	  naked	   in	   just	   a	  minute.	  You	  better	  watch	  out.”	   to	  which	   the	  daughter	  replies,	   “That’s	  what	   I’m	  afraid	  of.”	  Why,	   the	   mother	   asks.	   “The	   movie	   mother,	   the	   movie”,	   Edie	   Jr.	   emphatically	  exclaims.	  It	  appears	  Edith	  Jr.	  does	  not	  need	  viewers	  or	  critics	  to	  put	  her	  competence	  in	  question	  –	  as	  some	  did	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  film’s	  release	  –	  in	  deciding	  to	  appear	  in	  the	  film.	  Nor	  does	  she	  require	  us	  to	  question	  her	  competence	  in	  deciding	  how	  she	  wants	  to	  appear.	  Ethics,	  I	  believe,	  reconsidered	  from	  the	  position	  of	  the	  viewer	  or	  critic,	  requires	  resistance	  to	  the	   identification-­‐impulse	  and	  keeping	  at	  bay	  acts	  of	  ‘surrogacy’	   over	   the	   documentary	   image	   and	   over	   the	   object	   of	   study	   itself.	  Differentiating	   between	   the	   relation	   to	   the	   other	   as	   a	   reflection	   of	   self,	   and	   the	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confrontation	  with	  the	  difference	  of	  the	  other	  as	  radically	  separate	  from	  ‘I’,	  Levinas	  proposes:	  	  the	  movement	  from	  me	  to	  the	  other	  could	  not	  present	  itself	  as	  a	  theme	  to	  an	  objective	  gaze	  freed	  from	  this	  confrontation	  with	  the	  other,	  to	  a	  reflection.	  Pluralism	   implies	   a	   radical	   alterity	   of	   the	   other,	   whom	   I	   do	   not	   simply	  
conceive	  by	  relation	  to,	  myself,	  but	  confront	  out	  of	  my	  egoism.	  The	  alterity	  of	  the	   Other	   is	   in	   him	   and	   is	   not	   relative	   to	   me;	   it	   reveals	   itself.	  (Levinas,	  1979:	  121)	  	  What	   I	  would	   like	   to	   put	   forward	   is	   that,	   the	  women	   in	  Grey	  Gardens	   are	  neither	  a	  mirror	  nor	  a	  reflection,	  if	  we	  are	  able	  to	  resist	  the	  process	  of	  exercising	  surrogacy	  over	  the	  image;	  if	  we	  resist	  conceiving	  of	  them	  in	  relation	  to	  ourselves.	  Levinas	   sees	   the	   ethical	   manifest	   itself	   in	   our	   ability	   to	   face	   the	   other	   as	   a	  revelatory	   process	   in	   recognition	   of	   separateness.	   This	   confrontation	   with	  separateness	  is	  central	  to	  Levinas’	  thought.	  “Separation	  is	  the	  very	  constitution	  of	  thought	   and	   interiority,	   that	   is,	   a	   relationship	   within	   independence”	   (Levinas,	  1979:	  104).	  	  There	   is	   yet	   another	   way	   we	   could	   approach	   the	   manifestation	   of	   this	  independence.	   That	   is,	   through	   the	   visual	   schema	   of	   Grey	   Gardens.	   The	   film	   is	  composed	   of	   unstable	   images.	   Rather	   than	   filming	   from	   a	   fixed	   camera	   position,	  the	  camera	  work	  is	  hand-­‐held,	  searching	  throughout.	  The	  instability,	  the	  searching	  camera	  eye,	   accentuates	   the	  presence	  of	   the	   filmmaker(s),	   the	  presence	  of	   the	   ‘I’	  that	   is	   doing	   the	   looking	   as	   a	   separate	   entity.	   The	   filmmakers	   therefore	   do	   not	  blend	  easily	  or	  indistinguishably	  into	  the	  fabric	  of	  the	  social	  world	  they	  observe.	  	  In	   addition,	   the	   filmmakers	  work	  with	   a	   zoom	   lens.	   This	  means	   that	   they	  can	  work	   from	  some	  distance.	  Given	   the	  spatial	   configuration	  –	  bar	  one	  scene	  at	  the	   beach,	   the	   film	   is	   shot	   almost	   entirely	   in	   the	   domestic	   setting	   of	   the	   house,	  porches,	  and	  surrounding	  garden	  –	  a	  zoom	  lens	  would	  not	  be	  a	  technical	  necessity.	  As	  we	  see	  the	  focal	  distance	  shift	  within	  images	  and	  scenes,	  bringing	  the	  object	  of	  study	   closer,	  we	  become	  aware	  of	   the	  physical	  distance	  between	   the	   filmmakers	  and	  the	  women	  in	  actual	  space.	  Like	  the	  women,	  the	  filmmakers	  operate	  from	  the	  confines	   of	   the	   specific	   physical	   space	   they	  occupy	   at	   any	   one	   time.	   Though	   this	  zooming,	   in	   purely	   technical	   terms,	   brings	   us	   ‘closer’	   to	   the	   object	   of	   study,	   it	  actually	  compounds	  the	  separation	  or	  distance	  felt	  between	  the	  observer	  and	  the	  observed.	  To	  some	  this	  may	  signify	  an	  objectification,	  an	  undignified	  intrusion	  on	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private	   or	   personal	   space.	   But	   it	   could	   also	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   a	   Levinasian	  separation:	   a	  way	  of	  demarcating	   the	  women’s	   independence	   from	   the	  observer,	  which	  includes	  both	  the	  viewer	  and	  the	  filmmaker(s).	  	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  then	  why	  a	  number	  of	  documentary	  scholars	  have	  found	  Levinas’	   ethical	   thinking	   echoed	   in	   some	   of	   the	   more	   formally	   inventive	   works	  coming	  out	  of	  the	  documentary	  field,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  experimental	  film	  practices.	  For the	  relationship	  to	  the	  revelation	  of	  “radical	  alterity”	  is	  perhaps	  where	  the	  greatest	  advances	   in	   ethical	   thinking	   on	   documentary	  may	   be	   located.	   From	   this	   vantage	  point,	  we	  could	  look	  at	  the	  filmmakers’	  approach	  in	  Grey	  Gardens	  bringing	  alterity	  into	  relief	  and	  affirming	  separateness;	  that	  is,	  a	  relationship	  with	  independence	  in	  thought	  and	  in	  agency.	  This	  relationship	  may	  not	  be	  too	  dissimilar	  to	  the	  “originary	  unity”	   that	  Nancy	   speaks	   of,	   and	   its	   simultaneous	   division.	   Because,	   for	   Levinas,	  the	  ethical	  precedes	  the	  ontological	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  obligation	  to	  the	  other.	  	  This	   obligation	   may	   be	   equivalent	   to	   Nancy’s	   notion	   of	   originary	   unity.	  Levinas’	   idea	  of	  our	  obligation	  to	  the	  other	  resides	  in	  responsibility	  and	  does	  not	  emerge	  from	  thought,	  but	  from	  a	  movement	  towards	  the	  other.	  This	  movement	  is	  opened	  up	  in	  the	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  relation	  that	  he	  calls	  confrontation.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	   that,	   for	   Levinas,	   the	   “face”	   is	   not	   just	   the	   face	   that	  we	   see,	   but	   that	  which	  confronts	   us:	   a	   history,	   a	   situation,	   an	   impression,	   or	   a	   feeling,	   an	   idea.	   He	  envisions	   a	   radical	   openness,	   a	   transcendent	   that	   cuts	   across	   sensibility:	   “the	  vision	  of	  the	  very	  openness	  of	  being”,	  which	  has	  no	  form	  and	  cannot	  be	  configured	  in	   contemplation	   or	   practice	   (Levinas,	   1979:	   193).	   He	   says	   that	   “the	  comprehension	  of	  an	  existent	  consists	  in	  precisely	  going	  beyond	  the	  existent,	  into	  the	  open”	   (Levinas,	  1979:	  190).	  This,	   according	   to	  Levinas,	   leads	  us	   to	  a	   relation	  that	  is	  “different	  from	  experience	  in	  the	  sensible”	  (Levinas,	  1979:	  193). 
 To	   manifest	   oneself	   as	   a	   face	   is	   to	   impose	   oneself	   above	   and	   beyond	   the	  manifested	   and	   purely	   phenomenal	   form,	   to	   present	   oneself	   in	   a	   mode	  irreducible	   to	   manifestation,	   the	   very	   straightforwardness	   of	   the	   face	   to	  face,	  without	  the	  intermediary	  of	  any	  image,	  in	  one’s	  nudity	  (Levinas,	  1979:	  200). […] The	  face,	  still	  a	  thing	  among	  things,	  breaks	  through	  the	  form	  that	  nevertheless	  delimits	   it.	  This	  means	  concretely:	   the	  face	  speaks	  to	  me	  and	  thereby	  invites	  me	  to	  a	  relation	  incommensurate	  with	  a	  power	  exercised,	  be	  it	  enjoyment	  or	  knowledge.	  (Levinas,	  1979:	  198) 	  Levinas’	   term	  “responsibility”	  refers	  to	  an	  a	  priori	  ability	   to	  respond,	  a	  response-­‐ability	   (Sobchack,	  2004).	  But,	  over	  and	  above	   the	  ability	   to	  respond	  to	   the	  other,	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there	  remains	  the	  question	  of	  how	  one	  responds,	  in	  filmic	  expression	  or	  otherwise.	  This	   is	   a	   question	   rooted	   in	   pragmatism.	  My	   concern	   in	   this	   regard	   has	   been	   to	  relocate,	   to	   the	   centre	   of	   discussions	   on	   responsibility,	   the	   viewer’s	   attitude	   and	  response	  to	  the	  viewing	  experience.	  The	  viewer	  plays	  a	  part	  in	  the	  responsibility	  of	  ethical	  thinking	  through	  the	  reception	  of	  works.	  This	  relocation	  of	  the	  viewer	  into	  the	   centre	  of	   ethical	  debate	  does	  not	   free	   the	   filmmaker	   from	  responsibility,	   but	  shifts	  the	  discussion	  to	  include	  an	  omnidirectional	  practice	  of	  responsibility.	  	  But,	   likewise,	   there	   are	   limitations	   to	   reading	   the	   documentary	   method	  through	  Levinas.	  For	  Joanna	  Zylinska,	  in	  all	  that	  Levinas’	  thought	  opens,	  it	  situates	  itself	   in	   the	   transcendental,	   rather	   than	   the	   “immanent,	   as	   differentiation-­‐from-­‐within”	   (Zylinska,	   2014:	   95).	   Levinas	  writes	   little	   on	   art	   and	   refers	   less	   even	   to	  film.	  When	  he	  does,	  his	   thought	   is	  occupied	  with	  the	  musical	  and	   literary	  arts,	   in	  particular	  with	  rhythm.	  He	  sees	  in	  the	  musicality	  of	  an	  image	  (irrespective	  of	  the	  material	   presence	   of	   sound	   or	   image)	   the	   potential	   of	   its	   detachment	   from	   an	  object.	   His	   critique	   of	   the	   basic	   procedure	   of	   art	   is	   its	   habit	   of	   substituting	   the	  object	  with	  its	  image,	  and	  not	  with	  its	  concept.	  For	  Levinas,	  a	  “concept	  is	  the	  object	  
grasped,	   the	   intelligible	  object”	  (Levinas,	  2000:	  119).	  This	  happens	  for	  Levinas	   in	  rhythm,	  where	  the	  idea	  of	  rhythm	  is	  about	  the	  way	  a	  poetic	  order	  affects	  us.	  The	  elements	  of	  this	  poetic	  order	  call	  for	  one	  another	  and	  impose	  themselves	  on	  us,	  to	  participate	   in	   them,	   according	   to	   Levinas.	   “To	   insist	   on	   the	   musicality	   of	   every	  image	  is	  to	  see	  in	  an	  image	  its	  detachment	  from	  an	  object”	  (Levinas,	  2000:	  120).	  	  In	   conclusion,	   and	   to	   very	   briefly	   illustrate	   with	   another	   example,	   Libby	  Saxton’s	  essay	  “Fragile	  Face:	  Levinas	  and	  Lanzmann”,	  does	  well	  in	  articulating	  this	  detachment	   through	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   documentary	   film,	   Shoah	   (Lanzmann,	  1985).	   In	   relation	   to	   the	   contested	   unrepresentability	   of	   the	   Holocaust	   and	  Levinas’	   wider	   critique	   of	   representation	   as	   something	   reductive,	   Saxton	   argues	  for	   Lanzmann’s	   ethical	   treatment	   of	   Holocaust	   history	   coming	   through	   in	   the	  filmmaker’s	  omission	  of	  images	  of	  the	  victims	  and	  in	  	  the	   disjunctive	   relationship	   between	   voice	   and	   image,	   between	   the	  atrocities	   described	   by	   the	   witnesses	   and	   the	   empty,	   derelict	   and	  deceptively	   tranquil	  murder	  sites	   […]	   the	   film	  screen	  opens	  onto	  a	   face	   in	  the	  Levinasian	  sense,	  insofar	  as	  it	  directs	  attention	  beyond	  itself	  towards	  an	  otherness	  which	  cannot	  be	  recuperated	  in	  images.	  (Saxton,	  2007:	  10–11) 	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This	   ‘directing	   beyond’,	   as	   in	   Saxton’s	   example	   of	   the	   Shoah,	   is	   important	   in	  Levinas’	  thinking	  and	  can	  also	  be	  reflected	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  many	  contemporary	  artists’	   documentaries	   today.	   Indeed,	   in	   examining	   the	   confrontation	   of	   film	  objects	  and	  viewing	  bodies	  as	  a	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  encounter,	  images	  and	  our	  agency	  as	  onlookers	  are	  most	  productively	  entwined	  in	  a	  process	  of	  mutual	  consideration.	  As	  such,	   the	   encounter	   between	   film	   objects	   and	   viewing	   bodies	   is	   a	   face-­‐to-­‐face	  relation,	  too,	  which	  has	  inscribed	  within	  it	  an	  ethical	  demand	  for	  response-­‐ability.	  
 
MUTUAL CONSIDERATIONS: 2843 Colborne St. E (2012) 	  Hans	  Belting	  proposes	  that	  “the	  act	  of	  looking	  is	  not	  only	  attracted	  by	  images	  but	  is	  also	  displayed	   in	   them,	  as	   if	   images	  had	  a	   faculty	  of	   looking	   themselves	  or	   could	  reciprocate	   our	   looks”	   (Belting,	   2012:	   187).	   In	   considering	   the	   independence	   or	  agency	  of	  images	  to	  reciprocate	  our	  looks,	  we	  may	  find	  an	  implicit	  relationship	  to	  Levinas.	   This	   may	   be	   the	   ‘face’,	   or	   the	   confrontation,	   as	   revelatory	   process	   that	  Levinas	  speaks	  of.	  Levinas	  points	  to	  rhythm,	  or	  the	  musicality	  of	  an	  image,	  where	  the	   movement	   towards	   the	   other	   can	   be	   located	   and	   where	   the	   potential	   of	   its	  detachment	  from	  an	  object,	  and	  its	  independence	  from	  its	  representation,	  resides.	  But	  what	  if	  the	  image	  is	  absent	  altogether?	  	  	  
	  Fig.	  18:	  2843	  Colborne	  St.	  E,	  2012,	  film	  still.	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To	   site	   an	   example,	   2843	   Colborne	   St.	   E	   (Weissbach,	   2012),	   one	   of	   three	  films	   in	   Josh	  Weissbach’s	  The	  Addresses	   series,	   is	  made	  of	   a	   transparent	  piece	  of	  leader,	  which,	  through	  a	  contact	  film	  printing	  process,	  produces	  a	  black	  screen.	  In	  a	  representational	  sense,	  there	  is	  no	  image.	  Instead,	  the	  audio	  is	  privileged,	  featuring	  two	  cross-­‐generational	  conversations,	  between	  two	  pairs	  of	   fathers	  and	  sons.	  We	  hear	   a	  man	   bathing	   his	   son,	   floating	   between	   the	   tenderness	   of	   his	   interactions	  with	  the	  boy,	  and	  tense,	  instructive	  exchanges	  with	  another	  adult	  male.	  This	  man	  appears	   to	   be	   experiencing	   financial	   difficulties	   and	   is	   anxious	   about	   a	   meeting	  with	  social	  services.	  The	  adult	  son’s	  reassurances	  are	  met	  with	  verbal	  abuse.	  Since	  there	  is	  no	  image,	  it	  is	  through	  listening	  that	  we	  begin	  to	  participate:	  I	  may	  imagine	  the	  bathroom	  being	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  narrow	  corridor	  leading	  to	  a	  large	  living	  room.	  The	  kitchen	  may	  be	  annexed	   there	   through	  a	   smallish	  hatch.	  The	  house	  may	  not	  have	  been	  refurbished	  since	  the	  1980s.	  The	  nexus	  of	  Weissbach’s	  audio	  concept	  is	  in	   the	  movement	  between	  spaces,	  conversations,	  and	  generations;	  between	  what	  viewers	  may	  ‘fill	  in’	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  given	  representation.	  It	  may	  take	  multiple	  viewings	  to	  note	  that	  there	  are	  no	  footsteps.	  The	  two	  conversations	  are	  not	  in	  fact	  happening	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  or	  in	  the	  same	  space.	  The	  sonic	  fabric	  gives	  way	  to	  a	  dissonance	   between	   sound	   objects	   presumed	   to	   be	   ‘real’,	   and	   images	   that	   are	  conjured.	   “The	  projected	  blackness	   that	   is	  not	  darkness,”	  as	  Weissbach	  puts	   it,	   is	  partially	   a	  manifestation	   of	  Weissbach’s	   relationship	   to	   the	  material	   (Norouzi	   &	  Weissbach,	   2013).	   He	   was	   not	   present	   during	   either	   of	   the	   recordings.	   In	   the	  absence	  of	  image,	  the	  meaning	  of	  surreptitiously	  recorded	  conversations	  needs	  to	  be	  elucidated.	  As	  Weissbach	  explains:	  	   Do	  I	  close	  my	  eyes?	  Do	  I	  think	  of	  the	  space,	  the	  people	  I	  am	  sitting	  with?	  I	  am	   interested	   in	   the	   contract	   between	   the	   viewer	   and	   the	   screen.	   I	  want	  people	   to	  be	  next	   to	  each	  other	  when	  they	  are	  encountering	  the	  nastiness	  that’s	  going	  on	  [in	  the	  film].	  (Norouzi	  &	  Weissbach,	  2013)	  	  Weissbach’s	   honouring	   of	   his	   relationship	   to	   the	   material	   and	   his	   insistence	   on	  “the	   contract	   between	   the	   screen	   and	   the	   viewer”	   as	   a	   relationship	   that	   directs	  each	  towards	  the	  other,	  manifests	  in	  his	  choosing	  to	  do	  away	  with	  the	  image	  as	  it	  would	  have	  been	  imagined	  by	  him,	  the	  filmmaker.	  He	  does	  away	  with	  the	  symbolic,	  the	   interpretive,	   indeed	  with	   representation	   altogether.	   Here,	   a	   space	   is	   opened	  beyond	   the	   representational	   for	   viewers	   to	   navigate	   their	   orientation.	   As	   I	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navigate,	  what	  becomes	  apparent	  is	  the	  beckoning	  of	  the	  projected	  blackness	  itself,	  its	  alterity	  and	  independence.	  	  What	  is	  fascinating	  about	  2843	  Colborne	  St.	  E	  is	  that	  the	  film	  forces	  the	  viewer	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  about	  what	  kind	  of	  relationship	  one	  is	  willing	   to	   enter	   into	   with	   it.	   Is	   it	   a	   representational	   one?	   Or	   is	   it	   one	   made	   of	  images	  from	  memory?	  Or	  do	  I	  let	  it	  stand	  on	  its	  own	  terms:	  black,	  undetermined.	  Exactly	  that,	  and	  nothing	  more,	  is	  what	  I	  face.	  That	  may	  be	  the	  face	  of	  it.	  	  
2843	   Colborne	   St.	   E	   belongs	   to	   a	   practice	   which	   foregrounds	   the	  relationship	  of	  the	  viewer	  to	  the	  film	  object	  through	  its	  internal	  schema.	  The	  only	  material	   content	  we	   have	   to	   orient	   ourselves	   are	   the	   voices	   in	   the	   film,	   and	   our	  own	   viewing	   bodies.	   The	   absence	   of	   a	   visual	   framework	   produces	   a	   separation,	  which	  causes	  us	  to	  question	  the	  filmmaker’s	  intention	  towards	  us,	  the	  viewer.	  Why	  expose	  us	  to	  the	  “nastiness”?	  	  When	  considering	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  filmmaker	  towards	  viewers	  we	  might	  also	  ask,	  as	  Karen	  Barad	  does	  in	  reference	  to	  Levinas,	  “[w]hat	  if	  we	  were	  to	  recognize	   that	   responsibility	   is	   ‘the	  essential,	  primary	  and	   fundamental	  mode’	  of	  objectivity	  as	  well	  as	  subjectivity?”	  (Barad,	  2007:	  392).	  Thinking	  through	  Barad’s	  feminist-­‐materialist	   call	   for	   an	   extension	   of	   the	   humanist	   conception	   of	  responsibility	  towards	  other-­‐than-­‐human	  things	  delivers	  me	  to	  Vivian	  Sobchack’s	  term	   “interobjectivity”.	   For	   Sobchack,	   interobjectivity	   is	   a	   physical	   engagement	  with	  the	  material	  world	  as	  material	  –	  we	  are	  both	  objective	  subject	  and	  subjective	  object	   (Sobchack,	   2004:	   4).	   She	   draws	   on	   philosopher	   Maurice	   Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  suggestion	   that	   the	   relationship	   of	   existential	   subjects	   (body)	   and	   existential	  objects	   (world)	   is	   of	   a	   reversible	   nature,	   that	   both	   are	   “capable	   of	   acting	   upon	  
being	  and	  being	  acted	  upon”	  (Sobchack,	  2004:	  294).	  	  Weissbach’s	  projected	  blackness	  in	  2843	  Colborne	  St.	  E,	  I	  suggest,	  is	  capable	  of	   acting	   as	   well	   as	   being	   acted	   upon.	   It	   is	   an	   existential	   object	   in	   and	   of	   itself	  separate	  from	  my	  own	  being	  as	  subjective	  object.	   It	   is	  then	  in	  the	  realisation	  and	  acknowledgement	   of	   one’s	   own	   materiality,	   in	   the	   “body-­‐subject’s	   flesh”,	   that	   a	  “conscious	  differentiation	  of	  ethics	  (our	  reflective	  experience	  of	  response-­‐ability)	  from	   aesthetics	   (our	   reflective	   experience	   of	   sense-­‐ability)”	   can	   be	   drawn	  (Sobchack,	  2004:	  295).	  Because,	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  are	  “mutually	  informing	  and	  axiological	   modalities	   of	   consciousness	   and	   action”	   (Sobchack,	   2004:	   294).	  Furthermore,	  Sobchack	  distinguishes	  between	  vision	  as	  a	  “perceptual	  activity”,	  and	  the	  visible	  as	  a	   “perceptual	  product”	   (Sobchack,	  2004:	  179–182).	  Sobchack	   too	   is	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interested	  in	  what	  modes	  of	  representation	  in	  documentary	  command	  “an	  ethical	  response	  from	  the	  spectator”	  (Sobchack,	  2004:	  9).	  In	  her	  essay	  “Inscribing	  Ethical	  Space”	   she	   is	   not	   interested	   in	   a	   universal	   ideal	   of	   ethical	   looking	   or	   recording,	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  depictions	  of	  death,	  but	  in	  “thickness”	  (Sobchack,	  2004:	  227).	  By	  this,	  she	  means	  the	  filmmakers	  particular	  way	  of	  looking,	  the	  “quality	  of	  the	  filmmaker’s	  gaze”	  (Sobchack,	  2004:	  243).	  	  	   Inter-­‐objectivity	  then	  as	  a	  way	  of	  looking	  and	  recording	  is	  what	  summarises	  the	   conceptual	   aims	   of	   this	   research	   project:	   to	   think,	   be,	   and	   make	   as	   a	   thing	  amongst	   other	   things.	   To	   respond	   to	   the	   material	   world	   as	   material.	   From	   this	  position	   ethical	   principles	   become	   secondary	   to	   demands	   from	   the	   other	   for	  response-­‐ability.	   	   This	   response-­‐ability,	   I	   have	   been	   suggesting,	   can	   move	   in	  multiple	  directions	  and	  is	  a	  process	  that	  engages	  filmmakers,	  participants,	  viewers,	  and	  images	  themselves	  with	  one	  another.	  I	  have	  called	  this	  process	  ethical	  labour	  that	   involves	  acts	  of	  shared	  and	  omnidirectional	  responsibility.	  To	  this	  effect,	   the	  response-­‐ability	   in	  a	  Levinasian	  sense	  of	  the	  filmmaker	  to	  the	  material	   is	  central,	  as	   is	   the	   viewer’s	   to	   the	   film	  object	   equally	  being	   an	  other.	   In	   an	   interview	  with	  Levinas,	  philosopher	  Philippe	  Nemo asks	  whether	  the	  other	  is	  not	  also	  responsible	  for	   him?	  To	  which	   Levinas	   responds:	   “Perhaps,	   but	   that	   is	   his	   affair”	   (Lévinas	  &	  Nemo,	  1985:	  98).	  
 
Inter-objectivity as a way forward 	  The	   documentary	   turn	   appears	   to	   have	   offered	   a	   new	   dawn	   in	   terms	   of	   art’s	  relation	   to	   social	   life.	   Additionally	   it	   may	   have	   offered	   expanded	   possibilities	   in	  reading	   the	   documentary	   as	   a	   critical	   method	   in	   and	   of	   itself.	   The	   aim	   of	   the	  discussions	   presented	   here	   has	   been	   to	   argue	   for	   an	   inter-­‐objective	  modality	   of	  practice,	   which	   is	   by	   no	   means	   free	   of	   ethical	   challenges.	   Whilst	   contemporary	  artists	   have	   indeed	   inherited	   the	   ethical	   challenges	   that	   have	   presented	  themselves	   to	  historical	  documentary	  practices,	   viewers,	   I	   argue,	  may	  be	  gaining	  expanded	   interpretive	   possibilities	   through	   the	   ethical	   reframing	   present	   in	  notions	  of	  inter-­‐objectivity.	  Perceiving	  the	  world	  as	  a	  thing,	  and	  ourselves	  as	  things	  amongst	   other	   things,	   does	   not	   preclude	   a	   relation	   between	   those	   ‘things’.	   The	  negative	  value,	   instrumentalising	  things,	   is	  a	  distinction	  that	  can	  only	  ever	  be	  felt	  through	  a	  specific	  relation:	  the	  relationship	  of	  the	  filmmaker	  to	  the	  material.	  The	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trouble	  is,	  any	  value	  judgment	  of	  this	  relation	  is	  interpretative,	  and	  interpretations	  are	  context	  dependent.	  	  The	  concluding	  part	  of	  this	  research	  continues	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  task	  is	  not	  to	   think	   of,	   for	   or	   about	   the	   other	   (normally	   understood	   to	   be	   the	   basic	   act	   of	  responsibility),	   but	   to	   think	  as	  the	  other.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  proposing	   to	   think	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PART IV	  
 
 A THING AMONGST OTHER THINGS: Introduction	  	  	  
	  Central	   to	   the	   proposition	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   the	   exploration	   of	   things	   amongst	  other	   things	   building	   on	   previous	   considerations	   for	   inter-­‐objective	   relations.	   In	  light	  of	  the	  on-­‐going	  proliferation	  of	  documentary	  material	  in	  artistic	  production	  –	  the	   so-­‐called	   ‘documentary	   turn’	   –	   and	   the	   exchange	   of	   these	   works	   in	   the	  marketplace	   as	   art	   objects,	  what	   are	   the	  ethical	   and	  political	   implications	  of	   this	  ‘object	  turn’	   in	  documentary	  film?	  44	  Whilst	  questions	  regarding	  the	  circulation	  of	  documentary	  as	  an	  art	  object	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  art	  market	  are	  related	  to	  this	  inquiry,	  the	  central	  concern	  continues	  to	  be	  the	  objectification	  of	  the	  real	  as	  a	  critical	  practice.	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  image	  production,	  and	  specifically	  in	   the	  objectification	  of	   the	  real	  as	  a	  process	   in	  relation	  to	   its	  aesthetic	  potential.	  Additionally,	   I	   consider	   the	   attendant	   ethical	   conflicts	   that	   may	   arise	   in	   the	  aforementioned	   process.	   Previously	   I	   argued	   for	   the	   productive	   value	   of	  discomfort	   as	   a	   form	   of	   ethical	   labour	   in	   its	   confrontation	   with	   objectification.	  Additionally,	   I	   argued	   for	   the	   objectification	   impulse	   as	   a	   form	   of	   resistance	   to	  what	   I	  believe	   is	   too	  easily	  assumed	  about	  documentary:	   that	  documentary	   films	  are	   by	   default	   of	   political	   use	   value.	   The	   raison	   d'être	   of	   the	   traditional	  documentary	  is	  that	  it	  ‘acts’,	  is	  politically	  enacted,	  that	  it	  has	  political	  agency,	  and	  that	   it	   mobilises.	   Documentary	   topics,	   participants,	   stories,	   histories,	   are	  traditionally	   considered	  and	   referred	   to	  as	   ‘subjects’,	  not	   ‘objects’.	  Responsibility	  and	   the	   ethics	   of	   care	   towards	   one’s	   subjects	   are	   part	   and	   parcel	   of	   journalistic	  code	   of	   practice.	   But	   the	   aim	   of	   thinking	   through	   and	   referring	   to	   documentary	  objects	  here	  is	  not	  just	  to	  equalize	  the	  status	  quo	  through	  language.	  The	  aim	  of	  Part	  IV	  is	  to	  reframe	  the	  ethics	  of	  documentary	  from	  a	  materialist	  standpoint	  in	  order	  to	  build	  on	   the	  discourse	   that	  concerns	   the	  objectification	  of	   the	  real	  within	  artistic	  practice	   itself.	   Extending	   this	   specific	   inquiry	   from	   a	   materialist	   perspective	  enables	  me	  to	  shift	  the	  prevailing	  debate	  in	  documentary	  studies	  about	  the	  ethics	  of	   representation,	   which	   began	   in	   the	   1970s,	   towards	   the	   exploration	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44 	  This	   question	   was	   addressed	   to	   participants	   of	   the	   Object!	   On	   The	   Documentary	   as	   Art	  symposium	  at	  Whitechapel	  Gallery	  in	  London	  (04	  February	  2017),	  as	  part	  of	  the	  research	  process.	  I	  am	  grateful	   to	   the	  participants	  of	   that	  day	   for	   their	   contributions,	   and	   to	  my	  colleagues	  Nikolaus	  Perneczky	  and	  Mihaela	  Brebenel	  for	  their	  input.	  An	  earlier	  formulation	  was	  made	  public	  as	  part	  of	  
Object	  Documentary	  series	  of	  events	  at	  Bloc	  Projects	  (Sheffield,	  10-­‐18	  June	  2016).	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aesthetic	   potential,	   political	   stakes,	   and	   ethical	   challenges	   that	   arise	   from	  regarding	  documentary	   film	  as	  an	  art	  object	   in	  a	  contemporary,	   interdisciplinary	  context.	  Ethical	  principles	   in	   the	  documentary	   field	  are,	   I	   argue,	  predicated	  on	   the	  assumption	   that	   I	   –	   the	   filmmaker	   (subject/active)	   –	   act	   upon	   the	   participant	  (object/passive).	   The	   way	   the	   participant	   acts	   upon	   the	   filmmaker	   typically	  receives	   less	   attention	   in	   ethical	   debates.	   As	   this	   chapter	  will	   show,	   being	   acted	  upon,	  or	  responding	  to	  the	  “language	  of	  things”	  as	  Hito	  Steyerl	  puts	  it,	  can	  however	  form	  a	  vital	  aspect	  of	  the	  filmmaking	  process	  for	  some	  artists	  as	  well	  as	  filmmakers	  working	  with	   the	  documentary.	  By	  all	  accounts,	   this	   idea	   that	  we	  may	   indeed	  be	  capable	  of	  responding	  to	  the	  language	  of	  things	  can	  equally	  succumb	  to	  ideological	  instrumentalisation,	   or	   contribute	   to	   myth-­‐making	   (Steyerl,	   2008:	   121–130).	   In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  argue	  with	  and	  for	  the	  agency	  of	  the	  other,	  who	  also	  acts	  upon	  me,	  or	  may	  be	  ambivalent	  to	  my	  intentions	  as	  a	  filmmaker.	  This	  strategy	  requires	  me	  to	  likewise	   conceive	   of	   myself	   as	   an	   “agentic”	   object,	   or	   a	   thing	   (Bennett,	   2010).	  Whilst	   an	  object	  with	  agency	  could	  be	   considered	  a	   subject,	   I	  purposefully	  avoid	  terming	  an	  agentic	  object	  a	  subject	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  a	  horizontal	  configuration	  of	   status-­‐relations,	   as	   opposed	   to	   a	   hierarchical	   one.	   And	   although	   there	   are	  nuanced	  differences	  in	  object	  studies	  between	  objects	  and	  the	  historical	  trajectory	  of	  the	  thing,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  terms	  interchangeably	  when	  referring	  to	  a	  being,	  to	  an	  entity,	  and	  to	  matter.	  45	  	  This	   chapter	   looks	   at	   the	   process	   of	   shaping	   documentary	   material	   from	   the	  artists’	   perspective.	   I	   will	   propose	   documentary	   material,	   the	   individual	  components	   that	   make	   up	   the	   documentary,	   its	   constituent	   material,	   meaning	  what	  we	  see	  in	  the	  profilmic	  event	  as	  objects.	  	  If	  I	  am	  there	  with	  a	  camera,	  I	  am	  also	  an	  objective	  component.	  Additionally,	  the	  encounter	  between	  me	  and	  a	  situation	  is	  itself	  also	  an	  object.	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  process	  of	  shaping	  or	  relating	  to	  all	  of	  these	  constituent	   materials	   as	   objectification	   without	   assigning	   a	   negative	   value	  judgment.	   I	  will	   bracket	   off	   the	   assumed	   configuration	   of	   subject	   (filmmaker)	   as	  active	   and	   object	   (contributors,	   things,	   histories)	   as	   passive	   and	   think	   through	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Each	  term	  has	  its	  own	  history	  and	  has	  been	  investigated,	  amongst	  other	  disciplines,	  through	  the	  art	  historical	  context	  and	  through	  philosophy,	  as	  well	  as	  sociology,	  anthropology,	  and	  ethnographic	  studies.	   See	  Fiona	  Candlin	  and	  Raiford	  Guis’s	  Object	  Reader	   for	  an	  overview	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  object	  studies	  and	  thing	  theory.	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  46	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  when	  thinking	  through	  the	  subject	  as	  an	  object,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  preface	  the	  proposition	  by	  acknowledging	  that	  it	  comes	  from	  a	  position	  of	  relative	  liberty.	  If	  viewed	  from	  a	  historical	   position,	   considering	   the	   slave	   trade	   for	   example,	   factoring	   in	   contemporary	   labour	  exploitation	  or	  sex	  trafficking,	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few	  instances	  where	  the	  subject	  (the	  human	  body)	  is	  likewise	   treated	   as	   an	   object,	   the	   proposition	   of	   considering	   a	   human	   being	   as	   a	   thing	   amongst	  other	   things	  quickly	  becomes	  difficult	   to	  support.	  The	   luxury	  of	  conceptualising	   the	  subject	  as	  an	  object,	  and	  to	  further	  contemplate	  the	  agency	  of	  inanimate	  objects,	  is	  undoubtedly	  a	  contemplation	  afforded	  by	  the	  luxury	  of	  relative	  privilege.	  It	  is,	  after	  all,	  difficult	  to	  justify	  arguing	  for	  the	  rights	  or	  agency	  of	  objects	  when	  those	  rights	  remain	  unfulfilled	  for	  so	  many	  ‘subjects’	  worldwide.	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THE PLEASURE OF THE REAL: 
THE INCALCULABLY FAR AND THE VERY NEAR 
Electrical Gaza (2015)  	  In	  their	  essay	  titled	  “The	  Documentary	  Attitude”,	  Erika	  Balsom	  and	  Hila	  Peleg	  map	  the	   tension	   present	   in	   thinking	   about	   documentary	   across	   disciplines	   –	   the	  discipline	  of	  art	  and	  the	  discipline	  of	  documentary.	  Referencing	  the	  work	  of	  writer	  and	   film	  critic	   James	  Agee	   in	  Let	  Us	  Now	  Praise	  Famous	  Men,	  a	  book	  published	   in	  collaboration	  with	   the	   photographer	   and	   photojournalist	  Walker	   Evans	   in	   1941,	  the	   essay	   sets	   up	   the	   frustrated	   tension	   between	   the	   communicative	   power	   of	  words	  and	  images,	  each	  an	  aspirational	  conduit	  for	  accessing	  and	  communicating	  the	   real.	   Balsom	   and	  Peleg	   describe	  Agee’s	   humility	   in	   articulating	   the	   failure	   of	  words	  to	  communicate	  the	  perceivable,	  and	  Agee’s	  privileging	  of	  the	  photographic	  as	   his	   ethical	   position	   (Balsom	   &	   Peleg,	   2016).	   Photography,	   they	   suggest,	   is	  positioned	  closer	  to	  the	  real,	  to	  earth,	  flesh,	  to	  the	  “materiality	  of	  the	  real”	  than	  is	  the	  discipline	  of	  writing	  (Balsom	  &	  Peleg,	  2016:	  11).	  While	  written	  language	  may	  be	   insufficient,	   lacking,	   Balsom	   and	   Peleg	   also	   point	   to	   a	   similar	   lack	   in	  photography.	   The	   productive	   tension	   they	   set	   up	   is	   as	   follows:	   because	   of	  photography’s	  very	  close	  proximity	  to	  the	  real	  (closer,	  say,	  than	  words	  could	  be),	  the	  photograph	  risks	  capitulating	  to	  the	  muteness	  of	  the	  things	  it	  depicts	  (Balsom	  &	  Peleg,	  2016:	  12).	  Though	   I	  am	  not	  certain	   it	   is	   so	   intended,	   for	  a	  documentary	  practitioner	  like	  myself,	  the	  suggestion	  of	  proximity	  to	  the	  real	  and	  the	  suggested	  risk	   of	  muteness	   ring	   home	  with	   regards	   to	   the	   process	   and	   practice	  method	   of	  documentary	  itself.	  It	  rings	  home	  as	  the	  productive	  risk	  of	  contingency	  and	  chance,	  which	   drive	   the	   documentary	   method.	  47	  For	   this	   risk	   which	   Balsom	   and	   Peleg	  speak	   of	   is	   exactly	   the	   risk	   that	   compels	  me	   to	  make	  work	   in	   the	   documentary	  mode.	  To	  be	   in	   the	  presence	  of	  muteness,	  which	   is	  not	   silence,	   and	   to	  make	   this	  encounter	   communicable,	   is	   indeed	   the	   pleasure	   of	   the	   real,	   and	   therefore	   the	  pleasure	  of	   the	  documentary	  method.	  48	  It	   is	  precisely	  because	  words	  don’t	  come	  easily	  to	  me	  that	  I	  turn	  to	  moving	  image	  and	  its	  language	  to	  communicate	  both	  as	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  See	   Janet	  Harbond’s	   essay	   “Contingency’s	  Work:	  Kracauer’s	  Theory	  Of	   Film	  And	  The	  Trope	  Of	  The	  Accidental”	   for	   a	   discussion	   on	   contingency	   “as	   a	   historical	   category,	   and	   a	   conceptual	   term	  that	  prises	  open	  the	  bodily	  encounter	  with	  the	  image”	  (Harbond,	  2007:	  91).	  48	  In	  her	  keynote	  presentation	  at	  the	  Object!	  On	  the	  Documentary	  As	  Art	  symposium	  at	  Whitechapel	  Gallery,	  Erika	  Blasom	  referred	  to	  the	  “frisson	  of	  the	  real”.	  The	  expression	  of	  pleasure	  was	  taken	  up	  by	  Rosalind	  Nashashibi	  in	  the	  presentation	  that	  followed	  Balsom’s.	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filmmaker	   and	   as	   a	   film	   curator.	   Muteness,	   I	   suggest,	   need	   not	   be	   overcome	   or	  resolved,	  nor	  need	  it	  be	  given	  voice.	  Muteness	  produces	  its	  own	  language	  system.	  But	  what	  is	  this	  system?	  There	   are	   two	   very	   complex	   propositions	   initiated	   in	   Balsom	   and	   Peleg’s	  “The	   Documentary	   Attitude”	  which	   I	   feel	   are	   productive	   to	   explore	   further.	   One	  proposition	   regards	   the	   idea	   of	   photography’s	   proximity	   to	   the	   real.	   	   The	   other	  speaks	   of	   the	   risk	   of	   muteness	   in	   relation	   to	   photographic	   depiction.	   I	   want	   to	  begin	   with	   a	   discussion	   about	   the	   proximity	   of	   words	   to	   the	   real	   versus	   the	  proximity	  of	  images	  to	  the	  real.	  Could	  one	  mode	  of	  communication	  indeed	  enjoy	  a	  closer	  relation	  to	  the	  real	  than	  the	  other?	  I	   imagine	  this	  proposition	  as	  a	   friendly	  duel	  between	  words	  and	  images,	  each	  negotiating	  their	  distance	  and	  each,	  at	  times,	  competing	   for	  proximity	   to	   the	   real.	  The	  desire	   to	  measure	   this	  distance	  may	  be	  inherent.	   And,	   it	   may	   also	   manifest	   itself	   in	   the	   questioning	   of	   truth,	   which	  documentary	   is	   historically	   entangled	   with.	   “Is	   it	   real?”	   can	   at	   times	   be	  interchangeable	  with,	  “Is	  it	  true?”	  How	  close	  are	  we	  to	  knowing	  this,	  or	  that?	  	  How	  close	  am	  I	  to	  being	  able	  to	  touch	  something,	  to	  know	  another,	  to	  presence	  and	  to	  co-­‐exist	  with	  a	  thing,	  any	  thing?	  These	  questions	  articulate	  a	  desire	  to	  measure,	  to	  hold	  to	  account,	  to	  be	  cognisant	  of	  a	  proximity	  to	  something	  that	  evades	  definition.	  Heidegger	  already	  pointed	  out	  in	  1954	  that	  the	  abolition	  of	  distances	  in	  space	  and	  in	  time	  through	  the	  technological	  advancement	  in	  transportation	  and	  through	  the	  ability	   to	   communicate	   across	   vast	   networks	   and	   geographies	   had	   brought	   no	  nearness.	   Nearness,	   he	   says,	   “does	   not	   consist	   of	   shortness	   in	   distance.	  What	   is	  least	   remote	   from	   us	   in	   point	   of	   distance,	   by	   virtue	   of	   its	   picture	   on	   film	   or	   its	  sound	   on	   the	   radio,	   can	   remain	   far	   from	   us.	  What	   is	   incalculably	   far	   from	   us	   in	  point	   of	   distance	   can	   be	   near	   to	   us”	   (Heidegger,	   2001:	   163).	   This	   incalculable	  distance	   that	  can	  at	  once	  be	  very	  near	  sits	  at	   the	  centre	  of	   this	   research	   into	   the	  “products”	  which	  emerge	   from	  the	  documentary	  method.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	   I	  may	   call	   these	   products	   (as	   well	   as	   their	   constituents)	   objects	   or	   things	  interchangeably.	  	  Philosopher	   Jean	   Baudrillard	   assigns	   a	   distinctiveness	   to	   what	   he	   calls	  “marginal	   objects”,	   which	   are	   endowed	   with	   a	   double	   meaning	   because	   “[t]hey	  appear	  to	  run	  counter	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  functional	  calculation,	  and	  answer	  to	  other	   kinds	   of	   demands	   such	   as	   witness,	   memory,	   nostalgia	   or	   escapism.”	  (Baudrillard,	   1996:	   73).	   I	   would	   suggest	   the	   documentary	   is	   such	   a	   marginal	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object,	   and	   artist/filmmaker	   Rosalind	   Nashashibi	   frames	   the	   incommunicable	  closeness	   to	   this	   object	   or	   thing	   as	   the	   “thrill	   of	   the	   real”.	   49 	  One	   way	   of	  approaching	  Nashashibi’s	  films	  is	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  observational	  documentary	  film.	  And	  although	  the	  act	  of	  looking,	  as	  a	  contemplative	  yet	  outward-­‐reaching	  act,	  is	  a	  large	  part	  of	  Nashashibi’s	  method,	  it	  is	  by	  no	  means	  the	  only	  way	  to	  read	  her	  works.	   Nashashibi	   shoots	   on	   16mm	   film	   to	   create	   intimate	   perspectives	   and	  contemplative	  pacing,	  often	  adding	  an	  exacting	  sound	  design	  to	  her	  works.	  These	  sound	   elements	   collide	   with	   the	   analogue	   source	  material	   to	   conjure	   a	   visceral,	  physical	   viewing	   experience.	   In	   Nashashibi’s	   work,	   the	   ‘real’	   world	   ‘out	   there’	  comes	   into	   sensuous	   contact	   with	   the	   viewer’s	   equally	   real	   internal	   world.	  Nashashibi’s	  films	  are	  rarely	  encountered	  together	  in	  a	  cinema	  context,	  as	  they	  are	  more	   often	   commissioned	   by	   arts	   institutions	   and	   appear	   as	   single-­‐channel	  installations	   in	  museums	   and	   galleries.	   In	   a	   retrospective	   I	   curated	   for	   Close-­‐Up	  Film	   Centre	   in	   London,	   Nashashibi	   talked	   about	   the	   burden	   of	   the	   classic	  documentary	   mode	   and	   it’s	   desire	   for	   a	   “human	   element”.	   The	   desire	   to	   get	   to	  know	  a	  community	  through	  its	  story	  for	  Nashashibi	  “got	  in	  the	  way	  of	  looking”.	  50	  In	   the	  post	   screening	   talk	  with	  Dan	  Kidner,	  Nashashibi	   said,	   “Part	  of	  bringing	  an	  audience	  with	  me	  was	   to	   be	   a	   bit	  more	   self-­‐referential”.	   She	  wants	   her	   films	   to	  illustrate	  a	  feeling,	  her	  feeling	  of	  being	  there,	  and	  so	  looking	  with	  her	  is	  very	  much	  privileged	   over	   and	   above	   forms	   of	   expression	   that	   might	   follow	   a	   narrative	  trajectory.	   To	   echo	   Erika	   Balsom,	   these	   kinds	   for	   films	   “seek	   not	   to	   master	   the	  world	   but	   to	   remain	   faithful	   to	   it,	   creating	   for	   the	   viewer	   a	   time	   and	   space	   of	  attunement	   in	   which	   a	   durational	   encounter	   with	   alterity	   and	   contingency	   can	  occur,	  with	  no	  secure	  meaning	  assured”	  (Balsom,	  2017)	  .	  	  Though	  Nashashibi	  tackles	  diverse	  contexts,	  from	  a	  Scottish	  ballet	  school	  to	  the	  Gaza	  Strip,	  often	  working	   in	  closed	  communities,	  be	   they	  an	  extended	   family	  living	   in	   one	   house,	   or	   a	   crew	   of	   men	   on	   a	   cargo	   ship,	   the	   films	   share	   an	  attentiveness	   to	   the	   pleasure	   of	   the	   real.	   They	   tease	   out,	   invite,	   and	   call	   one	   to	  question	   the	   degree	   of	   a	   viewer’s	   attentiveness	   to	   and	   involvement	   in	   the	  construction	  of	  the	  films.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Rosalind	   Nashashibi,	   Object!	   On	   the	   Documentary	   as	   Art	   symposium,	   Whitechapel	   Gallery	   (04	  February	  2017).	  Organised	  for	  Sheffield	  Fringe.	  50	  Rosalind	   Nashashibi,	   FILMN	   YOUR	   LIFE	   WITH	   FASHION,	   Close-­‐Up	   Film	   Centre	   (09	  February	  2017).	  Organised	  for	  Sheffield	  Fringe.	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Nashashibi	   frames	   the	   “pleasure”	   in	   the	   things	   she	   films,	   as	   their	  “touchability”.	  51	  On	   the	   occasion	   of	   her	   show	   at	   Tulips	   and	   Roses	   in	   Brussels	  (2010),	  Jonas	  Zakaitis	  wrote:	  	  	  Imagine	  looking	  at	  a	  thing	  or	  a	  gesture,	  which	  is	  not	  quite	  recognizable,	  not	  having	   a	   history	   one	   could	   retrace,	   but	   still	   making	   some	   kind	   of	   mute	  sense.	   A	   thing	   as	   an	   absolute	   beginning,	   already	   orchestrating	   a	   universe	  around	  itself	  before	  anybody	  even	  realizes	  or	  speaks	  about	  it.	  52	  	  Nashashibi’s	  film	  Electrical	  Gaza	  (2015)	  is	  such	  a	  thing:	  an	  absolute	  beginning	  that	  orchestrates	  a	  real,	  all	  the	  while	  omitting	  the	  signposts	  of	  political	  articulation	  with	  purpose	   and	   determination.	   This	   documentary	   thing,	   Electrical	   Gaza,	   requires	   a	  suspension	  of	  the	  expectant	  documentary	  impulse	  to	  inform,	  educate,	  campaign	  in	  order	   to	   give	   space	   to	   the	  pleasure	   and	   the	   thrill	   of	   the	   real	   as	   it	   communicates	  itself	  on	   its	  own	   terms:	  mute,	  not	  quite	   recognisable,	   looking,	  presencing.	  A	  very	  well-­‐articulated	   inaccessibility,	   the	   logic	   of	   which	   is	   complete	   only	   through	  participation	  by	   its	   viewer.	   Said	  differently,	   the	   film	   can	  only	  be	   completed	  with	  the	   images	   I	   bring	   to	   the	   viewing	   experience,	   or	   as	   Balsom	   puts	   it,	   with	   the	  viewer’s	   “labour	   of	   associative	   thought”	   (Balsom,	   2017).	   Additionally,	   Electrical	  
Gaza	   requires	   the	   suspension	   of	   self-­‐interest	   as	   a	   political	   advocate	   (s/he	   who	  speaks	  for	  the	  other)	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  filmmaker	  and	  the	  viewer.	  Commissioned	   by	   the	   Trustees	   of	   the	   Imperial	  War	  Museum	   and	   shot	   in	  Gaza	   in	   just	   one	  week	   at	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   2014	   conflict	   –	   framed	  by	   the	   state	   of	  Israel	   as	   Operation	   Protective	   Edge	   –	   the	   film	   presents	   a	   calm,	   ambivalent	  observation	  of	   life	   in	  Gaza	  before	  and	   in	  between	  violent	  conflicts	  punctuated	  by	  an	  epic	  electronic	  orchestral	  score.	  It	  would	  be	  tempting,	  though	  I	  believe	  rash,	  to	  say	  that	  the	  film	  objectifies	  reality	  –	  that	  it	  is	  without	  politics.	  Indeed	  there	  are	  few	  overt	   signs	   of	   the	   Israeli/Palestinian	   conflict,	   which	   viewers	   will	   know	   has	  challenged	  the	  place	  and	  its	  people	  since	  the	  Six	  Day	  War	  of	  1967.	  Little	  reminds	  us	   of	   Gaza’s	   occupation	   until	   2005,	   and	   Israel’s	   continuing	   control	   over	   Gaza’s	  airspace,	   waters,	   borders,	   or	   the	   continuing	   tensions	   with	   Hamas.	   Given	   the	  Imperial	   War	   Museum’s	   remit	   for	   its	   collection	   to	   “explore	   the	   impact	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Ibid.	   In	   her	   essay	   “Contingency’s	   Work:	   Kracauer’s	   Theory	   Of	   Film	   And	   The	   Trope	   Of	   The	  Accidental”,	   Janet	   Harbond	   points	   out	   the	   haptic	   quality	   of	   “contingency”	   by	   iterating	   its	  etymological	  origin	  from	  the	  Latin	  word	  “tangere”,	  which	  means	  “to	  touch”	  (Harbond,	  2007).	  52 	  Excerpt	   from	   the	   press	   release	   written	   by	   Jonas	   Zakaitis	   for	   the	   occasion	   of	   Rosalind	  Nashashibi’s	  exhibition	  at	  Tulips	  and	  Roses	  in	  Brussels	  (2010).	  Courtesy	  of	  the	  artist.	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contemporary	   conflict	   on	   people’s	   lives”,	   Nashashibi’s	   film	  would	   at	   first	   glance	  appear	   to	   be	   a	   docile	   depiction	   of	   the	   Israeli-­‐Gaza	   conflicts	   (‘IWMC	   Rosalind	  Nashashibi	  Press	  Release	  FINAL’,	  2015).	  Wherein	  then	  lies	  the	  impact	  of	  Electrical	  
Gaza?	   Its	   power,	   I	   argue,	   resides	   in	   the	   subtle	   ways	   with	   which	   the	   image	   and	  sound	  work	  against	  expectations.	  There	  is	  no	  monologue,	  no	  dialogue,	  no	  protest,	  no	   campaigning,	   no	   visible	   resistance.	   Little	   of	   what	   is	   seen	   offers	   any	  remembrance	  of	  the	  on-­‐going	  conflict	  and	  intermittent	  wars.	  We	  see	  men	  chatting	  in	  Arabic	  (no	  translation	  is	  offered),	  the	  preparation	  of	  falafel	  wraps,	  ordinary	  life	  observed	  from	  a	  passing	  car.	  Footage	  of	  a	  gated	  border,	  busy	  with	  people	  locked	  in,	  or	  expectant	  of	  departure,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  reoccurring	  pointers	  towards	  the	  political	  situation	  of	  the	  region.	  Nashashibi	  explains:	  	  	  Gaza	   has	   been	   closed	   from	   the	   outside.	   There	   is	   a	   strong	   feeling	   of	  autonomy	  and	  activism	  and	  a	  corresponding	  fatalism	  and	  despair,	  another	  contradiction	   –	   Gazans	   are	   set	   apart	   from	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world	   and	   yet	  know	  that	  their	  situation	  is	  in	  some	  way	  central	  to	  it.	  Actually	  I	  think	  of	  the	  Gaza	   Strip	   as	  having	  been	  put	  under	   a	   kind	  of	   enchantment	  by	   the	  world	  powers.	   I’m	  using	  terms	   from	  an	  archaic	  or	  childish	   language	  to	  allow	  the	  extraordinary	   conditions	   to	   show	   through	   with	   all	   the	   attendant	  excitement,	   suffering,	   and	   boredom	   of	   life	   under	   enchantment.	   (‘IWMC	  Rosalind	  Nashashibi	  Press	  Release	  FINAL’,	  2015)	  	  In	   the	   film,	   enigmatic	   images	   of	   kids	   and	   horses	   in	   the	   sea	   are	   made	  extraordinary	   by	  what	   viewers	  may	   bring	   to	   it.	  What	   I	   bring	   to	   it	   specifically	   is	  subsequent	  knowledge	  of	  an	  incident	  that	  followed	  and	  which	  circulated	  through	  the	   news	  media	   some	   time	   after	   Nashashibi	   had	   left	   Gaza.	   In	   July	   2014,	   shortly	  after	   Nashashibi’s	   recordings	   of	   a	   beachside	   idyll,	   four	   Palestinian	   boys	   aged	  between	  9–11	  were	  killed	  at	  a	  beach	  in	  a	  missile	  attack	  by	  the	  Israeli	  military.	  The	  incident	  was	  witnessed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  international	  news	  organisations	  stationed	  at	   a	   nearby	   hotel.	   Journalists	   found	   themselves	  within	   200–300	  meters	   viewing	  distance	  from	  the	  incident.	  Images	  of	  the	  beach	  and	  the	  blood	  drenched	  survivors	  including	  two	  teenage	  boys	  and	  two	  adults	  circulated	  widely	  that	  summer	  of	  2014	  as	   one	   of	   a	   number	   of	   major	   news	   events.	   What	   haunts	   Nashashibi’s	   gently	  acquiescent	  and	  beautiful	  images	  of	  the	  coast	  is	  contingent	  on	  my	  knowledge	  of	  the	  subsequent	   missile	   attack	   entangled	   with	   images	   of	   the	   news	   event,	   and	   any	  number	   of	   other	   images,	   some	   associated,	   some	   historical,	   others	   personal	   or	  imagined,	  which	  reside	  in	  my	  thinking	  and	  which	  I	  bring	  to	  the	  film.	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  Fig.	  19:	  Electrical	  Gaza,	  2015,	  film	  still.	  	  	   German	  art	  historian	  Hans	  Belting	  reminds	  us	   that	   images	  “happen	  or	  are	  negotiated,	   between	   bodies	   and	   media”,	   thereby	   merging	   mental	   and	   physical	  images	   (Belting,	   2005a:	   311).	  53	  The	   film	   also	   speaks	   to	   me	   powerfully	   on	   a	  personal	   level.	   As	   a	   child	   migrant	   from	   revolutionary	   Iran	   in	   the	   late	   1970s	  arriving	   in	  Europe,	   I	  was	  not	  able	   to	  reconcile	   the	  news	   images	   I	  encountered	   in	  my	   new	   home	   with	   the	   place	   we	   had	   left	   as	   a	   family.	   Europe	   it	   seemed	   to	   my	  childhood	   eyes	  was	   constructing	   an	   image	   of	   a	   place	   entirely	   partial	   to	   its	   own	  agenda,	  whilst	  floating	  in	  my	  head	  were	  the	  attendant	  images	  of	  ordinary	  life	  of	  a	  place	  that	  was,	  yes,	  going	  through	  a	  revolution	  followed	  by	  violent	  conflict	   in	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war	  between	  1980–1988,	  but	  where	   life	   likewise	  continued	  (almost)	  as	  ‘normal’.	   Yes,	   there	   were	   days	   that	   we	   could	   not	   go	   to	   school,	   there	   were	  explosions	  and	  gunshots	  at	  night,	  uncertainty,	  fear,	  instability,	  a	  one-­‐party	  rule,	  but	  images	  of	  these	  conditions	  sit	  amongst	  a	  greater	  collection	  of	  images	  of	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  social	   scenes,	   eating,	   celebrating,	   going	   to	   school,	   feeding	   the	   ‘hobo’	   cat	   we	   had	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Belting	   defines	   “medium”	   not	   in	   its	   common	   sense	   but	   as	   “the	   agent	   by	   which	   images	   are	  transmitted”,	  whilst	  “body”	  is	  the	  performing	  or	  perceiving	  body	  on	  which	  images	  depend	  (Belting,	  2005a:	  302).	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adopted	  but	  who,	  as	   local	  custom	  has	   it,	  was	  not	   living	   indoors	  with	  us.	   In	  short,	  family	  life	  continued.	  What	  Nashashibi	  shows	  powerfully,	  and	  what	  I	  argue	  is	  the	  core	   of	   her	   political	   expression	   in	   this	   film,	   is	   her	   resistance	   to	   delivering	  catastrophe.	   The	   politics	   of	   the	   piece	   is	   expressed	   in	   the	   palpable	   dissonance	  where	   expectations	   of	   catastrophe	   are	   not	  met.	   Instead,	   viewers	   are	   confronted	  with	   a	   casual,	   ambivalent	   depiction	   of	   life	   in	   the	   Gaza	   Strip.	   Notions	   of	  documentary’s	   role,	   and	   by	   extension	   the	   documentarian’s	   role	   as	   a	   political	  advocate,	   are	   disrupted.	   And	   this	   provokes	   questions	   not	   just	   about	   the	  filmmaker’s	   intention	  but	  more	   significantly	   it	  provokes	  questions	   regarding	  our	  responsibility	  as	  viewers	  or	  critics.	  	  In	  light	  of	  this	  dissonance,	  classic	  questions	  about	  the	  responsibility	  of	  art,	  and	   ethical	   conduct,	   evidently	   surface.	  Where	   are	   the	   politics	   in	   the	   film?	   In	   the	  already	  mentioned	  post-­‐screening	  discussion	  with	  writer	  and	  curator	  Dan	  Kidner,	  prefaced	  with	  the	  playful	  demand,	  “We	  must	  talk	  about	  politics,	  Rosie”,	  Nashashibi	  quite	  rightly	  stands	  her	  ground	  with	  the	  defence	  of	  the	  experiential	   itself	  already	  containing	  politics.	  54	  	  	   Experience	  is	  the	  word	  through	  which	  politics	  is	  manifested.	  When	  you	  are	  shooting	  a	  film	  it’s	  very	  important	  to	  transgress	  some	  boundaries,	  whether	  it	  be	  a	  boundary	  of	  understanding,	  or	  whether	  it	  be	  a	  physical	  boundary	  or	  a	  boundary	  of	   fear	  […].	   I	  had	  thought	  about	  the	  [Gaza]	  coast:	  who	  is	  using	  the	   coast?	   Fishing	   communities,	   people	   picnicking	   on	   the	   beach,	   all	   the	  people	  who	  use	   that	   coast.	  And	   as	   I	   got	  more	   into	   the	  problem	  of	   getting	  into	  Gaza	  and	  what	  that	  meant,	  to	  cross	  that	  border,	  I	  understood	  that	  the	  only	  way	   I	   could	  access	  Gaza	  would	  be	   through	  being	  a	  physical	  presence	  there.	  What	  do	  I	  see	  through	  my	  body,	  through	  my	  eyes,	  through	  my	  ears,	  my	  touch?	  Making	  it	  really	  bodily.	  Because,	  I	  don’t	  feel	  the	  urge	  to,	  or	  I	  don’t	  feel	   the	   possibility	   to	   tell	   their	   stories.	   Any	   story	   I	   could	   tell	   would	   be	   a	  surface	  version	  of	  what’s	  already	  out	  there.	  For	  me,	  it	  was	  important	  that	  I	  was	  registering	  a	  physical	  presence	  there.	  And	  I	  was	  filming	  the	  people	  who	  bring	  about	  that	  [the	  fixer,	  the	  driver,	  the	  translator].	   	  That	  fixer	  is	  the	  go-­‐between	   of	   the	   media	   and	   the	   society	   in	   Gaza.	   He	   is	   the	   guy	   (and	   his	  colleagues)	   who	   brings	   people	   with	   his	   connections	   to	   Hamas,	   with	   his	  connections	   to	   local	   people	   into	   Gaza.	   And	   [that	   is	  what]	   allows	   all	   these	  journalists	  to	  make	  all	  these	  images.	  By	  turning	  the	  camera	  on	  them,	  and	  by	  acknowledging	  my	  own	  position	  in	  the	  world	  –	  and	  I	  use	  various	  techniques	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Ranciére	  defines	  aesthetics	  as	  “the	  system	  of	  a	  priori	   forms	  determining	  what	  presents	  itself	  to	  sense	   experience.	   It	   is	   a	   delimitation	   of	   […]	   spaces	   and	   times,	   of	   the	   visible	   and	   the	   invisible,	   of	  speech	  and	  noise,	  that	  simultaneously	  determines	  the	  place	  and	  the	  stakes	  of	  politics	  as	  a	  form	  of	  experience”	   (Rancière,	   2013:	   13).	   There	   is	   substantial	   literature	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   experiential	  being	  political.	   For	   further	   film-­‐specific	   reading,	   see	  Azoulay	   (2012),	  Köhn	   (2016),	   and	  Sobchack	  (1992,	  2004).	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in	  the	  film	  to	  show	  that	  [it’s	  my	  position	  from	  which	  we	  are	  looking].	  That	  was	  the	  way	  I	  felt	  that	  I	  could	  make	  something	  in	  Gaza.	  55	  	  But	  if	  we	  were	  to	  employ	  greater	  specificity,	   in	  order	  to	  locate	  the	  politics	  within	  
Electrical	   Gaza,	   I	   suggest	   that	   we	   cast	   our	   analysis	   at	   its	   form;	   at	   the	   discord	  between	  the	  images	  and	  the	  sound,	  and	  crucially	  at	  the	  way	  the	  film	  activates	  what	  we	  bring	   to	   the	  viewing	  experience,	   apropos	  of	  pre-­‐existing	  mental	   and	  physical	  images	   and	   associations.	   After	   all,	   the	   film	   entirely	   circumvents	   the	   routine	  solicitation	   of	   the	   viewer’s	   empathic	   identification,	   and	   therefore	   does	   not	  meet	  expectations	  of	  the	  ethical	  labour	  one	  would	  normally	  invest	  in	  a	  film	  that	  makes	  visible	   the	  social	   conditions	  surrounding	  political	   conflict.	  As	  a	  viewer	   I	  may	   feel	  that	  there	  is	  work	  still	  to	  be	  done,	  because	  I	  bring	  to	  the	  film	  knowledge	  of	  violent	  conflict	  that	  remains	  unfulfilled.	  	  Hans	  Belting	  identifies	  three	  constituents	  that	  together	  make	  up	  the	  image:	  its	  material	  self	   (that	  which	  we	  can	  touch),	  what	   is	  depicted	   in	   it	   (that	  which	  we	  see),	   and	   thirdly,	   what	   the	   viewer	   brings	   to	   it.	   For	   Belting,	   the	   human	   body	   is	  directly	  implicated,	  not	  just	  as	  the	  bearer	  of	  the	  image,	  but	  also	  as	  the	  producer	  of	  it	  (Belting,	  2001).	  The	  thing	  that	  may	  disturb	  my	  comfort	  levels	  with	  the	  work	  as	  a	  viewer	   may	   be	   exactly	   the	   thing	   that	   I	   produce	   with	   it,	   and	   for	   that	   I	   am	  responsible.	  	  Images,	  Belting	  invites	  us	  to	  remember,	  “are	  not	  just	  there,	  but	  arrive	  with	  a	  predetermined	  mise-­‐en-­‐scène	  which	  also	  includes	  a	  predetermined	  site	  for	  their	  perception	  which	  they	  guide	  by	  way	  of	  performance”	  (Belting,	  2005:	  9).	  	  If	  we	  want	  to	  study	  documentary	  film	  as	  an	  object	  in	  the	  art	  field,	  and	  if	  we	  want	  to	  seriously	  consider	  the	  performance	  of	  objectification	  as	  a	  critical	  practice	  method,	  and	  consider	  the	  productive	  value	  of	  the	  discomfort	  that	  may	  reside	  in	  the	  lack	  of	  fulfilment	  that	  Nashashibi	  for	  instance	  presents,	  this	  I	  suggest	  necessitates	  the	   incorporation	   of	   wider	   materialist	   perspectives.	   Here	   is	   why:	   documentary	  practice	   deals	   with	   the	   social	   world,	   live	   situations,	   real	   things.	   Relating	   to	   the	  social	  world	  as	  an	  object	  and	  putting	  it	  in	  the	  service	  of	  artistic	  activity	  can	  create	  an	  ethical	  challenge.	  The	   justified	   fear	   is	   that	  such	  an	  approach	  could	  undermine	  the	  ontological	  dignity	  of	  thinking,	  knowing	  subjects,	  or	  worse,	  further	  compound	  the	   instrumentalisation	   of	   things,	   people,	   and	   resources	   contributing	   to	   further	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  “Rosalind	   Nashashibi:	   FILMN	   YOUR	   LIFE	  WITH	   FASHION”,	   transcribed	   from	   a	   post-­‐screening	  talk	   with	   Dan	   Kidner	   at	   Close-­‐Up	   Cinema,	   organised	   by	   Sheffield	   Fringe	   in	   association	   with	   the	  Whitechapel	  Gallery	  symposium	  “Object!	  On	  the	  Documentary	  as	  Art”	  (09	  February	  2017).	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exploitation	   and	   suffering.	   For	   example,	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   designate	   value	   through	  language,	  we	  commonly	  speak	  of	  documentary	  subjects,	  not	  documentary	  objects.	  	  But	   can,	   and	   should,	   documentary	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   an	   object?	   I	   am	  interested	  in	  the	  mental	  shift	  from	  the	  conception	  of	  a	  use-­‐oriented	  documentary	  product	  to	  a	  more	  holistic	  conception	  of	  documentary	  as	  thing.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  marginal	  object	   I	   like	   to	  call	   a	  documentary	   thing,	  and	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  one	   that	   likewise	   answers	   to	   demands	   such	   as	   “witness,	   memory,	   nostalgia	   or	  escapism”	   (Baudrillard,	  1996:	  73),	   could	  have	  a	   relation	   to	  what	   Joanna	  Drucker	  calls	   “image	   events”.	   In	   her	   critical	   discussion	   of	   aesthetic	   works	   (not	   image	  culture	  as	  a	  whole),	  Drucker	  differentiates	  between	  images	  and	  image	  events:	  	  	   When	   conceived	   of	   as	   “things,”	   images	   lend	   themselves	   to	   management	  within	   mechanistically	   imagined	   frames.	   But	   when	   understood	   within	  contingent	  relations	  that	  are	  always	  constitutive,	  image	  events	  emerge	  from	  systems	   of	   codependency.	   As	   events,	   images	   introduce	   play,	   a	  differentiating	   spatial	   perspective	   that	   offers	   conceptual	   space.	   […]	   [T]he	  act	   of	   making	   experience	   un-­‐strange	   returns	   us	   to	   a	   place	   within	   the	  ideological	  system,	  rather	  than	  sustaining	  an	  illusion	  of	  separateness	  from	  it.	  (Drucker,	  2008	  :	  30)	  	  Drucker	  proposes	  refamiliarisation	  as	  a	  critical	  approach.	  She	  argues	  that	  making-­‐strange,	   de-­‐familiarising,	   shocking-­‐us-­‐into-­‐awareness	   as	   adopted	   by	   the	   avant-­‐garde	   may	   be	   obsolete.	   	   Instead,	   she	   proposes	   that	   refamiliarisation	   “returns	  images	  and	  symbolic	  expressions	  to	  a	  system	  of	  cultural	  and	  symbolic	  production	  with	  which	   they	   are	   codependent”	   (Drucker,	   2008:	  30).	   It	   is	   an	   “act	   of	   recovery,	  and	   connection,	  not	   innovation,	  novelty	  or	   shock	  exposure”	   (Drucker,	  2008:	  27).	  
Electrical	  Gaza	  offers	  such	  a	  conceptual	  space	  through	  a	  series	  of	  image	  events	  as	  Drucker	   would	   call	   them.	   By	   making	   un-­‐strange,	   Nashashibi	   re-­‐familiarises	   the	  viewer	   with	   ordinary	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   being,	   the	   experiential,	   as	   a	   locus	   of	   political	  expression.	  Simultaneously,	  the	  film	  rips	  from	  the	  viewer	  the	  redemptive	  potential	  inherent	  in	  the	  assumption	  of	  the	  political	  agency	  of	  documentary	  that	  otherwise	  might	   have	   been	   experienced	   as	   existing	   separately	   from	   the	   viewer.	   In	   other	  words,	  the	  film	  offers	  the	  objectified	  other	  the	  dignity	  of	  a	  wider	  perspective	  whilst	  it	  robs	  the	  viewer	  of	  his/her	  belief	  in	  an	  exceptional	  status	  as	  the	  arbiters	  of	  ‘how	  politics	  is	  done’.	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  Fig.	  20:	  Electrical	  Gaza,	  2015,	  film	  still.	  	  	  But	  I	  propose	  that	  there	  are	  yet	  other	  subtle	  ways	  to	  conceive	  of	  “things”	  and	  their	  attendant	  nearness,	  or	  their	  communicative	  closeness	  to	  the	  real	  –	  whether	  we	  call	  them	  images,	  or	  image	  events.	  	  A	  thing	  could	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  the	  enabled	  other	  to	  the	  reified	  or	  alienated	  object.	  According	  to	  American	  scholar	  Bill	  Brown,	  “[t]he	  story	  of	  objects	  asserting	  themselves	  as	   things	   […]	   is	   the	   story	  of	  a	   changed	  relation	   to	   the	  human	  subject	  and	  thus	   the	  story	  of	  how	  the	   thing	  really	  names	   less	  an	  object	   than	  a	  particular	  subject-­‐object	   relation”	   (Brown,	   2004:	   4).	   Whether	   thought	   of	   as	   a	   particular	  relation,	  or	  a	  self-­‐supporting	  entity,	  Hito	  Steyerl	  astutely	  cautions	  that	  to	  think	  of	  the	  image	  (or	  for	  our	  purposes	  of	  documentary)	  as	  “a	  thing	  like	  you	  and	  me”,	  has	  consequences	   like	   having	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   subjectivity	   may	   no	   longer	   be	   a	  “privileged	  site	  for	  emancipation”	  (Steyerl,	  2010a).	  As	  Steyerl	  points	  out:	  	   to	  engage	  in	  the	  language	  of	  things	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  documentary	  form	  is	  not	  equivalent	   to	  using	   realist	   forms	   in	   representing	   them.	   It	   is	  not	  about	  representation	  at	  all,	  but	  about	  actualising	  whatever	  the	  things	  have	  to	  say	  in	   the	   present.	   And	   to	   do	   so	   is	   not	   a	   matter	   of	   realism,	   but	   rather	   of	  relationalism	  –	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  presencing	  and	  thus	  transforming	  the	  social,	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historical	   and	   also	   material	   relations,	   which	   determine	   things.	   (Steyerl,	  2006;	  emphasis	  added)	  56	  	  	   One	  of	   the	  very	  powerful	  ways	  with	  which	  Rosalind	  Nashashibi	  actualises	  the	  material	  relations	  between	  herself,	  the	  conditions	  of	  (film)	  production,	  and	  the	  people	   and	   the	   situations	   she	   films,	   is	   the	   sound	   of	   her	   own	  breath	   in	  Electrical	  
Gaza.	  Suspended	  in	  the	  film,	  hovering	  above	  it	  like	  a	  pregnant	  cloud	  formation,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  breath	  hints	  awkwardly	  at	  Nashashibi’s	  presence,	  or	  a	  presence.	  It	   is	  not	   important	   to	   know	   it	   is	   the	   filmmaker’s	   own	  breath,	   as	   it	   functions	   to	   point	  intimately	   towards	   a	   proximity	   of	   things	   amongst	   other	   things	   in	   what	   would	  otherwise	  be	  a	  purely	  visual	  study	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  observational	  documentary.	  Whilst	   the	   images	   operate	   at	   some	   remove,	   the	   peculiar	   thingness	   of	   breath	  returns	  us	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  presencing	  suggested	  by	  Steyerl.	   It	  draws	  attention	  to	  a	  suggested	   relation	   through	   a	   sonic	   discord.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   breath,	   placed	  here	   as	   it	   is	   in	   Electrical	   Gaza,	   as	   a	   disembodied	   sound-­‐object,	   would	   seem	  incalculably	   far	   from	  the	   images	  we	  see.	   It	   is	  not	  a	   field	  recording.	   In	  other	  ways	  the	  breath	  we	  hear	  is	  audibly	  close	  in	  its	  sonic	  quality,	  hinting	  at	  a	  nearby	  presence	  that	   could	  be	   read	  as	   an	   involved	  or	   an	   involving	   relation	  between	   the	  observer	  and	  the	  observed.	  The	  use	  of	  breath	  here	  feels	  assured	  in	  its	  position	  as	  subject,	  yet	  it	  may	  be	  discomfortingly	  perceived	  as	  a	  dislocated	  object,	  because	  the	  sound	  we	  hear	  is	  audibly	  dislocated	  from	  the	  scene	  where	  the	  actual	  breathing	  took	  place.	  	  The	  inclusion	  of	  the	  breath	  appearing	  in	  the	  film	  as	  a	  disembodied	  sound-­‐object	   may	   be	   unusual	   for	   a	   documentary	   work,	   because	   it	   is	   audibly	   dubbed	  rather	   than	   being	   diegetic.	   Nashashibi	   tells	   me	   its	   inclusion	   caused	   some	  resistance,	   both	   from	   her	   collaborating	   sound	   artist,	   as	   well	   as	   from	   the	   film’s	  initial	   test	   viewers.	   “Can	   you	   do	   that?”	   some	   asked.	   Others	   emphatically	   adding,	  “You	  can’t	  do	  that.”	  57	  	  But	   a	   case	   could	   be	   made	   for	   it	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   aforementioned	   Heideggarian	  expression	  of	   the	   incalculably	   far	   that	   is	   at	  once	  very	  near.	   It	  may	  be	   read	  as	  an	  embodied	   reminder	   of	   presence	   and	   proximity.	   So	   actualised	   through	   this	  occasional	  pulse-­‐like	  sound,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  film	  reaches	  out	  to	  involve	  the	  viewer,	  implicitly	   drawing	   us	   close	   to	   the	   historical	   relation	   to	   Gaza.	   And	   perhaps	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Steyerl	  draws	  on	  Walter	  Benjamin’s	  concept	  of	  a	  language	  of	  things,	  which	  he	  developed	  in	  a	  text	  titled	   "On	   Language	   as	   Such	   and	   on	   the	   Language	   of	  Man"	  written	   in	   1916,	   but	  which	   remained	  unpublished	  during	  his	  lifetime	  (Benjamin,	  1996	  :	  62–74).	  57	  	  Conversation	  with	  the	  artist	  in	  her	  London	  studio	  (25	  November	  2016).	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concretely	   expressed,	   for	   me,	   the	   breath	   acts	   as	   a	   potent	   visceral	   marker	   of	  aliveness.	  As	  Belting	   reminds	  us,	   just	   as	   the	   body	   is	   responsible	   for	   creating	   the	  image	  between	  the	  here	  (filmmaker,	  viewer)	  and	  the	  there	  (photograph,	  screen),	  and	  not	  just	  with	  the	  eye	  but	  with	  the	  look,	  hearing	  likewise	  is	  embodied,	  involving	  not	  just	  our	  ears,	  but	  “the	  entire	  anatomy	  of	  the	  body	  with	  its	  zones	  of	  resonance	  and	   conduits	   of	   bones	   and	   skin”	   (Belting,	   2012:	   190).	   In	   her	   intention	   as	   a	  filmmaker	   to	   communicate	   the	   vital	  materiality	   of	   her	   own	   body	   as	   it	   lives,	   and	  quite	   literally	  breathes	   in	   relation	   to	   those	   she	   films,	  Nashashibi’s	  proximity	  and	  physical	   presence	   to	   Gaza	   as	   a	   contested	   site	   with	   all	   its	   attendant	   mental	   and	  physical	   images	   of	   suffering	   that	   viewers	   may	   hold	   and	   that	   are	   already	   in	  circulation,	  Nashashibi	  remained	  firm	  about	  the	   inclusion	  of	  her	  breath.	   In	  effect,	  making	  herself	  a	  thing	  amongst	  other	  things:	  breathing,	  co-­‐dependent,	  relating.	  In	  another	  register,	  a	  complexity	  emerges	  from	  Nashashibi’s	  particular	  use	  of	  breath	  that	   may	   suggest	   aliveness.	   The	   use	   of	   breath	   here	   offers	   perhaps	   the	   most	  affirmative	  political	  statement	  not	  often	  made	  about	  Gaza	  and	  Gazans:	  Alive,	   still	  alive.	  58	  Black	   Study	   scholar	   Ashton	   T.	   Crawley’s	   inspired	   text	   titled	  
Blackpentecostal	   Breath:	   The	   Aesthetics	   of	   Possibility,	   talks	   of	   breath,	   and	   of	  breathing	   as	   an	   utterance	   of	  what	   he	   calls	   “otherwise	   possibilities”.	   An	   on-­‐going	  movement	  that	  announces	  “infinite	  possibilities	  to	  what	  there	  is”	  existing	  amongst	  all	  else	  that	  we	  can	  detect	  with	  our	  sensuous	  capacity	  (Crawley,	  2017:	  2).	  Crawley	  theorises	   the	   process	   of	   breathing	   as	   an	   aesthetic	   production	   that	   disrupts	  normative,	   white,	   totalising	   accounts	   of	   history	   and	   knowledge	   production	  (Crawley,	  2017:	  43).	   	   […]	   breath	   as	   the	   intentioned	   performance	   of	   breathing	   […]	   produces	   an	  otherwise-­‐than-­‐history,	   one	   not	   dependent	   upon	   Newtonian	   physics	   of	  smooth,	   linear,	   contained	   time	  and	   space,	   but	   a	  performance	  of	   breathing	  and	  its	  eclipse	  as	  the	  hallucination	  of	  life	  and	  love	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  project	  of	  the	  plentitude	  of	  gratuitous	  violence	  and	  violation.	  But	  the	  breath,	  every	  breath,	   even	   stolen,	   breaks	   down	   the	   project	   through	   rememory.	  Remembered	   is	   the	   balance	   between	   the	   individual	   and	   the	   social.	  Generated	  are	  variations	  around	   the	   theme	  of	  discontinuity	  and	  openness	  as	   a	  way,	   as	   a	   form,	   as	   a	   politics	   against	   violent	   silences	   and	   enclosures,	  mutilations	  and	  deaths.	  (Crawley,	  2017:75)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  In	  Filipino	  people	  often	  greet	  each	  other	  by	  saying	  “buhay	  na	  buhay”	  (breathing,	  still	  breathing),	  which	  roughly	   translates	   to	  “Very	  much	  alive”.	   I’m	  grateful	   to	  my	  supervisor,	  Dr	  Chris	  Wright	   for	  this	  example,	  and	  our	  discussions	  on	  breathing	  and	  aliveness.	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  Crawley’s	   is	   an	   atheological	   and	   aphilosophical	   account	   of	   the	   practice	   of	  breathing	  as	  resistance	  to	  violation	  and	  to	  countenance	  of	  epistemic	  violence.	  Air	  and	   breathing	   are	   acts	   that	   sustain	   movement,	   and	   it	   is	   a	   shared	   practice.	  Epistemic	   theories	  of	  what	   a	  documentary	   is	  or	  ought	   to	  do,	   and	  assessments	  of	  ethics	   in	   documentary,	   likewise	   continue	   to	   be	   rather	   entangled	   with	   the	  prevailing	   idea	  of	   the	  medium	  carrying	   “information	  about	  a	  group	  of	  powerless	  people	  to	  another	  group	  addressed	  as	  socially	  powerful”	  (Rosler,	  2004:	  179).	  But	  Nashashibi’s	  film	  completely	  circumvents	  this	  hierarchy.	  	  The	   following	   scene	   from	  Electrical	  Gaza	   could	  be	   read	   as	  highlighting	   an	  intervention	   into	   said	  hierarchy.	   In	   this	   scene,	   a	   group	  of	  men	   are	   gathered	   in	   a	  lounge	   conversing	   in	   Arabic.	   As	   there	   is	   no	   translation	   offered	   in	   the	   film,	   I	   am	  forced	  to	  reflect	  on	  both	  the	  men’s	  ambivalence	  toward	  Nashashibi’s	  presence,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  filmmaker’s	  ambivalence	  towards	  me,	  as	  the	  viewer	  (in	  not	  offering	  a	  translation).	   This	   invites	   another	   reading;	   not	   one	   of	   boredom,	   disinterest	   or	  ambivalence.	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	   men’s	   indifference	   to	   the	   camera	   and	   to	  Nashashibi’s	  presence	  can	  be	  read	  as	  a	  demonstration	  of	  their	  agency.	  	  Here,	  they	  are	   not	   a	   group	   of	   powerless	   people	   seen	   merely	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   Israeli	  oppression.	   They	   appear	   instead	   as	   an	   egalitarian	   social	   group	   looking	   inwards,	  occupied	  with	  themselves.	  But	  the	  sporadic	  inclusion	  of	  a	  sound	  as	  intimate	  as	  the	  filmmaker’s	  own	  breath	  is	  not	  just	  a	  simplistic	  reminder	  of	  presence	  (the	  artists’	  or	  another’s).	   It	   functions	   as	   a	   powerful,	   and	   perhaps	   for	   some,	   a	   discomforting	  expression	   of	   what	   resistance	   to	   perceived	   distance	  may	   look	   and	   feel	   like	   in	   a	  moving	  image	  work.	  Nashashibi	  is	  letting	  us	  know	  that	  she	  is	  present,	  and	  that	  we	  are	   present	   (as	   viewers)	   breathing	   alongside	  Gazans,	   always	   necessarily	   nearby,	  regardless	  of	  geographical	  distance,	  as	  things	  amongst	  other	  things.	  To	  speak	  then	  not	  about,	  but	  to	  speak	  or	  to	  simply	  breathe	  nearby	  as	  a	  thing	  amongst	   other	   things,	   brings	   to	   mind	   a	   line	   from	   filmmaker	   and	   theorist	   Trinh	  Minh-­‐ha’s	   film	   Reassemblage	   (1982).	   There,	   Minha-­‐ha	   expresses	   the	   politics	   of	  documentary	   representation	   wholesomely:	   “she	   does	   not	   speak	   about,	   but	   she	  speaks	   nearby”	   (quoted	   in	   Dienderen,	   2010:	   92).	  When	  weighing	   this	   alongside	  Minh-­‐ha’s	   thoughts	   on	   authorship,	   and	  her	   attitude	   to	   the	  production	  process	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  agency	  of	  the	  other,	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  acted	  upon	  by	  the	  other	  –	  be	  it	  an	  event,	  person,	  or	  thing	  –	  and	  the	  politics	  present	  in	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  “nearby”	   becomes	   clearer.	   	   This	   “nearby”	   expresses	   the	   idea	   of	   proximity	   to	   the	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real	  suggested	  earlier,	  not	  in	  terms	  that	  would	  relate	  to	  space,	  but	  in	  terms	  that	  are	  political,	  in	  as	  far	  as	  pointing	  towards	  another	  mode	  of	  knowledge	  production.	  Like	  Crawley,	  Minha-­‐ha’s	   position	   is	   concerned	  with	   countering	   normative,	   dominant	  western	  philosophical	  knowledge	  production.	  For	  example,	  Minha-­‐ha	  speaks	  of	  the	  production	  process	  and	  authorship	  as	  an	  encounter	  within	  a	  field	  of	  energy	  where	  things	   are	   acknowledged	   as	   possessing	   the	   agency	   to	   act	   upon	   one	   another.	  Accordingly,	   the	   desire	   of	   a	   colour	   for	   example	   can	   have	   an	   equal	   stake	   to	   the	  desire	  of	  an	  artist	  during	  the	  process	  of	  artistic	  production:	  	  	  The	   elements	   of	   encounter	   (culture,	   personal,	   object)	   form	   the	   space	   of	  subjectivity.	   If	   I	   start	   working	   on	   the	   colour	   green,	   green	   dictates	   what	  comes	  next	  to	  green.	  Can	  we	  then	  talk	  about	  authorship?	  There	  is	  my	  logic	  next	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  colour,	  which	  stands	  on	  its	  own.	  This	  is	  what	  I	  mean	  with	  structure	   that	   stands	   on	   its	   own.	   They	   are	   not	   serving	   anything:	   not	   a	  feeling,	   an	   emotion.	   Green	   is	   not	   serving	   peace.	   It	   is	   there	   as	   a	   colour.	  Authorship	  is	  a	  field	  of	  energy,	  it’s	  unique	  because	  of	  the	  combination,	  but	  not	   because	   it	   belongs	   to	   an	   individual.	   (Minh-­‐ha	   quoted	   in	   Dienderen,	  2010:	  96)	  	  In	   that	  sense,	   the	  encounter	  and	   the	   field	  of	  energy	   that	  make	  up	   the	  real	  are	  as	  much	  a	  space	  of	  objectivity	  as	  they	  are	  a	  space	  of	  subjectivity.	  In	  this	  field	  of	  energy,	   bodies,	   things,	   and	   images	   may	   have	   an	   egalitarian	   relation,	   if	   not	   a	  reciprocal	  one,	  too	  (Belting,	  2012).	   	  Minh-­‐ha’s	  characterisation	  of	  authorship	  as	  a	  field	  of	  energy	  that	  does	  not	  belong	  solely	  to	  an	   individual,	   the	   filmmaker,	  or	  the	  viewer	  (as	  critic),	  likewise	  brings	  about	  other	  associations.	  A	  number	  of	  relational	  configurations	   for	   this	   field	   of	   energy	   come	   to	   mind:	   with,	   alongside,	   the	  aforementioned	  nearby.	  But	   to	  be	   clear,	   this	   “nearby”,	   the	  proximity	   I	  have	  been	  highlighting,	  is	  not	  what	  is	  otherwise	  referred	  to	  simply	  as	  ‘access’	  to	  an	  event,	  to	  persons,	   a	   community,	   an	   institution	  or	   an	  archive.	  To	   those	  unfamiliar	  with	   the	  documentary	  commissioning	  process,	  the	  term	  access	  literally	  refers	  to	  what	  and	  to	   whom	   a	   filmmaker	   has	   access.	   Guaranteed	   access	   is	   what	   qualifies	   a	  documentary	  project’s	  viability	  in	  the	  development	  stage,	  where	  production	  funds	  are	   agreed	   upon.	   And	   this	   brings	   to	   mind	   associations	   with	   organisation,	  pragmatism,	  and	  market	  calculation.	  The	  proximity	  I	  am	  talking	  about	  here,	  though	  related	   to	   the	  pragmatic	  needs	  of	   access,	   has	   another	   flavour.	  This	   flavour	   could	  find	  expression	  through	  another	  terming	  that	  describes	  a	  relational	  configuration.	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In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  talked	  about	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  ethics	  that	  is	  lived	  as	  omnidirectional	   responsibility.	   Supported	   by	   Levinas’	   view	   of	   ethics	   as	   an	  obligation	  that	  pre-­‐exists	  ontology	  or	  intentionality,	  I	  argued	  for	  a	  mode	  of	  being	  I	  called	  “as	  the	  other”.	  Ethics,	  responsibility,	  I	  hoped	  to	  argue,	  is	  not	  about	  thinking	  
for	   the	   other	   or	   about	   the	   other.	   This	   mode	   of	   thinking,	   it	   would	   seem	   to	   me,	  constitutes	  a	  kind	  of	  self-­‐appointed	  surrogacy	  that	  has	  us	  stuck	  in	  the	  performance	  of	   ethical	   principles	   rather	   than	   an	   ethics	   that	   is	   alive,	   lived	   in	   a	   space	   between	  here	  and	  there,	  me	  and	  you,	  between	  the	  filmmaker	  and	  the	  screen	  space,	  between	  the	   image	  and	   the	  viewer,	  but	  all	  while	   recognising	  separateness	  and	   the	   radical	  alterity	  that	  Levinas’	  thinking	  proposes.	  I	  hoped	  to	  demonstrate	  another	  mode,	  one	  I	  called	  as	   the	  other.	  This	  mode	  could	   imply	  a	   transmission	  between	   interrelated	  things.	   A	   transmission	  we	  may	  only	   be	   cognisant	   of	  when	  we	   experience	   things,	  entities,	   matter	   –	   the	   human	   as	   well	   as	   the	   non-­‐human	   –	   as	   being	   close,	  irrespective	   of	   geographical	   or	   physical	   distance	   in	   space.	   When	   we	   experience	  being	   as	   the	   other.	   For	   if	   authorship	   is	   indeed	   configured	   through	   an	   energetic	  field,	   this	   field	   consists	   of	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   energies	   co-­‐existing	   alongside,	   with,	  and/or	  nearby	  one	  another.	  We	  may	  call	  it	  a	  field	  of	  things	  amongst	  other	  things.	  Where	  otherwise	  singular	  energies	  or	  agencies	  are	  co-­‐dependent,	  each	  impacting	  on	   the	  other,	   could	   “as	   the	  other”	  not	   imply	  an	  energetic	  conduit?	  Could	  not	   this	  conduit,	  pinpoint	  and	  occupy	  a	  space	  in	  a	  similar	  manner	  suggested	  by	  Bill	  Brown,	  whereby	  a	  thing	  occupies	  a	  space	  in	  language	  that	  names	  a	  subject-­‐object	  relation	  (Brown,	  2004:	  4)?	  	  My	  “as”	  here	  does	  not	  mean	  “like	  the	  other”,	  but	  is	  intended	  to	  mean	   “likewise”,	   or	   “as	   well	   as”,	   which	   may	   suggest	   proximity,	   or	   let’s	   say,	   a	  privileging	   of	   solidarity	   in	   the	   face	   of	   political,	   social,	   or	   racial	   stratification.	  Regardless	  of	  how	  we	  name	   it,	  one	  crucial	  but	  perhaps	  overlooked	  aspect	  seems	  very	  clear	  to	  me:	  in	  this	  space,	  a	  relation	  is	  always	  already	  fully	  enacted	  before	  we	  may	  be	   cognisant	   of	   that	   relation,	   before	  we	  may	  be	   able	   to	  define	   it,	   before	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  speak	  of	  it.	  What	  I	  have	  hoped	  to	  articulate	  with	  the	  expression	  “as	  the	   other”	   is	   an	   egalitarian	   configuration	   in	   the	   material	   composition	   of,	   and	  proximity	  to,	  the	  real.	  In	  summary,	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  I	  see	  “as	  the	  other”	  affirmed	  is	  in	  Rosi	  Braidotti’s	  expression	  of	  an	  “embodied	  and	  connecting	  containment”.	  	  In	  “Affirmation	  versus	  Vulnerability:	  On	  Contemporary	  Ethical	  Debates”,	  Braidotti	  lays	  the	  ground	  for	  her	  nomadic	  ethics.	  “[A]n	  ethics	  worthy	  of	  the	  complexities	  of	  our	  times	  requires	  a	  fundamental	  redefinition	  of	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  subject	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in	  his/her	  contemporary	  location	  and	  not	  a	  mere	  return	  to	  a	  more	  or	  less	  invented	  philosophical	  tradition”	  (Braidottti,	  2006:	  236).	  Her	  nomadic	  ethics	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  pragmatism	  of	  accountability	  and	  sustainability.	  She	  sees	  it	  located	  not	  “within	  the	  confines	   of	   a	   self-­‐regulating	   subject	   of	   moral	   agency,	   but	   rather	   in	   a	   set	   of	  interrelations	  with	   both	   human	   and	   inhuman	   forces”	   (Braidottti,	   2006:	   237).	   To	  echo	   Braidotti,	   making	   oneself	   available	   to	   this	   set	   of	   interrelations	   in	   their	  foundational	   mode	   is	   to	   risk	   exposure	   and	   vulnerability.	   Recognising	   this,	   as	  Braidotti	  puts	  it,	  	  	   entails	   the	   necessity	   of	   containing	   the	   other,	   the	   suffering	   and	   the	  enjoyment	   of	   others	   in	   the	   expression	   of	   the	   intensity	   of	   our	   affective	  streams.	   An	   embodied	   and	   connecting	   containment	   as	   a	   moral	   category	  could	   emerge	   from	   this,	   over	   and	   against	   the	   hierarchical	   forms	   of	  containment	   implied	   by	   Kantian	   forms	   of	   universal	   morality.	   (Braidottti,	  2006:	  239)	  	  This	  embodied,	   connection-­‐making	   form	  of	   containment,	  Braidotti	  writes,	   entails	  recognising	  there	  is	  no	  distinction	  between	  self	  and	  other	  (Braidottti,	  2006:	  239).	  This	   erosion	   in	   distinction	   between	   self	   and	   other,	   I	   believe,	   is	   not	   intended	   to	  erase,	   let	   alone	   deny	   distinct	   characteristics	   of	   individual	   entities.	   It	   is	   not	  disputing	   alterity.	   I	   believe	   it	   is	   instead	   an	   erosion	   of	   a	   packing	   order,	   of	  hierarchies.	  As	   in	  Minh-­‐ha’s	   example,	   the	   colour	  green	  enjoys,	   if	   not	   an	  equal,	   at	  least	  a	  joint	  status	  in	  the	  desiring	  process.	  What	  would	  be	  so	  scary	  as	  to	  surrender	  to	  the	  colour	  green	  and	   its	  desire	  towards	  what	  sits	  next	   to	   it?	  To	  start	  with	  one	  word	  and	  surrender	  to	  the	  word	  that	  follows.	  	  The	   purpose	   of	  my	   analysis	   here	   of	   Rosalind	  Nashashibi’s	   very	   particular	  use	  of	  breath	  in	  Electrical	  Gaza	  was	  to	  establish	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  aliveness	  of	  the	   breath	   makes	   apparent	   an	   embodied	   relation	   that	   manifests	   as	   the	   other.	  Nashashibi,	   a	   subject	   who	   makes	   of	   herself	   a	   disembodied	   object	   through	   the	  dubbing	   of	   the	   sound	   of	   her	   breath,	   brings	   to	   the	   fore	   the	   imposed	   division	  between	  self	  and	  other,	  between	  subject	  and	  object.	  The	  subject	  is	  always	  already	  the	   object.	   And	   I	   feel	   that,	   contrary	   to	   the	   impression	   of	   an	   unnecessarily	  abstracted	  theorising,	  this	  may	  deliver	  us	  to	  Crawley’s	  very	  pragmatic	  “otherwise	  possibility”.	  	  It	  may	  deliver	  us	  to	  understanding	  ourselves	  in	  relation	  to	  all	  entities	  as	  a	  thing	  amongst	  other	  things.	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THE COMMUNICATIVE POWER OF SILENCE: 
Why Are You Angry? (2017) 	  Having	  made	  a	  case	  for,	  but	  by	  no	  means	  exhausted,	  the	  expansive	  possibilities	  of	  thinking	   through	   the	   real	   in	   relation	   to	  proximity,	   I	  want	   to	   return	  now	   to	  Erika	  Balsom	   and	   Hila	   Peleg’s	   aforementioned	   proposition	   of	   the	   photograph	   running	  the	  risk	  of	  “succumbing	  to	  the	  muteness”	  of	  the	  objects	  it	  depicts	  (Balsom	  &	  Peleg,	  2016:	  12).	  	  Detectable	   in	   some	   documentary	   practice	   methods	   is	   what	   I	   would	  interpret	  as	  an	  interest	  in	  precisely	  that	  risk,	  and	  in	  muteness.	  But	  how	  should	  we	  understand	   the	   term	  mute?	   I’d	   like	   to	  start	  with	  suggesting	   that	  muteness	  gets	  a	  rough	  deal,	  associated	  as	   it	   is	  with	   the	  wordless,	   the	  unspoken,	   the	  unexpressed,	  often	  merged	   with	   the	   assumption	   of	   silence,	   or	   with	   being	   silenced.	   Beginning	  simply	  with	  quotidian	  associations,	  in	  human	  development,	  muteness	  can	  refer	  to	  the	  inability	  to	  speak.	  The	  causes	  can	  be	  physiological,	  having	  to	  do	  with	  injury	  to	  the	   brain,	   the	   tongue,	   the	   vocal	   cords,	   mouth,	   or	   to	   hearing	   loss.	   In	   psychiatry,	  muteness	   can	   be	   associated	   with	   an	   anxiety	   disorder,	   referred	   to	   as	   selective	  mutism,	  when	  a	  person	  may	  chose	  not	  to	  speak	  in	  specific	  situations,	  or	  to	  specific	  people.	   Selective	   mutism	   can	   be	   ascribed	   to	   social	   anxieties.	   Muteness	   can	   also	  occur	  in	  a	  temporary	  state	  of	  shock,	  or	  following	  trauma.	  	  Additionally,	   risking	   a	   breezy	   movement	   akin	   to	   a	   passing	   yet	   perhaps	  consequential	   comment	   that	   takes	   briefly	   into	   account	   otherwise	   commonplace	  cultural	   inscriptions:	   in	   biblical	   terms,	   we	   can	   observe	  muteness	   receiving	   even	  shorter	   shrift.	   There,	   muteness	   can	   find	   itself	   being	   associated	   with	   demonic	  forces:	   “As	   they	   were	   going	   out,	   a	   mute,	   demon-­‐possessed	  man	  was	   brought	   to	  Him.	   After	   the	   demon	  was	   cast	   out,	   the	  mute	  man	   spoke;	   and	   the	   crowds	  were	  amazed“	   (New	  Testament,	  Gospel	  According	   to	  Matthew,	  9:32–33).	  Elsewhere	   in	  the	  New	  Testament,	  silence	  –	  earthy,	  heavenly,	  or	  the	  silence	  of	  ‘God’	  –	  appears	  to	  take	   an	   even	  darker	   turn	   foreshadowing	   a	   great	   revelation	   or	   a	   future	   calamity:	  destruction,	  annihilation,	  the	  judgment	  of	  ‘God’.	  	  	  Having	   begun	   with	   a	   brief	   summary	   of	   ‘scientific’	   inscriptions	   associated	  with	   muteness,	   and	   having	   moved	   intentionally	   through	   the	   theological	   –	   a	  dramatic	   cultural	   inscription	   we	   may	   have	   no	   awareness	   of	   –	   I	   want	   to	   cast	   a	  slightly	  wider	  net	  now	  on	  the	  rough	  hand	  silence	  has	  been	  dealt.	  One	  that	  might	  be	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more	  immediately	  recognisable	  as	  relevant	  to	  this	  study,	  and	  which	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  more	  damning	  than	  my	  breezy	  examples	  so	  far.	  	  In	   his	   1973	   manifesto-­‐like	   charge	   against	   the	   invocation	   of	   the	   term	  “masses”	   in	   the	   fields	   of	   sociology	   and	   politics,	   titled	   In	   the	  Shadow	  of	   the	  Silent	  
Majorities,	   Jean	  Baudrillard	  tries	  to	  recover	  the	  misconception	  of	   the	  existence	  of	  the	   social	   –	   evidenced	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   revolution	   and	   the	   problem	   of	  widespread	  non-­‐participation	  in	  politics	  at	  the	  time	  –	  by	  reframing	  the	  “silence”	  of	  the	  majority	  as	   that	  majorities’	  wilful	  resistance	  to	  politics,	   to	  representation.	  No	  longer	   representable,	   remaining	   nameless	   and	   unidentifiable,	   unmanipulatable,	  the	   “masses”	   know	   they	   are	   neither	   subjects	   nor	   objects,	   and	   silence	   is	   their	  weapon	  of	  active	  resistance	  (Baudrillard,	  1983).	  The	  “revolution	  by	  involution”	  or	  implosion,	  Baudrillard	  warns,	   is	   “silent	  and	   involutive	  –	  exactly	   the	  reverse	  of	  all	  speech	  making	  and	  consciousness	  raising.	  It	  has	  no	  meaning.	  It	  has	  nothing	  to	  say	  
to	  us”	  (Baudrillard,	  1983:	  49,	  emphasis	  added).	  But	  if	  the	  social	  does	  not	  exist,	  as	  Baudrillard	  claimed	  then,	  and	  the	  “masses”	  have	  nothing	  to	  say	  to	  us,	  then	  who	  is	  meant	   by	   “us”?	   Could	   it	   not	   be	   the	   case	   that	   silence	   is	   overlooked	   as	   an	   act	   of	  resistance,	  as	  an	  otherwise	  expression	  containing	  meaning?	  	  My	  mother	  tells	  me	  that	   I	  did	  not	  speak	  until	  very	   late.	  Fearing	  the	  worst,	  concerned	   relatives	   urged	   her	   to	   have	  me	   seen	   by	   a	  medical	   professional.	   I	   did	  eventually	   speak,	   albeit	   well	   past	   the	   expected	   normalcy	   of	   a	   child’s	   speech	  development.	   The	   anecdote,	   though	   otherwise	   unremarkable,	   helps	   clarify	   my	  approach.	   In	   particular	   where	   it	   relates	   to	   a	   preference	   for	   non-­‐interventionist	  filming	  techniques;	  to	  an	  interest	  in	  unrestrained	  looking	  and	  non-­‐verbal	  modes	  of	  being;	  and	  to	  an	  affection	  for	  chance	  within	  documentary	  encounters.	  59	  	  A	  well-­‐known	  approach	  to	  the	  gathering	  of	  documentary	  material	  is	  to	  ask	  questions,	   to	   instigate	   actions,	   to	   project	   oneself	   or	   one’s	   agenda.	   Those	   can	   be	  loosely	  termed	  as	  speech	  making,	  or	  speech	  educing	  acts.	  An	  alternative	  approach,	  favoured	  by	  many	   filmmakers	  operating	   in	   the	   art	   context,	   but	   also	   to	   a	   varying	  extent	   practiced	   within	   the	   distinct	   historical	   branches	   of	   documentary	   (Direct	  Cinema,	   Cinéma	   Vérité,	   in	   ethnographic	   film,	   experimental	   and	   avant-­‐garde	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Alongside	  notions	  of	   contingency,	   chance	  could	  be	  refigured	  here	  as	  an	  active	  player	   in	   “being	  acted	   upon”	   rather	   than	   an	   uninvolved	   state	   of	   passivity.	   Whilst	   I	   am	   aware	   of	   chance	   in	  documentary	  being	  potentially	  related	  to	  leaving	  oneself	  open	  to	  being	  acted	  upon,	  my	  current	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  explore	  that	  as	  a	  theme.	  I	  leave	  this	  possible	  expansion	  to	  a	  future	  exploration.	  Regarding	  the	   general,	   not	   the	   documentary	   or	   film	   specific	   subject	   of	   causality,	   determinism,	   chance,	  accident,	  and	  coincidence,	  see	  Aristotle’s	  Concept	  of	  Chance	  (Dudley,	  2012).	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cinema),	   is	   to	   say	   nothing,	   or	   very	   little,	   to	   be	   there,	   nearby,	   alongside,	  waiting.	  Insights	   may	   or	   may	   not	   emerge	   from	   the	   other	   from	   questions	   addressed	   to	  themselves,	  whether	  communicated	  verbally	  or	  not.	  	  It	  has	   long	  been	  established	   in	   the	   field	  of	  documentary	  and	  ethnographic	  studies	  that	  this	  method	  can	  constitute	  active	  participation.	  In	  “Whose	  Story	  Is	  It?”	  for	  example,	  David	  MacDougall,	  ethnographic	  filmmaker,	  visual	  anthropology	  and	  documentary	  scholar,	  notes	  “[j]ust	  as	  we	  see	  that	  the	  maker	  is	  the	  locus	  of	  a	  set	  of	  cultural	   and	  historical	   forces,	   so	   too	  we	  must	   see	   the	   film	   in	   the	   same	   light,	   and	  acknowledge	   the	  maker	  as	  but	  one	  aspect	  of	   its	  coming	   into	  being”	   (MacDougall,	  1991:	  7).	  In	  his	  work	  as	  filmmaker	  and	  critic,	  MacDougall	  is	  interested	  in	  methods	  of	   discerning	   the	   differences	   in	   “the	   structures	   we	   inscribe	   in	   films	   from	   the	  structures	   that	   are	   inscribed	   upon	   them,	   often	   without	   our	   [the	   filmmakers]	  knowing,	   by	   their	   subjects”	   (MacDougall,	   1991:	   4).	   Filmmaker	   and	   feminist	   film	  scholar	   Fatimah	   Tobing	   Rony	   also	   honours	   the	   contributions	   from	   the	   other	  through	   the	   articulation	   of	   a	   third-­‐eye	   perspective	   in	   her	   analysis	   of	   early	  ethnographic	  cinema.	  Writing	  from	  the	  position	  of	  a	  woman	  of	  colour	  raised	  in	  the	  US,	   Rony	   says,	   “[p]erhaps,	   we	   the	   Savages,	   plunged	   in	   darkness,	   do	   understand	  each	  other.	  What	  we	  share	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  see	  with	  the	  ‘third	  eye’”	  (Rony,	  1996:	  4).	  	  Rony	   acknowledges	   the	   everyday	   commonplace	   experience	   of	   third-­‐eye	  encounters.	  It	  is	  when	  we	  feel	  ourselves	  ‘outside’	  of	  ourselves,	  observing	  a	  scene	  in	  which	  we	  are	  ourselves	  embroiled	  in	  like	  a	  detached	  scientist.	  She	  draws	  on	  Frantz	  Fanon	  and	  James	  Baldwin,	  amongst	  others,	  and	  writes	  from	  the	  specific	  experience	  of	  a	  person	  of	  colour	  developing	  a	  double	  consciousness:	  simultaneously	  viewing	  oneself	  and	  being	  viewed	  as	  an	  object.	  Rony	  describes	  this	  experience	  as	  formative,	  whilst	   simultaneous	  acknowledging	   the	  struggle	   for	   recognition	  as	  an	  egalitarian	  subject.	   Focusing	   her	   attention	   on	   fragments	   of	   early	   ethnographic	   film,	   like	   the	  peripheral	   figure	   of	   a	   young	   West	   African	   girl	   breaking	   the	   cinematic	   code	   by	  looking	   at	   the	   camera	   in	   Félix-­‐Louis	   Regnault’s	   1895	   photographic	   study	   during	  the	   Exposition	   Ethnographique	   de	   l’Afrique	   Occidentale	   in	   Paris,	   Rony	   writes,	  “[t]hose	   made	   into	   Ethnographic	   subjects	   stare	   back	   at	   the	   camera,	   at	   us,	   one	  hundred	  years	  later,	  and	  the	  directness	  of	  that	  gaze	  declares,	  “I	  am	  here,	  and	  so	  are	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you”	  (Tobing	  Rony,	  1996:	  217).	  60	  Rony’s	  analysis	   in	  The	  Third	  Eye:	  Race,	  Cinema,	  
and	   Ethnographic	   Spectacle,	   while	   intersecting	   with	   critiques	   of	   representation,	  ultimately	  steers	  away	  from	  those	  critiques	  by	  articulating	  how	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  third	  eye	  can	  be	  realised	  as	  an	  act	  of	  resistance.	  	  But	   what	   if	   we	   were	   to	   think	   of	   documentary	   and	   all	   its	   constituents,	  including	   the	   human	   as	  well	   as	   the	   non-­‐human,	   not	   as	   “agentic”	   subjects,	   but	   as	  
things	   existing	   on	   the	   same	   ontological	   plane?	   What	   could	   emerge	   from	   the	  promise	   of	   a	   distributed	   agency	   and	   a	   non-­‐subject	   centred	   approach	   to	  documentary	   practices?	   Even	   if	   only	   as	   a	   thought	   experiment,	   it	   is	   worth	  considering,	  because,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  subjectivity	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  the	  sole	  ground	  on	  which	  to	  seek	  emancipation	  (Steyerl,	  2010a).	  Jane	   Bennett’s	   work	   is	   helpful	   in	   articulating	   an	   alternative.	   Like	   Rony,	  Bennett’s	  underlying	  desire	   is	   for	  a	  reformulation	  of	  how	  we	   locate,	  assume,	  and	  assign	   agency.	   Bennett	   describes	   “Thing-­‐Power”	   as	   “the	   curious	   ability	   of	  inanimate	   things	   to	   animate,	   to	   act,	   to	   produce	   effects	   dramatic	   and	   subtle”	  (Bennett,	  2010:	  6).	  Whilst	  Bennett	  concentrates	  her	  analysis	  on	  the	  “vital”,	  that	  is,	  the	   lively	   materialism	   of	   matter	   through	   examples	   such	   as	   electricity,	   food,	  discarded	  objects,	   and	   stem	   cells,	  which	   she	  posits	   are	   all	   agential,	   she	  does	  not	  exclude	   the	   human	   body	   as	   a	   site	   of	   “vital	  materiality”.	   Bennett	   is	   interested	   in	  developing	  a	  vocabulary	  that	  allows	  for	  “better	  discernment	  of,	  the	  active	  powers	  issuing	   from	   nonsubjects”,	   because	   “the	   image	   of	   […]	   instrumentalized	   matter	  feeds	   human	   hubris	   and	   our	   earth-­‐destroying	   fantasies	   of	   conquest	   and	  consumption” (Bennett,	  2010:	  ix).  The	  purpose	  of	  foregrounding	  a	  hypothetical	  object-­‐to-­‐object	  relation	  as	  the	  coexistence	  of	  things	  amongst	  other	  things	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  therefore	  to	  foreground	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  of	  a	  solely	  subject-­‐centred	  film	  culture,	  according	  to	  which	  principle,	  we,	   as	  makers,	   act,	   articulate,	  direct,	   construct.	  Viewers	  and	   critics	   too	  act,	  or	  react,	  and	  construct.	  According	  to	  this	  trajectory,	  we	  are	   in	  an	  exceptional	  position,	  sovereigns	  of	  our	  agency	  to	  act/re-­‐act	  to	  the	  object.	  	  But	  articulations	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  things	  may	  also	  act	  upon	  us	  have	  taken	  but	  a	  peripheral	  position	  in	  documentary	  critique.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60 	  Some	   may	   disagree	   with	   Rony’s	   use	   of	   the	   term	   “Ethnographic	   subjects”,	   arguing	   that	  “ethnographic	  object”	  would	  be	  more	  accurate,	  but	  we	  could	  also	  read	  the	  word	  “subject”	  to	  mean	  “topic”	  or	  “motif”.	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Whilst	   it	   is	   indeed	   manageable	   to	   conceive	   the	   productive	   impact	   of	   the	  articulation	   of	   thingness,	   and	   the	   productive	   impact	   of	   distributed	   agency,	   in	  relation	  to	  environmental	  concerns	  and	  eco-­‐politics,	  as	  Bennett	  does	   in	  her	  book	  
Vibrant	  Matter:	  A	  Political	  Ecology	  of	  Things,	  applying	  it	  to	  documentary	  practice	  is	  contentious.	   This	   is	   especially	   true	   if	   we	   factor	   in	   the	   prevailing	   fear	   that	  foregrounding	   the	   materiality	   of	   all	   entities	   including	   the	   human	   body	   may	  endorse	   further	   instrumentalisation.	   So,	   what	   is	   to	   be	   gained	   from	   following	  Bennett’s	  argument	   in	  theorising	  situations	  “as	  encounters	  between	  ontologically	  diverse	   actants,	   some	   human,	   some	   not,	   though	   all	   thoroughly	  material”?	  61	  Like	  Bennett,	  it	  is	  my	  hope	  that	  what	  we	  gain	  is	  a	  shift	  from	  “the	  endorsement	  of	  ethical	  principles	  to	  the	  actual	  practice	  of	  ethical	  behaviors”	  (Bennett,	  2010:	  xi).	  	  	  I	  share	  Bennett’s	  desire	  for	  this	  shift.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  documentary	  method,	  I	  am	  motivated	   by	   the	   desire	   to	   configure	   a	  way	   for	   viewers	   and	   critics	   to	   invest	  their	  labour	  in	  locating	  the	  subtleties	  of	  expression	  and	  production	  techniques	  that	  may	   impact	   their	   assessment	   of	   ethical	   relations.	   As	   in	   Rony’s	   aforementioned	  example,	  if	  the	  West	  African	  girl	  can	  reach	  past	  the	  objectified	  gaze	  and	  silently	  call	  upon	  the	  viewer	  one	  hundred	  years	  later,	  then	  the	  power	  issuing	  from	  there,	  from	  the	   girl	   in	   the	   photograph,	   may	   have	   something	   to	   do	   with	   the	   communicative	  power	   of	   silence.	   As	   a	   primer	   to	   exploring	   the	   productive	   potential	   of	   silence,	   I	  would	  like	  to	  first	  declare	  my	  fondness	  for	  “The	  Windup	  Doll”,	  a	  poem	  by	  the	  late	  Iranian	  writer	  and	  filmmaker	  Forugh	  Farrokhzad.	  	  Farrokhzad	  opens	  her	  poem	  with	   these	  words:	   “More	   than	   this,	   yes	  more	  than	   this	   one	   can	   stay	   silent”	   (Farrokhzad,	   2004:	   31).	   With	   this	   first	   line,	  Farrokhzad	  sets	   the	  scene	   to	  an	   image;	  many	   images,	   to	  be	  accurate,	   follow.	  One	  way	  to	  think	  of	  this	  piercing	  opening	  line	  is	  as	  though	  it	  is	  establishing	  a	  scene:	  the	  scene	  of	   the	  observer,	  and	   the	  act	  of	   looking	  and	  of	   thinking.	  The	  opening	   line	   is	  followed	  by	  an	  irreverently	  polemic	  and	  deeply	  thoughtful,	  detailed	  catalogue	  of	  all	  things	  else	  one	  can	  do	  in	  a	  moment	  of	  silence:	  watch,	  gaze,	  stand	  motionless,	  find,	  trade,	  mould,	  “be	  constant,	  like	  zero”,	  before	  crying	  out	  aloud	  “for	  no	  reason	  at	  all”,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Bennett	   is	   using	   Bruno	   Latour’s	   terminology	   here,	   who	   configured	   an	   actant	   as	   “a	   source	   of	  action	   that	   can	   be	   either	   human	   or	   nonhuman;	   it	   is	   that	   which	   has	   efficacy,	   can	   do	   things,	   has	  sufficient	   coherence	   to	   make	   a	   difference,	   produce	   effects,	   alter	   the	   course	   of	   events” (Vibrant	  
Matter,	  p.	  viii).	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and	   in	   spite	   of	   all	   that	   has	   been	   seen	   and	   thought,	   “Ah,	   so	   happy	   am	   I!”	  (Farrokhzad,	  2004:	  35).	  	  This	  is	  to	  say,	  by	  way	  of	  a	  rather	  prosaic	  introduction,	  that	  for	  me,	  muteness	  never	  carried	  any	  adverse	  qualities.	  Muteness,	  I	  argue,	  could	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  the	  communicative	  power	  of	  silence,	  which	  can	  convey	  and	  transmit	  thought.	  I	  argue	  it	  contains	  ‘the	  other’	  in	  ways	  suggested	  by	  Rony.	  The	  pleasure	  of	  watching	  someone	  think	   –	   be	   they	   a	   child,	   an	   animal,	   or	   an	   adult	   –	   is	   not,	   as	   could	   be	   assumed,	   a	  dubious	  attraction	  to	  the	  mysterious	  or	  mythical,	  but	  a	  solid	  trust	  in	  the	  capacity	  of	  unspoken	   thought	   to	   call	   on	   other	   thoughts	   to	   produce	   themselves.	   The	  communicative	  power	  of	  silence,	  muteness	  as	  I	  interpret	  it	  then,	  accommodates	  an	  invitation	   to	   participate,	   and	   is	   ancillary	   to	   engagement	   and	   exchanges.	   The	  photograph	  must	  be	  silent	  Roland	  Barthes	  declared,	  to	  see	  it	  well	  it	  may	  be	  best	  to	  shut	  one’s	  eyes.	  “The	  photograph	  touches	  me	  if	  I	  withdraw	  it	  from	  its	  usual	  blah-­‐blah:	   “Technique,”	   “Reality,”	   “Reportage,”	   “Art,”	   etc.:	   to	   say	   nothing,	   to	   shut	   my	  eyes,	   to	   allow	   the	   detail	   to	   rise	   of	   its	   own	   accord	   into	   affective	   consciousness”	  (Barthes,	  1981:	  53–55).	  62	  I	  realise	  I	  have	  entered	  into	  a	  slippery	  ideation	  of	  silence.	  	  In	  art,	  concepts	  of	  silence	   can	  mislead,	   taking	  up	  a	  heroic	   status.	   Susan	  Sontag’s	   famous	  essay	   “The	  Aesthetics	   Of	   Silence”,	   written	   in	   1967,	   catalogues	   and	   offers	   up	   for	   historical	  review	  some	  of	   the	   tropes	  of	   this	  heroism	  accompanying	   the	  uses	  and	  abuses	  of	  silence	  in	  modern	  art.	  Beginning	  her	  critique	  with	  the	  artist’s	  withdrawal	  from	  his	  vocation,	   and	   obliquely	   referencing	   Duchamp,	   Rimbaud,	   and	   Wittgenstein’s	  respective	   biographies	   Sontag	   notes	   that	   “[s]ilence	   is	   the	   artist's	   ultimate	   other-­‐worldly	   gesture;	   by	   silence,	   he	   frees	   himself	   from	   servile	   bondage	   to	   the	  world,	  which	  appears	  as	  patron,	  client,	  audience,	  antagonist,	  arbiter,	  and	  distorter	  of	  his	  work”	  (Sontag,	  2013:	  13).	  But	  the	  more	  frequent	  iteration	  of	  silence	  as	  a	  trope	  for	  “seriousness”	  is	  attributed	  by	  Sontag	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  contempt	  or	  disregard	  on	  the	  side	  of	  art	  for	  the	  agency	  of	  its	  audience.	  The	  frustration	  of	  this	  audience	  with	  what	  may	  be	  experienced	  as	   “unintelligibility	  or	   invisibility	  or	   inaudibility”	   is	   attributed	  by	  Sontag	  to	  the	  complicity	  of	  art	  with	  the	  “ideal	  of	  silence”	  (Sontag,	  2013:	  14).	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  I’m	   aware	   that	   this	   opens	   another	   discussion,	   and	   that	   to	   some	   extent,	   my	   analysis	   in	   this	  research	   has	   led	   its	   way	   through	   technique,	   art	   versus	   documentary,	   form,	   etc.,	   but	   what	   I	   am	  interested	   in	   here	   in	   Barthes’	   quote	   is	   the	   expression	   of	   withdrawal,	   the	   non-­‐verbal	   affective	  encounter	  that	  comes	  through	  in	  silence	  or	  muteness.	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Silence	   is	   a	  metaphor	   for	   a	   cleansed,	   noninterfering	   vision,	   in	   which	   one	  might	  envisage	  the	  making	  of	  art-­‐works	  that	  are	  unresponsive	  before	  being	  seen,	   unviolable	   in	   their	   essential	   integrity	   by	   human	   scrutiny.	   The	  spectator	  would	  approach	  art	  as	  he	  does	  a	   landscape.	  A	   landscape	  doesn't	  demand	  from	  the	  spectator	  his	  “understanding”.	  (Sontag,	  2013:	  30)	  	  The	  filmic	   landscape	  of	  Why	  Are	  You	  Angry?	   (Nashashibi/Skaer,	  2017),	   the	  latest	   collaborative	   work	   of	   Rosalind	   Nashashibi	   and	   Lucy	   Skaer,	   which	   was	  commissioned	   for	   documenta	   14,	   does	   place	   a	   demand	   on	   the	   viewer	   for	  understanding.	  It	  does	  so	  through	  a	  complex	  staging	  of	  images,	  and	  a	  very	  delicate	  soundscape	  that,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  avoids	  the	  spoken	  word.	  The	  film	  takes	  its	  title	  from	  Paul	  Gauguin’s	  1896	  painting	  Why	  Are	  You	  Angry?	  (No	  Te	  Aha	  Oe	  Riri).	  In	  the	  film,	  Nashashibi/Skaer	  appropriate	   images	  of	  Tahitian	  women,	  restaging	  three	  of	  Gauguin’s	  paintings	  of	  women	  in	  the	  South	  Pacific.	  Nashashibi	  explains:	  	   The	  idea	  came	  about	  to	  go	  to	  Tahiti	  to	  make	  a	  film	  from	  his	  prism,	  from	  his	  set	   of	   conditions.	   We	   wanted	   to	   see	   what	   we	   could	   do	   with	   what	   was	  already	   recognisable	   [from	   knowing	   the	   paintings].	   We	   revisit	   these	  conditions	   or	   contents	   [of	   the	   paintings]	   as	   a	   pre-­‐existing	   structure.	   We	  were	   interested	   in	   questioning	   particularly	   Gauguin’s	   viewpoint,	   his	  relationship,	  and	  trying	  out	  what	  would	  result	  from	  us	  doing	  that.	  63	  	  The	  first	  restaging	  we	  see	  is	  of	  Gauguin’s	  well-­‐known	  painting	  Spirit	  of	  the	  
Dead	  Watching	  (1892).	  The	  original	  image	  features	  Gauguin's	  young	  Tahitian	  lover	  Teha’amana,	   and	   is	   thought	   to	   deal	   with	   questions	   of	   sex	   and	   sexuality.	  64	  Art	  historical	  disagreements	  as	  to	  whether	  Teha’amana’s	  look	  –	  described	  as	  fearful	  –	  was	  caused	  by	  her	   fear	  of	   "tupapaus",	   the	  Tahitian	  mythology	  of	   the	  spirit	  of	   the	  dead	  as	  suggested	  by	  Gauguin	  through	  his	  own	  writing	  in	  Noa	  Noa,	  or	  whether	  she	  was	   looking	   fearful	   of	   Gauguin	   himself	   –	   the	  much	   older,	   colonial,	  white	   other	   –	  remain	   the	   subject	   of	   speculation.	   As	   the	   writer,	   curator,	   and	   critic	   Stephen	   F.	  Eisenman	  points	  out	  in	  Gauguin’s	  Skirt	  however,	  any	  examination	  into,	  or	  adequate	  evaluation	   of	   Gauguin’s	   relationship	   to	   Teha’amana,	   are	   burdened	   by	   a	   lack	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Recorded	   Skype	   conversation	   with	   Rosalind	   Nashashibi	   (20	   June	   2017).	   All	   quotations	   that	  follow	  in	  this	  section	  are	  taken	  from	  a	  transcript	  of	  the	  recording.	  	  64	  See	   Stephen	   F.	   Eisenman,	   Gauguin's	   Skirt,	   Thames	   &	   Hudson,	   1999;	   Abigail	   Solomon-­‐Godeau,	  “Going	  Native:	  Paul	  Gauguin	  and	  the	  Invention	  of	  Primitivist	  Modernism”	  in	  Race-­‐ing	  Art	  History,	  ed.	  Kymberly	   N.	   Pinder,	   Routledge,	   2002;	   Griselda	   Pollock,	   Avant-­‐Garde	   Gambits	   1888–1893:	   Gender	  
and	  the	  Color	  of	  Art	  History,	  Thames	  &	  Hudson,	  1993.	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biographical	  documentation.	   	  In	  his	  essay	  “Sex	   in	  Tahiti”,	  Eisenman	  discusses	   the	  liminal	  sexuality	  he	  finds	  present	  in	  both	  the	  painting,	  and	  in	  accounts	  of	  Gauguin’s	  personal	   exploration	   of	   sexual	   difference,	   or	   queerness,	   to	   use	   a	   contemporary	  term	  (Eisenman,	  1999:	  91–152).	  Eisenman	  finds	  evidence	  in	  the	  revised	  version	  of	  Gauguin’s	   autobiographical	   fiction	   Noa	   Noa	   of	   the	   painter’s	   interest	   in	  androgynous	  bodies	  through	  his	  descriptions	  of	  clothing	  and	  social	  egalitarianism,	  the	   absence	   of	   strictly	   gendered	   labour	   divisions	   that	   the	   artist	   observed	   in	  Tahitian	  culture.	  Nashashibi/Skaer	  were	  also	  interested	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  “the	  representation	   of	   women	   as	   a	   specific	   problem	   could	   possibly	   be	   handled	  differently	   if	   one	   managed	   to	   dodge	   some	   pitfalls,	   so	   that	   the	   body	   becomes	  culturally	  overwritten”.	  65	  	  	  We	  wanted	  to	  work	  with	  the	  details	  of	  the	  paintings	  and	  the	  integrity	  that	  the	   women	   seem	   to	   have.	   He	   portrays	   them	   with	   a	   sense	   of	   their	   own	  autonomy	  we	  thought.	  In	  a	  way,	  what	  we	  did	  was	  copy	  in	  our	  contemporary	  moment	   what	   Gauguin	   did.	   But	   ours	   differs	   because	   there	   isn’t	   this	  assumption	  of	  a	  sexual	  life,	  or	  a	  sexual	  story.	  The	  question	  of	  the	  women’s	  acquiescence	  is	  not	  completely	  gone,	  but	  the	  relationship	  is	  different,	  in	  that	  we	   are	   in	   a	   much	   more	   globalised	   period	   and	   we	   weren’t	   there	   as	  fantastical	  figures,	  as	  Gauguin	  would	  have	  been.	  And	  we	  were	  hiring	  people	  to	  do	  things	  rather	  than	  painting	  people	  who	  we	  were	   living	  amongst.	  We	  knew	   that	   we	   weren’t	   going	   to	   be	   representing	   anything	   that	   was	  unfiltered,	   that	  was	   from	   a	   position	   of	   familiarity	   other	   than	   through	   our	  familiarity	  with	  Gauguin’s	  depictions.	  	  
	  
	  In	  Nashashibi	   and	   Skaer’s	   restaging	   of	   Gauguin’s	   image,	   an	   older	  woman	  appears,	   first	   lying	   naked	   on	   her	   stomach	   on	   a	   divan	   type	   bed.	   Later,	   she	   is	  replaced	   by	   a	   younger	   nude	   figure	   assuming	   the	   same	   pose.	   Neither	   woman	  standing	  in	  for	  Teha’amana	  looks	  afraid.	  We	  see	  the	  younger	  woman’s	  hands	  and	  face	   studied	   in	  detail.	   The	   figure	  of	  death	  originally	   seated	   in	   the	  background	  as	  depicted	  by	  Gauguin	  is	  initially	  absent.	  Later,	  both	  women	  interchangeably	  appear	  as	   that	   figure	   seated	   in	   the	  background.	   Initially,	   the	   changing	   roles	   of	   the	   older	  and	   younger	   woman	   may	   lead	   to	   questions	   of	   obsolescence,	   or	   mortality.	   But	  Nashashibi	  explains:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  This	  is	  in	  reference	  to	  how	  women’s	  bodies	  are	  seen	  and	  how	  we	  see	  ourselves	  divided	  into	  parts	  rather	  than	  as	  whole	  things.	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We	  just	  wanted	  to	  see	  the	  different	  intensities	  of	  each	  woman	  in	  a	  different	  role,	  and	  for	  them	  to	  feel	  those	  different	  roles.	  We	  didn’t	  feel	  that	  there	  was	  any	  authenticity	  to	  those	  roles.	  We	  wanted	  that	  to	  be	  clear.	  That	  girl	  is	  not	  really	  scared,	  and	  that	  woman	  is	  not	  really	  Death.	  It	  was	  about	  the	  pleasure	  and	  the	  experimentation	  of	  trying	  the	  different	  roles.	  	  	  The	  sound	  of	  this	  initial	  scene	  is	  muted,	  returning	  only	  as	  we	  look	  at	  a	  wide	  shot	  of	   the	  young	  nude	  with	  the	  older	  woman	  seated	   in	   the	  back	  as	   the	   figure	  of	  Death.	  Contrasting	  becomes	  inevitable.	  We	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  women’s	  gazes.	  They	  either	  look	  straight	  at	  the	  camera,	  or	  past	  the	  camera	  with	  an	  expression	   of	   thoughtfulness,	   or	   with	   apparent	   ambivalence	   towards	   their	  surroundings.	   As	   the	   older	   woman	   gets	   up	   during	   the	   first	   part	   of	   this	   muted	  sequence,	  we	   see	  her	   smiling.	  Reading	  her	   lips	  we	  understand	  her	   saying,	   “Je	  ne	  sais	  pas”.	  	  What	  stands	  out	   for	  me	   in	  contrast	   to	   this	  scene	   is	   that	  some	  of	   the	  other	  muted	   segments	   in	   the	   film	   tend	   to	   be	   joyful	   interactions,	   either	   amongst	   the	  Taihitian	   women	   themselves,	   or	   with	   the	   filmmakers/camera.	   In	   other	   delicate	  ways,	   the	  soundscape	  of	   the	  film	  overall	   is	  very	  reflective	  of	  what	  we	  might	  hear	  when	  we	   are	   not	   entangled	   in	   speech	   acts,	  when	   silent:	   the	  wind	   gets	   to	   speak;	  water;	   waves;	   roosters	   crowing;	   the	   mechanical	   sounds	   of	   cars;	   the	   16mm	   film	  gauge	   turning;	   the	  drone	  of	   an	  airplane	   cabin;	   all	  manner	  of	  birds;	  haunting	   live	  music	   barely	   audible	   through	   a	   distant	   PA	   system.	   Only	   once	   do	   we	   hear	   the	  women	  speak	  with	  words.	  They	  tell	  each	  other	  their	  names.	  	  	  The	  absence	  of	  spoken	  word,	  and	  the	  decision	  to	  keep	  mute	  some	  sequences	  in	  the	  film	  of	  the	  women	  and	  the	  filmmaker’s	  own	  voices,	  and	  their	  interactions	  with	  the	  Tahitian	  women,	   produces	   a	   curious	   effect.	   As	   a	   group,	   neither	   the	   subjects	   nor	  authors	  seem	  to	  me	  silent	  or	  mute.	  Doing	  away	  with	  speech	  acts,	  and	  the	  dropping	  out	   of	   sound,	   their	   expressiveness	   seems	   to	   become	   amplified.	   As	   Nashashibi	  explains:	  	   We	  were	  shooting	  on	  a	  16mm	  Bolex	  film	  camera,	  so	  there	  is	  no	  synch	  sound	  that	   we	   recorded.	   Often	   I	   find	   if	   you	   put	   text,	   as	   in	   dialogue,	   into	   a	   film,	  people	   locate	   the	  meaning	   there.	  Text	  equals	  meaning,	  or	  verbal	   language	  equals	  meaning.	   But	  we	  were	  much	  more	   interested	   in	   a	   visual	   language.	  We	  were	  Gauguin.	  We	  weren’t	  really	  there,	  Lucy	  and	  I	  were	  Gauguin.	  At	  no	  point	  did	  we	  think	  that	  we	  were	  either	  muting	  them	  or	  showing	  ‘who	  they	  really	  were’.	  We	  were	   just	  Gauguin.	  We	  wanted	  the	  sound	  to	  have	  a	   loose	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affiliation	   to	   the	   picture.	   Dropping	   out	   the	   sound	   at	   some	   points	   to	   us	  seemed	   like	  a	  different	  pictorial	  mode.	   It’s	   a	  play	  between	   the	  medium	  of	  painting	   and	   the	   unnaturalism	   of	   film.	   As	   well	   as	   that,	   the	   silence	   in	   our	  minds	  reflected	  on	  an	  inner	  world.	  There	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  dread	  or	  uncertainty	  to	  that	   silence.	   It	  punctures	  you	   through	   to	  a	  different	   reality.	  To	   then	  bring	  the	  outside	  noise	  back	  into	  the	  room	  again	  is	  a	  reminder	  of	  the	  artificiality	  I	  suppose.	  We	  were	  after	  a	  compositional	  intensity	  rising	  and	  dropping.	  	  	  The	   second	   image	   restages	  Gauguin’s	  Why	  Are	  You	  Angry?	  (No	  Te	  Aha	  Oe	  Riri).	   It	  features	   a	   group	   of	   women	   watched	   over	   by	   the	   central	   figure	   of	   an	   older,	  matriarchal	  figure.	  She	  is	  perched	  on	  her	  doorstep	  holding	  her	  hand	  in	  a	  gesture	  of	  calm	   contemplation.	   Intercut	   with	   the	   live	   staging	   of	   the	   still	   figures	   in	   the	  paintings	  are	  documentary	  images	  of	  the	  women	  in	  their	  daily	  lives:	  in	  their	  yards,	  in	  front	  of	  their	  homes,	  attending	  to	  a	  horse,	  attending	  to	  each	  other,	  their	  children,	  performing	   Tahitian	   dances.	   As	   is	   the	   case	   with	   some	   of	   Nashashibi’s	   previous	  works,	  “real	  action	  and	  ritualised	  action	  coexist”	  in	  Why	  Are	  You	  Angry?	  (Honoré	  &	  Ribadeneira,	  2012:	  17).	  	  	  
	  
	  Fig.	  21:	  Why	  Are	  You	  Angry?,	  2017,	  film	  still.	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Nashashibi/Skaer	  say	  they	  set	  out	  to	  create	  their	  “own	  mythologisation	  of	  Tahitian	  women”,	   and	   to	   draw	   attention	   to	   the	   conflict,	   and	   likewise	   to	   the	   potential,	   in	  encountering	   again	   the	   contemporary	   images	   of	   Tahitian	   women	   through	   the	  historical	  gaze	  we	  are	  familiar	  with	  through	  Gauguin’s	  eyes	  (‘Why	  Are	  You	  Angry?’,	  n.d.).	  	   But	  they	  admit	  that	  this	  idea	  of	  creating	  their	  own	  mythologisation	  has	  its	  limits,	   and	   that	   being	   female	   authors	   does	   not	   put	   them	   in	   a	   greater	   position	   of	  access	  or	  authenticity.	  It	  could	  also	  be	  said	  that	  the	  ethics	  of	  the	  encounter	  –	  being	  there	  with	  the	  camera	  –	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  the	  ethics	  of	  displaying	  products	  of	  that	  encounter	   in	   another	   setting.	  The	   context	   of	   its	   display	   at	   documenta	   14	   raises	  another	  question.	  The	  Athens	  segment	  of	  the	  documenta	  14	  exhibition	  came	  under	  particular	  attack	   for	  neglecting	   to	  engage	  with	  on	   the	  ground	  politics	  of	   the	  host	  city,	   accused	   as	   is	   was	   of	   performing	   a	   gestured	   politics	   that	   informs	   only	   the	  global	   art	   world.	   The	   documenta	   14	   Athens	   segment	   also	   stood	   accused	   of	  engaging	  in	  a	  “rhetoric	  of	  authenticity”	  (Falkenhausen,	  2017).	  66	  	  But	   Nashashibi/Skaer	   claim	   no	   authenticity	   in	   their	   representation	   of	  Tahitian	  women	   in	  Why	  Are	  You	  Angry?.	  Their	  work	  claims	  neither	  a	  participant-­‐observer	   collaborative	  mode,	   nor	   that	   they	   are	  working	   as	   artist-­‐ethnographers.	  The	  work	  is	  also	  not	  a	  social	  outreach	  sponsored	  by	  documenta	  GmbH.	  Quite	  the	  opposite,	   to	   the	   women	   they	   worked	   with,	   they	   were	   also	   foreign,	   from	   an	   ex-­‐colonising	  nation,	  and	  the	  women	  were	  paid	  workers,	  performing	  in	  the	  film.	  The	  specific	   position	   Nashashibi/Skaer	  were	   exploring	   in	  Why	  Are	  You	  Angry?	   is	   the	  kind	  of	  self-­‐aware	  outsider	  situation	  that	  they	  as	  artists	  may	  share	  with	  Gauguin.	  	   We	  were	  interested	  in	  the	  exotic	  female	  as	  seen	  through	  European	  colonial	  eyes.	  There	   is	   imbedded	   in	   the	   figures	  of	  Gauguin	   this	   ambivalence	  about	  how	   they	   feel	   and	   that	   can	   be	   read	   as	   the	   inscrutable	   native	   –	   that	   they	  remain	  unreadable.	  We	  decided	  that	  this	  was	  a	  problem	  and	  that	  there	  was	  no	  way	  of	  solving	  it	  with	  logic	  or	  with	  the	  intellect.	  So	  our	  decision	  was	  to	  repeat	  a	  set	  of	  conditions	  around	  the	  tropes	  of	  the	  other,	  and	  the	  female	  and	  the	  exotic	  to	  see	  what	  would	  happen	  if	   the	  camera	  is	   in	  our	  hands.	  To	  see	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  discussions	  on	  cultural	  imperialism	  raised	  during	  the	  Athens	  segment	  of	  documenta	   14,	   see	   for	   example,	   Wilson-­‐Goldie,	   K.,	   “Learning	   Curves”,	   Artforum	   (Wilson-­‐Goldie,	  2017),	  “We	  Come	  Bearing	  Gifts”	  –	  iLiana	  Fokianaki	  and	  Yanis	  Varoufakis	  on	  Documenta	  14	  Athens	  (Varoufakis	   &	   Fokianaki,	   2017),	   and	   “Get	   Real”,	   Susanne	   Von	   Falkenhausen’s	   feature	   article	   on	  authenticity	  and	  the	  ethnic	  other	  (Frieze,	  2017).	  See	  also	  the	  still	  relevant	  discussion	  by	  Hal	  Foster	  in	   his	   short	   essay	   “The	   Artist	   as	   Ethnographer”,	   in	   The	   Traffic	   in	   Culture:	   Refiguring	   Art	   and	  
Anthropology	  (University	  of	  California	  Press	  ,	  1995),	  pp.302-­‐309.	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what	  bodies	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  whole,	  and	  what	  bodies	  can’t	  be	  seen	  as	  whole.	  Even	  if	  within	  a	  moment	  in	  the	  film	  you	  could	  reach	  some	  sort	  of	  idea	  of	  the	  female	   figure	   as	   a	   whole,	   which	   isn’t	   immediately	   falling	   into	   the	   same	  questions	  [of	  representation]	  and	  the	  same	  problems,	  it	  can	  probably	  only	  be	  a	  momentary	  experience,	  or	  else	   it’s	  built	  around	  a	   lot	  of	  qualifications	  and	   layers.	  We	  don’t	   know	  whether	   this	  qualification	   is	   in	   the	   sum	  of	   the	  film	  or	  if	  there	  are	  individual	  images	  that	  are	  doing	  that	  or	  if	  we	  are	  just	  re-­‐opening	  a	  discussion	  about	  it.	  	  
	  	  Fig.	  22:	  Why	  Are	  You	  Angry?,	  2017,	  film	  still.	  	   Since	   Gauguin’s	   women	   are	   silent,	   and	   since	   the	   film	   replicates	   the	  muteness	  of	  the	  pictorial,	  or	  put	  differently,	  since	  there	  is	  no	  affirmation	  through	  speech	  in	  the	  film,	  it	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  pinpoint	  how	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  women	  (their	  “wholeness”)	  is	  communicated.	  Perhaps	  it	   is	  not	  coincidental	  that	  one	  of	  the	  only	  times	  in	  the	  film	  that	  one	  of	  the	  women	  begins	  to	  speak	  is	  through	  the	  absence	  of	  sound;	  however	  clearly	  readable	  is	  the	  aforementioned	  expression	  “Je	  ne	  sais	  pas”.	  Without	  affirming	  themselves	  through	  speech,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  in	  their	  willingness	  to	  participate	   in	   the	   roleplaying	   designated	   by	   Nashashibi/Skaer,	   and	   in	   the	   ways	  they	  choose	  to	  look	  at	  or	  past	  the	  camera,	  that	  we	  begin	  to	  feel	  their	  presence	  as	  whole.	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EPILOGUE	  
 
A SPACE OF ATTUNEMENT: Cameraperson (2016) 
 Few	   films	   have	   embodied	   the	   core	   questions	   of	   ethics	   in	   documentary	   in	   more	  exacting	  ways	   than	  Cameraperson	   (Johnson,	   2016)	   by	   first-­‐time	   director	   Kirsten	  Johnson.	  Likewise,	  in	  perhaps	  more	  significant	  ways	  than	  any	  of	  the	  films	  I’ve	  been	  talking	  about	  here,	  Cameraperson	  wholesomely	  encapsulates	  and	  illustrates	  all	  the	  concerns	   of	   this	   research	   like	   no	   other	   work	   I’ve	   seen.	   This	   is	   because	  
Cameraperson	   is	  a	  film	  about	  process,	  about	  relationships,	  and	  far	  more	  than	  any	  film	   to	   my	   knowledge,	   it	   makes	   this	   visible.	   In	   particular,	   it	   makes	   visible	   the	  experience	  of	  being	  in	  the	  field	  with	  the	  camera.	  Again,	  perhaps	  to	  an	  even	  greater	  extent	   than	  any	  of	   the	  works	   I’ve	  been	  discussing	  here,	  Cameraperson	   is	   hard	   to	  approach	  from	  a	  purely	  theoretical	  standpoint.	  	  My	  interest	  in	  closing	  this	  final	  part	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  the	  thesis	  as	  a	  whole	  with	  Cameraperson	  is	  because	  it	  can	  help	  us	  return	  to	  the	  intended	  gaps	  I	  spoke	  of	  in	  the	  introduction,	  that	  is,	  the	  gaps	  between	  the	  analytic	  and	  the	  poetic,	  between	  the	  theoretical	  and	  praxis.	  Between	  what	  documentary	  ‘ought’	  to	  do	  in	  theory,	  and	  what	  it	  can	  do	  in	  praxis.	  But	  more	  than	  this,	  I	  would	  prefer	  to	  stay	  silent,	  to	  echo	  Forugh	  Farrokhzad	  once	  more.	  To	  stay	  silent	  and	  let	  the	  film	  do	  its	  work,	  to	  speak	  for	  itself.	  The	  film	  –	  and	  films	  in	  general	  –	  want	  to	  be	  seen,	  want	  to	  be	  experienced.	  This	   much	   seems	   obvious,	   and	   literature	   relating	   to	   the	   fields	   of	   visual	   culture,	  anthropology,	   and	  ethnography,	  as	  well	   as	   film	  studies,	   is	  plentiful	   in	   supporting	  this	  by	  now	  trite	  statement.	  But	  I	  take	  liberty	  in	  reiterating	  it	   in	  order	  to	  make	  it	  clear	  that	  this	  research,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  writing	  produced	  here,	  does	  not	  have	  its	  foundation	  in	  a	  theoretical	  position,	  but	  instead	  comes	  out	  of	  the	  experiential	  –	  it	  is	  a	  practical,	  materially-­‐lived	  position.	  	  It	  may	  also	  be	  necessary	   to	  acknowledge	   that	   some	  of	   the	   ideas	   I’ve	  been	  discussing	   here	   are	   perhaps	   difficult	   to	   conceptualise,	   if	   coming	   at	   them	   from	   a	  purely	  theoretical	  standpoint.	  Cameraperson	  is	  a	  helpful	  example,	  as	  it	  offers	  to	  my	  knowledge	  the	  most	  exacting	  articulation	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  a	   filmmaker,	  of	  working	  specifically	  with	  the	  camera,	  and	  of	  the	  bodily	  experience	  of	  being	  fluid	  in	  thought.	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  Fig.	  23:	  Cameraperson,	  2016,	  film	  still.	  	  	  It	   articulates,	   better	   than	   I	   am	   able	   to	   here,	   the	   attitude	   needed	   to	   invite	   a	  particular	   quality	   of	   experiences:	   the	   experience	   of	   being	   acted	   upon,	   and	   the	  process	  of	  making	  muteness	  and	  silence	  visible	  as	  a	  productive	  way	  forward	  from	  the	   deadlock	   of	   ethical	   assumptions	   and	   ethical	   principles.	   Cameraperson	   very	  specifically	  embodies	  the	  fluidity	  and	  deliberation	  of	  an	  ethics	  that	   is	   lived	  in	  the	  field,	   or	   is	   “nomadic”,	   as	   Braidotti	   might	   put	   it.	   It	   succeeds	   in	   going	   beyond	  representation	  by	  articulating	   the	   limits	  of	   representation	   through	   the	  discarded	  footage	   in	  which	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  cameraperson	  and	  the	  people	  and	  things	  she	  films	  are	  slowly	  revealed.	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  ‘revelations’	  in	  those	  outtakes	  are	  collateral,	  minor,	  subtle,	  not	   ‘documentary	  gold’	  prized	  for	  its	  dramatic	  value.	  That’s	  why	  it	  ended	  up	  on	  ‘the	  cutting-­‐room	  floor’.	  	  Variously	   described	   as	   an	   “interrogation	   of	   the	   power	   of	   the	   camera”,	   a	  “cinémemoir”,	   “video	  album”	  and	  “cinematic	   remix”,	   the	   film	  consists	  of	  outtakes	  from	  documentaries	   Johnson	  has	  been	   involved	  with	  as	  a	   jobbing	  camerawoman	  spanning	  her	  25-­‐year	  engagement	  with	  documentary.	   Johnson’s	  accolades,	  as	   the	  cameraperson	   of	   many	   well-­‐known	   films	   circulating	   in	   the	   commercial	  documentary	  field,	  are	  impressive.	  Films	  include	  Laura	  Poitras’	  Citizenfour	  (2014),	  
The	  Oath	  (2010),	  and	  Risk	  (2016),	  her	  latest	  film	  on	  Julian	  Assange;	  Derrida	  (2002)	  and	   The	   Invisible	   War	   (2012)	   by	   Kirby	   Dick	   respectively;	   and	   Fahrenheit	   9/11	  (2004)	   by	  Michael	   Moore.	   The	   contents	   of	   the	   films	   Johnson	   has	   been	   involved	  with	   have	   impressively	   ranged	   the	   entire	   spectrum	   of	   the	   social	   justice	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documentary	   gambit	   to	   inform,	   investigate,	   uncover.	   Topics	   have	   ranged	   from	  Evangelical	   Christians	   advocating	   for	   a	   sexual	   revolution	   though	   chastity;	   the	  notorious	   1971	   heist	   by	   activists	   leading	   to	   the	   exposure	   of	   abuses	   by	   the	   FBI	  against	  political	  dissidents;	  economic	  hardship	  resulting	  in	  the	  hunger	  experienced	  by	  very	  many	  contemporary	  Americans;	   the	  rape	  of	  soldiers	   in	  the	  US	  military;	  a	  group	   of	   women	   campaigning	   for	   peace	   and	   helping	   to	   place	   in	   power	   the	   first	  female	  head	  of	  state	  in	  Liberia;	  the	  history	  of	  US	  women	  sent	  into	  ground	  combat;	  genocide	   in	   Sudan;	   environmental	   justice	   causes;	   reproductive	   rights	   in	   the	   US;	  and	  terminal	  illness.	  Yet,	  Johnson’s	  own	  film	  displays	  none	  of	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  the	  advocacy	  agenda	  normally	  associated	  with	  the	  documentary	  genre	  coming	  forth	  in	  this	  list.	  	  	  One	   of	   the	   most	   telling	   scenes	   in	   Cameraperson	   illustrates	   the	   cameraperson-­‐subject	   relationship.	   In	   it,	   philosopher	   Jacques	   Derrida	   expresses	   concern	   for	  Johnson’s	  safety	  as	  she	  films	  him	  crossing	  a	  busy	  New	  York	  street.	  This	  interaction	  could	   easily	   be	   discarded	   as	   casual	   ‘off-­‐camera’	   banter,	   typical	   for	   documentary	  filming	   situations.	  But	   in	   its	   casualness	   it	   reveals	   a	   key	  misconception	   about	   the	  documentary	   filming	  process	   and	   specifically	   about	   the	   cameraperson.	  Referring	  to	   the	  physical	  position	  of	  being	  behind	   the	   lens,	  Derrida	   jokingly	  analyses:	   “She	  [Johnson]	  sees	  everything	  around	  you.	  Yet	  she	  is	  totally	  blind.	  That’s	  the	  image	  of	  the	  philosopher	  who	   falls	   in	   the	  well	  while	   looking	  at	   the	  star	   [Derrida	  points	  at	  himself]”.	  Derrida	  is	  indeed	  the	  ‘star’,	  though	  not	  one	  of	  those	  in	  the	  night’s	  sky,	  as	  the	   original	   image	   suggested	   by	   Derrida	   describes.	   Yet	   his	   assessment	   of	   the	  situation,	   and	   of	   the	   process	   of	   filming,	   is	   to	   my	   estimation	   entirely	   misjudged.	  Johnson	   is	   neither	   blind,	   nor	   does	   she	   see	   everything.	  Quite	   to	   the	   contrary,	   her	  looking	   is	   very	   specific	   in	   drawing	   a	   relationship	   between	   her	   and	   what	   she	  focuses	   her	   attention	   and	   her	   lens	   on.	   This	   scene	   follows	   another	   ‘off-­‐camera’	  conversation	   from	   a	   separate	   shoot	  where	  we	   hear	   Johnson	   explain	   that	   though	  filming	   in	   public	   (without	   a	   tripod)	   requires	   no	   prior	   permission,	   she	   tends	   to	  make	  eye	  contact	  with	  those	  she	  films	  in	  an	  implicit	  gesture	  of	  seeking	  consent.	  “I	  always	  try	  to	  have	  some	  kind	  of	  relationship	  to	  people,	  like	  I	  look	  them	  in	  the	  eye	  like,	  ‘You	  see	  me	  shooting	  you,	  don’t	  you?’”	  (Johnson,	  2016).	  	  Elaborating	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	   ‘me’	  and	   ‘you’	  and	  the	  ethics	  that	  comes	  through	  in	  the	  title	  of	  the	  work,	  Rolling	  Stone	  reviewer	  David	  Fear	  astutely	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comments,	  “It’s	  significant	  that	  the	  title	  doesn't	  separate	  the	  two	  words;	  watching	  this	  film,	  you	  get	  the	  sense	  that	  for	  Johnson,	  there's	  no	  clear	  point	  where	  ‘camera’	  ends	  and	  ‘person’	  begins”	  (Fear,	  2016).	  Johnson	  adds,	  "[t]here's	  not	  really	  a	  word	  for	  what	  the	  relationship	  between	  you	  and	  the	  people	  you're	  filming	  is,"	  she	  says.	  "I	   really	   appreciate	   that	   people	   check	   themselves	   on	   calling	   people	   ‘characters.’	  Even	   ‘subject’	   is	   a	   challenging	  word.	  What	   the	  accurate	   term	   is,	   I’m	  not	   sure	   […]	  You	  plus	  a	  camera	  is	  different.	  You’re	  not	  just	  human	  when	  you	  have	  a	  camera	  with	  you”	  (quoted	  in	  Deutsch,	  2016).	  	  In	   ways	   that	   are	   significant	   to	   this	   study,	   the	   title	   of	   Johnson’s	   film	   and	  Fear’s	   commentary	   on	   its	   implication	   connect	   with	   the	   ideas	   and	   concerns	  articulated	  here	  at	  the	  level	  of	  theory.	  For	  one,	  it	  connects	  to	  Rosalind	  Nashashibi’s	  desire	   to	   seeing	   and	   being	   seen	   as	   whole	   though	   her	   experiment	   with	   the	  representation	  of	  the	  nude	  ‘exotic’	  female	  ‘other’.	  The	  connection	  is	  also	  present	  in	  the	   theoretical	  articulation	  of	  a	  mode	  of	  working	   that	  envelops	  and	  connects	   the	  self	   as	   the	   other.	   It	   is	   present	   also	   in	   Braidotti’s	   articulation	   of	   a	   connected,	  embodied	  containment	  of	  the	  other	  as	  a	  foundational	  mode	  of	  being	  and	  in	  her	  call	  for	  a	  recalibrated	  ethics.	  	  Throughout	   this	   thesis,	   there	   is	   a	   discernable	   tension	   between	   the	   terms	  ‘object’	  and	   ‘other’.	  The	  tension	  exists	  because,	  at	  times,	   the	  question	  arises	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  term	  ‘object’	  could	  be	  substituted	  with	  the	  term	  ‘other’.	  Part	  of	  the	   aim	   with	   this	   project	   has	   been	   to	   work	   with	   this	   tension	   as	   a	   productive	  slippage,	  and	  to	  tease	  out	  the	  overlapping	  of	  the	  terms.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  expression	  “as	  the	  other”	  that	  I	  have	  been	  labouring	  to	  articulate	  is	  an	  attitude	  towards,	  and	  a	  feeling	   for,	   a	   process	   within	   an	   existing	   relationship,	   a	   bond	   that	   we	   may	   not	  understand	   cognitively,	   and	   which	   some	   of	   us,	   including	   myself,	   may	   be	   ill-­‐equipped	  at	  explaining	  linguistically.	  Johnson	  articulates	  this	  relationship	  through	  images	   in	   Cameraperson	   more	   adequately	   than	   words	   can.	   In	   this	   relationship,	  filmmaker/subject,	   subject/object,	   or	   self/other	   are	   paradoxically	   differentiated,	  but	   are	   also	   an	   inseparable	   thing	   enveloped	   in	   a	   co-­‐dependent	   encounter	   that	   is	  carried	  through	  from	  the	  past	  and	  ripples	  on	  into	  the	  future.	  	  To	   describe	  Cameraperson	   as	   an	   examination	   of	   the	   power	   of	   the	   camera,	   or	   an	  interrogation	  into	  the	  role	  of	  the	  cameraperson,	  is	  to	  undermine	  the	  complexity	  of	  how	  the	  particular	  translates	  to	  the	  universal.	  The	  universal	  of	  the	  film	  is	  the	  most	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sensitive	   articulation,	   to	  my	  eyes,	   of	   an	   ethical,	   as	  well	   as	  political	   position.	  This	  position	  is	  the	  filmic	  articulation	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  a	  situation,	  and	  of	  an	  image	  that	  no	  filmmaker,	  no	  participant,	  and	  no	  viewer	  can	  fully	  understand	  or	  control,	  and	   which	   no	   one	   owns	   or	   can	   fully	   explain.	   The	   film	   presents	   “evidence	   of	  relationships”,	  as	  Johnson	  puts	  it.	  “[A]n	  image	  is	  always	  a	  relationship,	  and	  it’s	  not	  just	  a	  relationship	  in	  the	  moment	  that	  it’s	  taken	  in.	  It’s	  a	  relationship	  that	  moves	  on	  into	  the	  future	  and	  it	  creates	  more	  relationships”	  (quoted	  in	  Coyle,	  2016).	  In	  ways	  not	  too	  dissimilar	  to	  Johnson’s	  filmic	  articulation,	  it	  has	  been	  my	  desire	  throughout	  these	  pages	  to	  articulate	  the	  means	  by	  which	  the	  films	  I	  have	  been	  discussing	  call	  on	   the	   thoughts	  of	   others	   to	  produce	   themselves	   in	  unspoken	  dialogue	  with	  one	  another,	  and	  to	   illustrate	  how.	  That	   these	  means,	  however	  oblique	  or	  contrarian,	  can	  be	  tangible	  and	  visible.	  In	  providing	  a	  space	  for	  self-­‐interrogation,	  these	  films	  open	  up	  and	  call	  on	  the	  viewer	  to	  become	  involved	  as	  a	  thing	  among	  other	  things.	  	  In	  many	  ways	  this	  thesis	  attempted	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  articulation	  of	  the	  relationship	   between	   the	   camera	   (person)	   and	   the	   object	   (of	   study)	   by	   bringing	  into	  the	  discussion	  the	  viewer’s	  position	  in	  that	  relationship.	  My	  writing	  here	  has	  moved	   between	   the	   perhaps	   ‘violent’	   manifestation	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	  filmmakers	   and	   viewers	   (Buñuel,	  Martens,	   Brakhage,	  Weissmann,	  Martin,	   and	   to	  some	   extent	   the	   Maysles)	   to	   a	   perhaps	   more	   holistic	   manifestation	   of	   that	  relationship	   (Gerrets,	   Nashashibi,	   Nashashibi/Skaer,	   Johnson).	   I	   considered	   the	  potentially	   violent	   aspects	   of	   objectification	   as	   a	   means	   by	   which	   to	   force	   the	  viewer	   into	   a	   space	   of	   self-­‐interrogation	   as	   to	   their	   role	   in	   the	   documentary	  encounter.	  Principally,	  any	  assessment	  of	  ethics	  cannot	  exclude	   the	  viewer/critic	  being	   complicit	   in	   the	   conditions	   that	   produce	   injustice,	   or	   suffering.	   And	   my	  primary	   obligation,	   therefore,	   is	   to	   review	   my	   own	   role	   in	   making	   ethical	  assessments	  in	  the	  viewing	  process.	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  assessments	  should	  not	  be	  confined	   to	  what	   the	   filmmaker	   is	   doing,	   but	   to	  what	   I	   am	  doing	   as	   a	   viewer	   or	  critic.	   Cameraperson	   lays	   bare	   the	   conditions	   of	   a	   lived	   ethics.	   It	   shows	  deliberations,	  the	  interactions,	  the	  hesitations,	  the	  accidental,	  the	  mismanaged,	  the	  ‘mistakes’	  and	  misunderstandings	  that	  make	  up	  the	  real	  and	  that	  were	  left	  out	  of	  the	  diverse	  films	  that	  it	  is	  composed	  of.	  And	  in	  so	  doing	  it	  shows	  ‘realness’	  itself.	  It	  shows	  that	  objectification,	  to	  perceive	  and	  to	  work	  with	  the	  materiality	  of	  the	  real,	  can	   be	  measured	   affectively	   in	   the	   gaps	   of	   expression;	   in	  what	   is	   not	   shown;	   in	  what	  is	  not	  said.	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Everything (UK/Austria 2017)	  23	  min,	  VHS	  with	  sound	  	  A	  USB	  drive,	  containing	  the	  movie	  file,	  is	  available	  inside	  the	  front	  cover.	  For	  copies	  of	   this	   thesis	   with	   this	   item	   missing	   please	   contact	   the	   author	   at	  http://www.minounorouzi.com	  	  	  
SYNOPSIS: Everything (2017) 
 
“Everything” is an unsettling documentary adaptation of the fictional short story by the 
late Austrian writer Ingeborg Bachmann. Composed of misappropriated home-video 
tapes, the film zooms in on current leanings towards dissociative socio-political 
relations through a micro exploration of the slippery politics of domesticity, parenting 
and family relations. 
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ARTIST STATEMENT 	  In	  many	  ways,	  Everything	  (2017)	  occasions	  the	  surfacing	  of	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  I	   had	   accumulated	   for	   a	   number	   of	   years	   regarding	   the	   ethics	   of	   documentary	  practice.	   These	   were	   questions	   that	   first	   arose	   in	   relation	   to	   my	   experience	   of	  working	   in	   the	   field	   of	   commercial	   media	   production,	   and	   subsequently	   in	   the	  development	  of	  my	  own	  artistic	  practice.	  	  At	   the	   tail	  end	  of	  my	   freelance	  activities	   in	   the	  broadcast	   sector,	   I	  made	  a	  number	  of	  moving	  image	  works,	  all	  of	  which	  were	  expressions	  of	  my	  desire	  to	  be	  attentive	   to	   the	  material	  world	  not	  as	   something	   that	   I	   am	   tasked	   to	  organise	  or	  shape,	  but	  as	  material	   that	  shapes	  me,	  or	  more	  significantly,	   is	  shaped	  through	  a	  shared	   effort	   in	   social	   encounters.	   Resisting	   the	   impulse	   of	   authorial	   control,	   a	  defining	  aspect	  of	  my	  film	  practice	  came	  to	  consist	  in	  simply	  being	  present	  in	  space	  as	   a	   thing	   amongst	   other	   things,	   without	   a	   predetermined	   idea	   of	   outcome	   or	  strategic	   intervention.	   What	   initially	   attracted	   me	   to	   film	   making	   as	   a	   critical	  artistic	   practice	   was	   the	   possibility	   of	   working	   with	   documentary	   not	   as	  representation,	  but	  as	  a	  physical	  and	  material	  encounter	  similar	  to	  how	  I	  imagined	  a	  painter	  or	  sculptor	  may	  work. My	  filming	  strategy	  prior	  to	  making	  Everything	  consisted	  of	  working	  with	  a	  fixed	  camera	  position	  and	  with	  symmetry	  as	  a	  compositional	  device.	  This	  meant	  I	  did	   not	   need	   to	   ‘supervise’	   the	   image	   (adjust	   framing,	   track	   movement	   and	   so	  forth).	  It	  allowed	  me	  to	  step	  away	  from	  the	  camera.	  Physically	  separated	  from	  the	  camera,	   I	   was	   to	   those	   present	   visibly	   part	   of	   the	   social	   fabric	   that	   was	   being	  recorded.	  This	  clearly	  demarcated	  the	  position	  of	  each	  entity	  involved	  in	  a	  network	  of	   relations.	   In	   significant	   ways	   the	   process	   of	   making	   Everything	   was	   quite	  different.	   To	   start	   with	   I	   did	   no	   original	   filming	   for	   this	   film.	   Instead,	   I	  misappropriated	  home	  video,	  some	  of	  which	  I	  had	  shot	  years	  ago,	  some	  of	  which	  others	   had	   shot	   of	   my	   family	   and	   friends	   –	   a	   wedding,	   family	   outings,	   trips,	  gatherings	   –	   without	   any	   regard	   for	   their,	   or	   my	   own,	   personal	   relation	   to	   the	  histories	   depicted.	   An	   extreme	   form	  of	   objectification	  whose	   added	   complexity	   I	  was	   cognisant	  of.	  As	   filmmaker	  and	   scholar	  Michelle	  Citron	  puts	   it,	   depictions	  of	  those	   close	   to	   oneself	   for	   the	   consumption	   of	   strangers	   intensifies	   the	   ethical	  dilemma	   (Citron,	   1999:	   274).	   Whilst	   Everything	   is	   not	   an	   autobiographical	   film,	  there	  are	  elements	  of	  autobiography	  in	   its	  affective	  register.	  What	  could	  possibly	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emerge	   from	   excising	   these	   individual	   histories	   from	   their	   ‘real’	   context	   and	  reassembling	  them	  as	  the	  material	  on	  which	  the	  fictional	  narrative	  is	  based?	  	  Some	  time	  ago	  I	  had	  read	  and	  been	  fascinated	  by	  “Everything”,	  one	  of	  seven	  short	   stories	   by	  Austrian	  writer	   Ingeborg	  Bachmann,	   published	   in	   her	   book	  The	  
Thirtieth	   Year	   (1961).	   In	   Bachmann’s	   story,	   a	   man	   talks	   philosophically	   about	  fatherhood,	   parenting,	   childhood,	   and	   his	   wife.	   	   My	   documentary	   adaptation	   of	  Bachmann’s	   story	   is	   composed	   of	   degraded	   home-­‐video	   tapes.	   It	   deals	   with	   the	  slippery	   politics	   of	   parenting	   and	   family	   relations	   through	   the	   instability	   of	   the	  images,	  and	  the	  ethics	  of	  their	  procurement,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  attendant	  confinement	  present	   in	   normative	   conceptions	   of	   domesticity,	   family	   relations,	   and	   child	  development.	   The	   inner	   monologue	   of	   a	   man	   talking	   in	   very	   existentialist,	  philosophical	   terms	  about	   these	   themes	   is	  Bachmann’s	   fictional	  background	   to	   a	  fragmented	  ‘real’	  taking	  place	  in	  an	  assemblage	  of	  home	  footage.	  Whilst	  Bachmann's	  fictional	  short	  story	  is	  about	  one	  family	  unit,	  the	  central	  characters	   of	   the	   story	   are	   decentred	   in	   this	   documentary	   adaptation	   through	  multiple	   depictions	   of	   father,	  mother	   and	   child.	   The	   use	   of	   archival	   home	   video	  depicting	   my	   friends	   and	   family,	   using	   multiple	   fathers,	   children,	   and	   mothers	  whilst	   telling	  one	  couple's	  story,	   is	  a	  deliberately	  haunting	  gesture	  towards	  what	  might	  be	  called	  a	  universal	   “family	  common”.	  As	   I	   formulate	   it,	  a	   family	  common	  extends	  out	   from	  the	   traditional	  nuclear	   family	   to	   include	  an	  assembly	  of	  people	  who	  may	  be	  configured	  differently	  to	  simply	  “man-­‐woman-­‐child”	  and	  may	  not	  be	  blood	   relatives.	   More	   broadly,	   a	   family	   common	   could	   be	   thought	   of	   as	  ‘community’.	  In	  the	  film,	  the	  use	  of	  privately	  collected	  video,	  and	  the	  appropriation	  of	  the	  real	  onto	  a	  fictional	  canvas,	  was	  intended	  to	  raise	  questions	  about	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	   cataloguing	   and	   the	   objectification	   of	   the	   real.	   What	   struck	   me	   in	  Bachmann’s	  story	  was	  the	  ‘objective,’	  near-­‐scientific	  position	  from	  which	  the	  male	  voice	  observes	  and	  narrates	  the	  harrowing	  events	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  disintegration	  of	  his	  family	   life.	  Bachmann,	   it	  seemed	  to	  me,	  had	  written	  the	  inner	  monologue	  of	  a	  man	  not	  from	  his	  central,	  biographical,	  psychological,	  ‘heroic’	  position,	  but	  through	  the	  material	  world.	  Leaves	  in	  a	  tree,	  whiskey,	  a	  clock,	  lovers’	  hands	  interlocking	  in	  a	  cinema	  queue,	  the	  wheels	  of	  a	  pram,	  a	  knife.	  My	  adaptation	  of	  Bachmann’s	  story	  primarily	   set	   out	   to	   put	   another	   layer	   to	   the	   decentring	   of	   the	  main	   figure:	   the	  narrator.	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  Fig.	  25	  &	  26:	  Everything,	  2017,	  VHS	  stills.	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Bachmann’s	   text	   is	   a	   critique	   of	   the	   politics	   of	   domestic	   life,	   of	   the	  organisation	  and	  structure	  of	  family	  life.	  This	  is	  voiced	  primarily	  through	  the	  male	  central	   character	   in	   the	   story.	   I	   wanted	   to	   tease	   out	   and	   build	   on	   Bachmann’s	  critique	  with	  multiple	   versions	   of	   the	   central	   characters	   –	   the	  man,	  woman	   and	  child	   –	   in	   order	   to	   extend	   this	   critique	   towards	   the	   broader	   idea	   of	   a	   “family	  common”,	  meaning	  community.	  This	  critique	  is	  already	  present	  but	  not	  explicit	  in	  Bachmann’s	  text.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  whilst	  Bachmann’s	  story	  is	  about	  one	  particular	  man,	  woman,	  and	  child,	  I	  used	  multiple	  men,	  women,	  and	  children	  not	  necessarily	  related	  to	  one	  another	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  extend	  the	  socio-­‐political	  frame	  towards	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  failing	  or	  failed	  community.	  In	  the	  film	  then,	  one	  couple’s	  story	  becomes	  the	  fictional	  background	  to	  the	  fragmented	  multiplicity	  of	   ‘real’	   lives	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  foreground.	  This	  underscores	  the	  coming	  together	  of	  multiple	  narrators.	  In	  effect,	   there	  are	  four:	  Bachmann,	  the	  man	  in	  her	  story,	  and	  the	  people	  within	  the	  documentary	   images.	   In	   my	   role	   as	   the	   filmmaker	   who	   assembles,	   I	   cannot	  circumvent	   being	   there	   as	   a	   narrator	   as	   well.	   But	   my	   working	   process	   was	   to	  concentrate	  on	   responding	   to	  what	   the	  material	   ‘wants’	   (the	   images,	   the	   literary	  text).	   This	   should	   not	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   naïve,	   vitalist	   leaning	   towards	   the	  conception	  of	  the	  artist	  as	  ‘mystic’,	  or	  an	  immaterial	  ‘spirit’	  guiding	  the	  process.	  No.	  I	   am	   talking	  very	   literally	  about	  physically	   responding	   to	   the	  encounter	  with	   the	  distinct	   material	   elements	   as	   a	   constructive	   exchange.	   Being	   with	   and	   amongst	  other	  material	  lives	  as	  a	  conduit,	  and	  privileging	  the	  materiality	  of	  my	  body.	  I	  think	  of	  this	  as	  an	  object-­‐to-­‐object	  relation,	  and	  what	  drove	  the	  filmmaking	  as	  research	  was	  the	  ethical	  complexity	  of	  this	  approach,	  and	  the	  challenge	  of	  articulating	  such	  a	  practice	  method	  in	  words.	  	  The	   film	   informed	   my	   theoretical	   articulations	   and	   the	   way	   I	   approached	   the	  analysis	  of	  the	  works	  of	  others	  in	  significant	  ways.	  Once	  I	  had	  begun	  looking	  into	  critical	   theories	   that	   related	   to	  my	   initial	   research	   question,	   I	   felt	   I	   had	   to	   very	  purposefully	   go	   out	   and	   make	   the	   film	   in	   the	   objectifying	   mode	   I	   wanted	   to	  critique,	  in	  order	  to	  know	  in	  my	  own	  flesh	  what	  was	  involved	  and	  how	  the	  process	  would	   impact	  on	  both	   the	   film	  and	  on	  my	   theoretical	  position.	   In	   relation	   to	   the	  production	  process,	  what	  started	  as	  a	  form	  of	  creative	  self-­‐harm	  actually	  affirmed	  my	   inescapable	   tendency	  to	  empty	  out	  my	  own	  desires,	  or	  preconceived	   ideas	   in	  relation	   to	   outcome.	   So	   the	   filmmaking	   really	   reinforced	   and	   affirmed	   that	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SCRIPT: Everything (2017) Translated	   and	   adapted	   from	   the	   original	   German	   text,	   “Alles”,	   by	   Ingeborg	  Bachmann.	  	   FRED	  	  When	  I	  married	  Hannah	  it	  was	  less	  for	  her,	  but	  because	  she	  was	  having	  the	  baby.	  I	  didn't	  need	  to	  make	  a	  decision.	   I	  was	  moved.	   It	  was	  new...	  and	  it	  came	  from	  us.	   I	  had	  moments	  of	  complete	  absence.	  Waiting	  for	  him.	  I	   had	   thoughts,	   totally	   unexpected.	   Like	   coming	   across	   a	   mine,	   so	   explosive	   I	  should	   have	   run.	   Hannah	   got	  me	  wrong.	   Because	   I	   couldn't	   decide	   whether	   the	  pram	  should	  have	  small	  or	  large	  wheels.	  	   HANNAH	  	  	  Are	  you	  listening?	  	   FRED	  	  I	  don't	  know.	  You	  decide.	  	  	   FRED	  	  Standing	   around	   in	   shops,	   she	   was	   deciding	   between	   synthetics	   and	   real	   wool.	  Choosing	  hats,	  little	  jackets,	  nappies.	  Me,	  and	  a	  baby.	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From	  me,	  he	  should	  hear	  his	  first	  words;	  table,	  bed,	  nose,	  foot.	  	  And	  later	  much	  more	  complicated	  words	  like:	  Resonance,	  Diapositive.	  Structuralism.	  	  He	  arrived.	  	  And	  had	  no	  use	  for	  big	  lessons.	  	  I	  wasn't	  prepared	  for	  the	  one	  thing.	  Naming	  him!	  	  We	  settled	  in	  a	  hurry	  on	  3	  names.	  Which	  we	  registered.	  	  My	  fathers	  name,	  her	  father's	  name	  and	  my	  grandfathers.	  	  We	  never	  used	  any	  of	  them.	  	  Hannah	  was	  very	  creative,	  inventing	  meaningless	  combinations	  of	  syllables.	  	  None	  of	  the	  registered	  names	  seemed	  to	  fit	  the	  puny	  little	  body.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  week,	  he	  was	  Fipps.	  (List	  random	  boys	  names)	  	  He	  too	  had	  plans	  for	  me.	  	  He	  was	  focusing	  more	  and	  more	  on	  us,	  reaching	  for	  us	  with	  his	   little	  arms,	   I	  was	  beginning	  to	  suspect	   this	  meant	  nothing.	  That	   it	  was	  us,	   searching	   for	  motives.	   It	  was	  around	  that	  time	  I	  started	  to	  worry.	  Hannah	  already	  felt	  far.	  	  Sitting	  upright	  in	  the	  pram,	  teeth,	  whining.	  	  Upright,	  wabbly,	  sliding	  on	  his	  knees.	  His	  first	  words.	  	  I	  still	  didn't	  know	  what	  to	  do.	  	  I	  didn't	  have	  to	  initiate	  him.	  	  Good.	  	  Evil.	  	  No	  one	  really	  knows.	  I	  just	  watched.	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He	  didn't	  care	  which	  way,	  which	  person.	  	  Hannah	  and	  I	  were	  closer	  to	  him	  because	  we	  put	  ourselves	  there.	  	  He	  couldn't	  care	  less	  who	  was	  changing	  his	  nappies,	  holding	  him.	  	  How	  long	  until	  he	  could	  actually	  say	  so	  himself.	  	  He	  was	  frightened,	  yes.	  But	  not	  of	  avalanches,	  or	  something	  going	  wrong.	  He	  was	  afraid	  of	  leaves	  moving	  in	  a	  tree.	  Incredibly	  scared	  of	  flies.	  	  How	  is	  he	  going	  to	  live	  if	  I	  leave	  him	  so	  totally	  in	  the	  dark?	  	  He	  asked	  for	  things,	  wished	  for	  things,	  gave	  orders	  and	  talked.	  Just	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  it.	  	  He	  bumped	  into	  a	  neighbour's	  kid,	  poked	  him	  right	  in	  the	  face,	  stepped	  back	  and	  seemed	  to	  have	  no	  idea	  he	  had	  another	  child	  in	  front	  of	  him.	  	  In	  the	  early	  days	  he	  still	  screamed	  when	  he	  was	  feeling	  bad.	  But	  when	  he	  screamed	  now,	  there	  was	  something	  else.	  	  Hannah’s	  approach:	  	  Seduction.	  To	  get	  him	  not	  to	  behave	  badly.	  	  
She	  was	  in	  love.	  	  She	  believed	  in	  his	  innocence.	  I	  saw	  nothing	  of	  that	  innocence.	  Nothing	  at	  all.	  	  I	  watched	  him	  and	  his	  little	  gang	  of	  friends.	  	  Three	  of	  them	  were	  collecting	  water	  from	  the	  side	  of	  the	  curb.	  	  They	  were	  standing	  in	  a	  circle	  talking.	  	  It	  all	  looked	  terribly	  important.	  	  They	  crouched	  and	  Fipps,	  who	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  container,	  was	  about	  to	  release	  the	  water	  when	  they	  suddenly	  got	  up	  again	  and	  moved	  three	  paving	  stones	  further	  along.	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But	  this	  place	  didn't	  seem	  quite	  right	  either.	  	  They	  got	  up	  a	  second	  time.	  	  The	  atmosphere	  was	  tense.	  	  Finally,	  a	  meter	  further	  they	  found	  the	  right	  location	  for	  their	  mission.	  	  The	  water	  was	  released	  and	  the	  three	  of	  them	  watched	  it	  flow.	  	  Mission	  completed.	  	  The	  world	  could	  rely	  on	  these	  little	  men!	  	  	  The	   world,	   everything	   was	   being	   moved	   forward	   and	   in	   the	   same	   direction	   as	  always.	  	  
I	  was	  turning	  my	  hatred	  towards	  everything	  manmade.	  	  The	  tramlines,	  street	  numbering,	  time.	  	  Perfect	  order.	  	  The	  rubbish	  disposal;	  university	  timetables;	  registry	  offices.	  Institutions	  you	  can't	  run	  your	  head	  against.	  	  I	  owed	  him...	  some	  place	  where	  he	  can	  make	  his	  own	  world.	  	  But	  I	  gave	  up.	  	  	  I	   liked	   to	   see	   him	   play	   but	   even	   the	   games	   seemed…	   Hide	   and	   seek.	   Cops	   and	  robbers.	  Hannah	  noticed.	  We	  tried	  to	  talk	  about	  it.	  	  She	  didn't	  get	  it.	  	  She	  would	  just	  get	  up,	  mid-­‐sentence,	  and	  wander	  off	  to	  the	  kid’s	  room.	  	  She	  started	  nightly	  prayer	  sessions	  with	  him.	  	  Anything	  would	  do,	  a	  cross,	  a	  magic	  spell,	  a	  talisman.	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We	  both	  got	  him	  there...	  A	  worker	  wants	  his	  son	  be	  a	  doctor.	  	  A	  doctor	  wants	  his	  son	  to	  be	  at	  least....	  a	  doctor.	  	  I	  don't	  get	  it.	  	  	  I	  didn't	  want	  our	  son	  to	  be	  cleverer	  or	  better.	  I	  didn't	  want	  to	  be	  loved	  by	  him.	  He	  didn't	  have	  to	  listen	  to	  me	  …	  agree.	  	  I	   just	  wanted	   him	   to	   show	  me	  with	   one	   simple	  gesture	   that	   he	  was	  not	   going	   to	  become	  like	  us.	  I	  didn't	  see	  that	  gesture,	  watching	  him.	  	  I'm	  not	  sure	  it's	  a	  man's	  place	  to	  observe	  his	  own	  child	  like	  that.	  	  Like	  a	  scientist	  observing	  a	  'case'.	  I	  was	  watching	  the	  lost	  case	  that	  is	  humanity	  in	  my	  son.	  	  My	  son.	  	  	  Hannah	  …	  She	  never	  disappointed	  me.	  She	  was	  beautiful,	  gentle	  &	  raw,	  mature,	  a	  little	  special,	  then	  again	  not,	  a	  woman	  ….my	  woman.	  	  I	  just	  wasn't	  thinking	  when	  I	  was	  with	  her.	  	  She	  would	  have	  liked	  to	  raise	  a	  whole	  brood.	  	  She	  would	  have	  accepted	  any	  condition.	  	  
I	  …	  none.	  	  I	  just	  focused	  on	  never	  getting	  her	  pregnant	  again.	  	  Once,	  in	  an	  argument	  she	  explained,	  what	  she	  would	  like	  for	  him.	  
Everything:	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A	  bright	  room	  	  More	  vitamins	  	  A	  spiderman	  outfit	  	  More	  love	  	  
All	  of	  love	  	  A	  container	  to	  store	  love	  	  Enough	  for	  a	  lifetime	  because	  of	  the	  people	  outside	  A	  good	  education	  Languages,	  to	  support	  his	  talents	  She	  was	  crying.	  I	  laughed.	  I	  think	  she	  never	  once	  considered	  that	  our	  child	  could	  be	  'one	  of	  them'.	  That	  like	  them	  he	  could	  get	  hurt,	  offended,	  overstretched.	  	  That,	  like	  them	  he	  could…	  	  	  I	  saw	  it	  earlier	  …	  He	  was	  3	  or	  4.	  Angry	  and	  screaming.	  	  A	  tower	  he	  had	  built,	  had	  collapsed.	  	  He	   paused	   and	   whispered	   to	   himself	   intently,	   "I'll	   burn	   your	   house.	   Break	  everything.	  All	  of	  your	  things."	  (hushed	  tone)	  I	  picked	  him	  up.	  	  Promised	  him	  we'll	  rebuild	  the	  tower.	  	  He	  repeated	  his	  threats.	  	  I	  saw	  Hannah	  disturbed	  a	  little	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  	  She	  told	  him	  off.	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HANNAH	  	  Who	  says	  such	  things?	  	   FRED	  	  Later,	  he	  threw	  a	  little	  girl	  down	  the	  stairs.	  	  That	  incident	  did	  scare	  him	  a	  bit.	  	  He	  cried	  …	  promised	  he'll	  never	  do	  it	  again.	  For	  a	  time	  he	  was	  hitting	  Hannah,	  for	  no	  apparent	  reason.	  	  This	  phase	  passed	  too.	  I	   forget	   to	   remember	   all	   the	   lovely	   things	  he	   said.	  How	  gentle	   he	   could	  be.	  How	  lively	  he	  was	  in	  the	  morning.	  	  "Eat	  with	  both	  hands	  on	   the	   table,	  mind	  your	  posture,	  greet	  politely,	  don’t	  speak	  with	  a	  full	  mouth".	  	  I	  wasn't	  home	  much	  after	  he	  started	  school.	  I'd	  meet	  friends	  after	  work,	  or	  I’d	  lock	  myself	  into	  my	  study.	  	  I	  met	  Lizzy.	  	  She	  worked	  at	  the	  local	  coffee	  shop	  near	  the	  office.	  	  I	  brought	  her	  little	  gifts,	  cinema	  tickets	  or	  something	  to	  eat.	  She	  didn't	  speak	  much.	  I	  went	  to	  see	  her	  often,	  over	  a	  year.	  It	  was	  a	  confusing	  time.	  	  I	  presumed	  Hannah	  was	  clueless.	  But	  she	  had	  seen	  us	  at	  a	  cafe	  and	  a	  couple	  of	  days	  later	  standing	  in	  line	  at	  the	  cinema.	  She	  pretended	  not	   to	  know	  me.	  From	  me	  a	  paralytic	  nod	  …	  moving	  along	   in	   the	  line.	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Lizzy's	  hand	  in	  mine.	  	  I	  actually	  sat	  through	  the	  movie.	  Ran	  home	  after	  the	  screening	  as	  if	  that	  would	  in	  some	  way	  make	  it	  better.	  	  I	  nervously	  prepared	  my	  defense.	  	  Hannah	  was	  silent.	  	  Listening	  as	  if	  what	  I	  was	  saying	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  her.	  	  Finally	  when	  she	  did	  speak	  …	  	  Shy	  	  Embarrassed	  	  She	  said:	  	  	   HANNAH	  	  Think	  of	  the	  child.	  	  	   FRED	  	  I	  was	  destroyed.	  Not	  because	  of	  what	  she	  said,	  but	  how	  she	  said	  it.	  	  Her	  humble	  reserve.	  	  I	  went	  on	  my	  knees.	  	  Begged	  her.	  	  Promised.	  	  Never-­‐again.	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My	  son.	  	  So	  weird.	  	  Father	  and	  son.	  	  It's	  such	  a	  dark	  thing.	  	  My	  sperm,	  undefined,	  	  and	  Hannah’s	  blood	  feeding	  the	  baby.	  	  Her	  blood	  at	  his	  birth.	  	  Blood	  at	  the	  end	  too.	  	  Gushing	  out	  of	  his	  head.	  	  He	  couldn't	  say	  much	  lying	  there	  on	  the	  hard	  stone.	  Just,	  “I	  want	  to	  go	  home”.	  Died?	  	  Passed	  away?	  	  We	  couldn't	  pick	  the	  words.	  	  “....	  Our	  only	  child,	  torn	  from	  us	  by	  accident."	  	  The	  printers	  wanted	  to	  know	  if	  we	  didn't	  prefer	  "Our	  much	  loved	  child"?	  	  Hannah	  said	  it	  goes	  without	  saying	  that	  he	  was	  much	  loved	  and	  it	  mattered	  little	  now	  anyway.	  	  	  Hannah.	  	  She	  held	  the	  spotlight	  because	  of	  the	  baby.	  	  I	  saw	  her.	  Full	  of	  life.	  	  Fearful.	  	  Gentle.	  	  Strict.	  	  Always	  prepared	  to	  direct	  the	  child…	  then	  let	  him	  run.	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Her	  best	  moments	  were	  around	  the	  time	  of	  the	  knife	  incident.	  	  She	  was	  radiant.	  	  Standing	  by	  her	  son.	  	  	  It	  was	  in	  year	  5.	  	  He	   had	   attacked	   one	   of	   his	   classmates	  with	   a	   knife,	   intending	   to	   ram	   it	   into	   the	  boy’s	  chest.	  	  But	  he	  missed,	  and	  stabbed	  him	  in	  the	  arm.	  	  We	  were	  called	  in	  and	  had	  to	  sit	  through	  an	  embarrassing	  meeting	  with	  the	  school	  governor,	  the	  teacher,	  parents.	  	  We	  didn't	  manage	  to	  get	  him	  to	  say	  sorry	  to	  his	  classmate.	  	  We	  tried	  to	  force	  him	  …visited	  the	  boy	  in	  hospital.	  I	  don't	  think	  he	  actually	  specifically	  disliked	  the	  boy.	  	  Whenever	  I	  think	  of	  the	  school	  trip	  and	  his	  accident,	  I	  think	  of	  the	  knife	  incident.	  	  I	  assumed	  he	  was	  like	  other	  kids	  his	  age:	  	  Wild	  	  and	  gentle	  Loud	  	  and	  …	  silent	  by	  himself.	  	  The	  school	  governor	  called	  me.	  	  We	  met	  at	  my	  office.	  	  He	  tried	  to	  say	  something	  in	  the	  foyer…	  in	  the	  street	  …	  at	  the	  cafe	  opposite.	  	  No	  place	  is	  appropriate	  to	  tell	  a	  parent	  that	  their	  child	  is	  dead.	  	  	  “It	  wasn't	  the	  teacher’s	  fault”,	  he	  told	  me.	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I	  nodded.	  	  It	  wasn't	  the	  head	  injury	  itself…	  …but	  ….I	  probably	  know,	  he	  said...the	  tumor.	  	  I	  nodded.	  	  A	  tumor?	  “The	  school	  is	  deeply	  affected	  by	  the	  incident”,	  he	  said.	  	  “There	  will	  be	  an	  inquiry”.	  	  “The	  police	  have	  been	  notified”.	  	  I	  just	  thought	  about	  the	  poor	  teacher.	  I	  got	  up	  before	  we	  had	  ordered.	  	  Left	  money.	  	  Wandered	  out	  into	  the	  street.	  	  Back	  to	  the	  office.	  	  Left	  again	  immediately.	  	  Back	  to	  the	  coffee	  shop.	  	  I	  would	  have	  rather	  had	  a	  drink.	  	  5	  o'clock.	  	  I	  don't	  know	  what	  I	  said.	  	  There	  was	  an	  indescribable	  scream.	  An	  incredible	  sound.	  During	  the	  days	  that	  followed	  I	  organized	  everything	  on	  my	  own.	  	  I	  kept	  the	  date	  of	  the	  funeral	  from	  Hannah.	  	  It	  was	  a	  beautiful	  day.	  A	  slight	  breeze.	  	  Lots	  of	  flowers.	  	  The	  school	  governor	  spoke.	  	  For	  the	  first	  time	  I	  saw	  his	  classmates.	  	  They	  were	  a	  silent	  little	  bunch	  standing	  there.	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Hannah	  is	  no	  longer	  sitting	  in	  his	  room	  for	  hours.	  	  Now	  I	  talk	  to	  him.	  	  I	  will	  carry	  you	  on	  my	  back.	  	  Buy	  you	  a	  blue	  balloon.	  	  A	  boat	  trip.	  	  I’ll	   blow	   on	   your	   knee	   when	   you	   scared	   yourself	   falling	   …	   help	   you	   with	   your	  homework.	  I	  went	  too	  far.	  Where	  Hannah	  sees	  a	  garden,	  I	  see	  a	  minefield.	  Don't	  go	  too	  far.	  	  Learn	  to	  walk	  first.	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CURATORIAL WORK 	  
Object Documentary	  	  Sheffield	  Fringe	  2016,	  Bloc	  Projects,	  Sheffield	  (10–18	  June	  2016)	  A	  9-­‐day	  programme	  of	  events	  including	  an	  exhibition,	  artist	  talks,	  screenings,	  open	  studios.	  	  
	  Fig.	   27:	   Sheffield	   Fringe	   2016,	  Object	  Documentary,	   Bloc	   Projects,	   2016,	   artwork.	   Designer:	   Tina	  Borkowski.	  	  
Participating	   artists:	   Mox	  Mäkelä,	   Timo	  Menke	   &	   Nils	   Agdler,	   Patricia	   Bandeira,	  Ted	   Kennedy,	   Peter	   Martin,	   Francesco	   Pedraglio,	   Leafcutter	   John,	   Emma	   Leach,	  Alison	  J	  Carr,	  Jumana	  Manna	  &	  Sille	  Storihle,	  Rosalind	  Nashashibi,	  Richard	  Wiebe,	  Pat	   Law,	   Sasha	   Litvintseva,	   Sarah	   Beddington,	   Mairéad	   McClean,	   Xiaowen	   Zhu,	  Tinne	   Zenner,	   Daniel	   Jacoby,	   Ben	   Balcom,	   Sky	   Hopinka,	   Andrée-­‐Anne	   Roussel,	  Zachary	  Epcar,	  Patricia	  Azevedo	  &	  Clare	  Charnley,	  Scott	  Willis,	  Ian	  Nesbitt,	  Liz	  von	  Graevenitz,	  Alistair	  Macdonald,	  Michael	  Day,	  Richard	  Bartle,	  Maud	  Haya-­‐Baviera,	  Lesley	  Guy	  &	  Lea	  Torp	  Nielsen	  &	  Dale	  Holmes,	  Jenni	  Olson,	  Bloc	  Studio	  Artists.	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CURATORIAL STATEMENT: Object Documentary 
The	   fifth	   edition	   of	   Sheffield	   Fringe	   investigated	   ‘documentary’	   film	   as	   an	   art	  object.	   It	   did	   so	   on	   the	   premise	   that	   thinking	   of	   and	   trading	   documentary	   as	   an	  object	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  ‘objectification’	  of	  actuality.	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SYMPOSIUM AND SCREENING SERIES: 
Object! On the Documentary as Art	  Whitechapel	  Gallery	  and	  Close-­‐Up	  Film	  Center,	  London	   (04	  February	  –	  08	  March	  2017)	  	  Participants:	   Erika	   Balsom,	   Rosalind	   Nashashibi,	   Mairéad	   McClean,	   Ben	   Balcom,	  Hannah	  Black,	  Wu	  Tsang,	  Sky	  Hopinka,	  Neïl	  Beloufa,	  Hannah	  Catherine	  Jones,	  Shela	  Sheikh,	  Stephen	  Connolly,	  Judy	  Price,	  Sasha	  Litvintseva.	  	  Curatorial	   statement	   (with	  Nikolaus	  Perneczky	  and	  Mihaela	  Brebenel):	  This	  one-­‐day	   symposium	  brought	   together	   filmmakers,	   artists	   and	   scholars	   to	   explore	   the	  aesthetic	  potential,	  political	  stakes	  and	  ethical	  challenges	  that	  arise	  from	  regarding	  documentary	  film	  as	  an	  art	  object.	  We	  considered	  documentary	  as	  a	  commodity	  in	  circulation,	   a	   resource	   in	   artistic	   production,	   a	   material	   trace,	   a	   document,	   or	  simply	  as	  “a	  thing	  like	  you	  and	  me”	  (Hito	  Steyerl).	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PUBLICATIONS AND REVIEWS 
 
Web publication: Sheffield Fringe 2016, Object Documentary, May 2016.
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Preview article: Our Favourite Places, Sheffield Culture Guide, Sheffield Fringe 2016:  
Object Documentary, 01 June 2016. Writer Lucy Holt.
Working as a complimentary but investiga-
tive counterpoint to Sheffield’s hugely influ-
ential Doc/Fest, this year’s Sheffield Fringe 
is a curatorial project that seeks to explore 
the subjectivities of documentary through 
artistic practice.
The fifth version of Sheffield Fringe is operating under 
the title of Object Documentary, and seeks to probe the 
idea of the documentary – and the people and expe-
riences bound up within it – as “a material resource in 
art production”. It asks if the objectification of the real 
is always a negative process.
The weeklong programme includes screenings, perfor-
mances, readings and exhibitions, which are all free to 
the public.
One of the opening events sees Leafcutter John (of Po-
lar Bear fame) performing pieces from his recent album 
Resurrection, utilising a self-made light controlled inter-
face, through which bodily gestures alter the sounds 
emitted. His music draws upon the electronic, but also 
some more traditional conventions of folk, creating a 
performance in which the body and the performer are 
very much at the centre.
Later in the weekend, Ester Harris will curate a 
programme of films that explore the notion that a “fin-
ished” documentary becomes divorced from its subject 
matter and takes on a new identity as a separate 
entity. The films shown as a sequence entitled Ingested 
Identities frequently use food as a way to nod to the 
theme of consumption.
The Royal Road, which runs from the 13th to the 18th, 
is described as a “cinematic essay” by Jenni Olson, in 
which California serves as a backdrop for a patchwork 
of complex, “seemingly disparate” stories.
Object Documentary promises to be an ambitious 
programme which, in visually interesting ways, unpicks 
the authority of the documentary. (So you can mention 
that to Louis Theroux when he gets here).
See the full programme.
Image: Mairead McLean, No More, 2014.
Written by Lucy Holt; June 1, 2016
Press announcement: art agenda, Sheffield Fringe 2016: Object Documentary, 08 June 2016. 
Writer: Minou Norouzi.
June 10–18, 2016






Facebook / Twitter / Instagram
Artists: Mox Mäkelä (Finland), Timo Menke & Nils Agdler (Sweden), 
Patricia Bandeira (Portugal), Ted Kennedy (USA), Peter Martin (UK), 
Francesco Pedraglio (UK), Leafcutter John (UK), Emma Leach (UK), 
Alison J Carr (UK), Jumana Manna & Sille Storihle (Norway/Palestine), 
Rosalind Nashashibi (UK), Richard Wiebe (USA), Pat Law (UK), Sa-
sha Litvintseva (UK), Sarah Beddington (UK), Mairéad McClean (UK), 
Xiaowen Zhu (China), Tinne Zenner (Denmark), Daniel Jacoby (Peru), 
Ben Balcom (USA), Sky Hopinka (USA), Andrée-Anne Roussel (Can-
ada), Zachary Epcar (USA), Patricia Azevedo & Clare Charnley (UK/
Brasil), Scott Willis (UK), Ian Nesbitt (UK), Liz von Graevenitz (UK), 
Alistair Macdonald (UK), Michael Day (UK), Richard Bartle (UK), Maud 
Haya-Baviera (UK), Lesley Guy & Lea Torp Nielsen & Dale Holmes 
(UK), Jenni Olson (USA), Bloc Studios Artists. With special contribu-
tions from Gareth Evans and Adam Pugh.
Bloc Projects is pleased to host Sheffield Fringe 2016: Object Docu-
mentary, a nine-day programme of screenings, presentations, and art-
ists’ talks exploring the intersection of art and documentary practices, 
curated by Minou Norouzi.
The programme launches on Friday, June 10 with screening pro-
gramme Reciprocal Relations and a live light-controlled performance 
by Leafcutter John. On Saturday, June 11, Rosalind Nashashibi, 
Jumana Manna & Sille Storihle, Sasha Litvintseva, Sarah Bed-
dington, and Mairéad McClean‘s works are presented in dialogue 
across two programmes, one selected by guest curator Gareth Ev-
ans, followed by a discussion with featured artists led by writer Adam 
Pugh. Sunday, June 12 sees two film programmes, featuring works 
by Daniel Jacoby, Zachary Epcar, Ben Balcom as well as by Bloc 
Studios artists, and an Open Studios event. From Monday, June 
13, the gallery hosts two daily showings of Jenni Olsen‘s 16mm film 
The Royal Road, which seamlessly explores colonial history and butch 
identity.
The complete Sheffield Fringe 2016 catalogue can be found here.
About Sheffield Fringe
Now in its fifth edition, Sheffield Fringe includes both emerging and 
established artists working with the moving image in diverse ways. 
Formerly an annual event, Sheffield Fringe is now held in Sheffield 
biennially, outside of which it operates nomadically through interna-
tional exhibitions, events and research projects. Its Sheffield-based 
manifestation coincides with Sheffield International Documentary Film 
Festival (Doc/Fest), with the intention of creating a complimentary 
platform, and a context in which to encourage exchanges between the 
contemporary art and documentary film communities.
 
About the programme
The Sheffield Fringe 2016 programme, Object Documentary investi-
gates the ethical challenges of regarding documentary film as an ob-
ject and documentary material as a resource, through a diverse series 
of talks and screenings exploring themes ranging from international 
conflict resolution in varying geographies from present day Palestine to 
historic Scotland; the nature and creation of stories; political use-value 
in filmmaking; colonial histories; and reflections on memory and butch 
identity.
Curatorial statement: Object Documentary investigates “documenta-
ry” film as an art object, where thinking of and trading documentary as 
an object opens up the possibility of the “objectification” of actuality.
Documentary practice deals with the social world, live situations, 
“real” things. Relating to the social world as an object and putting it in 
the service of artistic activity can create an ethical challenge. Indeed 
thinking of documentary as an object, and of documentary material 
as a resource, can be discomforting. Beyond its status in the market 
place as an art object, the other ways in which documentary film can 
manifest as an object are difficult to articulate. But they can be felt. 
Sometimes visible, sometimes implied, one of the ways in which an 
“object relation” becomes palpable is in the relationship that creates 
the work. Where a discomforting relation is detected, we tend to 
address such occasions as “problematic.” The first problem arises with 
the designation of value when defining an object vis-à-vis a subject: in 
an effort to designate value through language, we speak of documen-
tary subjects, not documentary objects. The second problem arises 
with exactly what we mean by the word “documentary.” So far, known 
characterizations remain narrow. 
Whether regarded as artworks or documentaries, the critical stance of 
the contributions to Sheffield Fringe 2016 lies in the relationship of the 
filmmakers to the material.
About Bloc Projects
Bloc Projects is an artist-led project space in Sheffield, UK presenting 
a regular programme of exhibitions, events, residencies, exchange 
projects and educational activity. Established in 2002, the organisation 
provides a platform for early–mid career artists to develop and present 
new work, encouraging experimentation, and inviting critical dialogue. 
Bloc Projects delivers partnerships projects, and has been a long-term 
member of the Art Sheffield Consortium. 
Media information: 
Jade Richardson, press@sheffieldfringe.com / Charlotte Morgan, 
info@blocprojects.co.uk
Review: a-n, Sheffield Fringe: documentary film as an art object, 10 June 2016.  
Writer: Chris Sharratt.
The fifth edition of the Sheffield Fringe festival at Bloc Pro-
jects features work by more than 35 artists and questions 
the objectification of the ‘real’. Chris Sharratt finds out more 
from curator Minou Norouzi.
Now on its fifth edition, Sheffield Fringe this year investi-
gates the notion of the documentary film as an art object. 
Presenting work by more than 35 artists, it includes films by 
Rosalind Nashashibi, Mairéad McClean and Jenni Olson, 
and takes place over nine days.
Programmed to coincide with the international documentary 
film festival Sheffield Doc/Fest, curator Minou Norouzi ex-
plains that the Fringe creates a “complimentary space and 
context to encourage creative collaborations between the 
contemporary art and documentary communities”.
She continues: “Artists often tell me they find it difficult to 
get their films screened. Sheffield Fringe… exists to give 
a home to those works that may be underrepresented or 
overlooked, alongside more established artists.”
The theme of this year’s festival, which is titled Object 
Documentary, has been a long time in the making. “[It] came 
out of a five-year plan – we were always going to question 
the objectification of the ‘real’, however defined, in our 5th 
edition,” says Norouzi.
“In light of the proliferation of artists working with documen-
tary material, and these works’ status in the market place 
as art objects, it seemed pertinent to address the ethical 
challenges that come with that.”
Norouzi, who trained at film school and was originally a 
documentary practitioner, explains that she has always 
questioned conventional approaches, and in particular the 
way people and stories are used and then discarded in the 
documentary process. While artists may take a different 
approach to form and content, they are not immune to such 
issues.
“As art practitioners, whether we are aware of it or not, we 
have inherited some of the questions about the ethics of 
documentary practice that started being raised from the 
1970s onwards. So [Sheffield Fringe] wanted to contribute 
to existing debates in art about ethics in general by talking 
about the ethics of working with documentary, specifically 
within the art context.”
The festival programme is divided into a series of themed 
strands: Reciprocal Relations (Friday 10 June, 6pm); Willing 
The Possible (Saturday 11 June, 6pm); Necessary Frames 
(11 June, 8pm); Ingested Entities (Sunday 12 June, 2pm); 
and Concrete Utopia (12 June, 4pm). An exhibition screen-
ing of Jenni Olson’s 2015 film, The Royal Road, runs 13-18 
June (2pm & 4pm daily).
Nearly 80% of the films featured in the programme are the 
result of submissions to an open call. “Whilst the Object 
Documentary theme was set, the concepts for the individual 
programmes were fluid, and came to fruition through the 
open call,” says Norouzi.
“The submitted films greatly determine the individual 
curatorial strands. In a way [the films] demand the curato-
rial context in which they want to be seen. One has to be 
sensitive to what a film wants; that was my mission when 
starting Sheffield Fringe, to be sensitive to the film’s ‘wants’, 
because I often found my own films in a misplaced context.”
Bearing in mind the importance of context, what then makes 
Sheffield Fringe, rather than Sheffield Doc/Fest, the appro-
priate home for this work? “I could answer simply by saying 
the films we show are ‘form liberated’ – they don’t follow a 
convention of documentary or otherwise,” says Norouzi.
“But of course there are also by now conventions within art 
which artists knowingly or unknowingly follow. So perhaps 
it’s more productive to say this: The question of what ‘art’ is 
or does, and even what ‘documentary’ is or does remains 
open ended. It’s good that there are many perspectives on 
the definition of both art and documentary – disagreements 
stimulate debate.”
Sheffield Fringe 2016: Object Documentary is at Bloc Pro-
jects, Sheffield, 10-18 June 2016. sheffieldfringe.com
Images:
1. Mairéad McClean, No More, 2014
2. Jenni Olson, The Royal Road, 2015
3. Alistair Macdonald, A Summer Voyage, 2015
4. Sasha Litvintseva, Exile Erotic, 2015
BEST OF SHEFFIELD | YEAR OF MAKING | ALTERN8
A MAGAZINE FOR SHEFFIELD | ISSUE 100 | FREE
NOW THEN
Review: Now Then Magazine, Issue 100, Cover page, July 2016. 
2The views expressed in the following articles are the opinions of the writers 
and not necessarily those of Now Then Magazine. Reproduction of any of the 
images or writing in Now Then without prior consent is prohibited. Now Then 
may be unsuitable for under 18s. Now Then is a registered trademark of Opus 
Independents Ltd, 71 Hill Street, Sheffield, S2 4SP.
Partners
OPUS INDEPENDENTS IS A NOT-FOR-PROFIT, INDEPENDENT ORGANISATION 
WORKING IN CULTURE, POLITICS AND THE ARTS, ENCOURAGING AND 
SUPPORTING PARTICIPATION, ACTIVISM AND CREATIVITY THROUGH MEDIUMS 
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Given that we’re supposed to take a break over summer, we 
weren’t sure if we’d be able to pull our fingers out and get this 
special 100th issue of Now Then together in time, let alone find 
the money to print it.
In truth it came right down to the line, but I’m glad we did, 
because it’s been really fun and actually quite emotional digging 
through the last 99 issues, reflecting on our wins and our losses. 
As James, one of the founders of Now Then, attests in his piece 
on page 8, we’ve had plenty of both over the last eight years. 
As a seed tossed hopefully into the grassroots in April 2008, 
Now Then has grown slowly but surely into something we are 
all proud of. We knew the soil was rich and fertile, but we were 
amateur gardeners at best, wielding improvised tools and 
faithful guesswork. Seasons came and went, and much to our 
surprise we are still standing.
This magazine is written by the people of Sheffield, for the 
people of Sheffield, so that makes you the fertiliser. You, who 
made your voice heard through Now Then. You, who picked it 
up, read it cover to cover, plastered it on your walls, told your 
friends. You, who submitted your artwork, your band’s first EP, 
your photos, your opinions, your hopes for the city. You, who 
put your money where your mouth was, going on to become 
regular clients, independent allies and good friends.
It might sound overblown, but without you we might have given 
up on tending to these branches a long time ago. That said, 
we know there is still plenty of work to do, and we relish the 
prospect.
We have assembled a dream team line up of past featured 
artists for this issue, all with links to Sheffield. Elsewhere, we’ve 
got a section about Year of Making (p26-31), an extended 
album reviews section covering our writers’ Best of Sheffield 
selections, interviews with Mark Archer of Altern8 and local net 
radio station UK Mondo, and more special 100th issue content.
As ever, get in touch if you have something to say. Over and out.
SAM 
sam@nowthenmagazine.com
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Review: Now Then Magazine, Issue 100, Contents page 3, July 2016. 
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Running in parallel to the super-slick Doc/Fest, Bloc Projects 
have held their own exposition of weirder and wilder filmmak-
ing for five years now, free brownies for attendees included. 
The fringe has a wider remit than its bigger sister, with most 
films in the programme blurring the lines between fiction, art 
film and straight-up documentary. 
Take, for example, Tapes From The Revolutionary by Scott 
Willis, an attempt to profile an eccentric elderly leftist known 
for wandering Edinburgh with a camcorder. Perhaps inevita-
bly, the self-declared communist attempts to take over Scott’s 
film for his own purposes, refusing to co-operate unless his 
dry lectures on the bourgeoisie are filmed verbatim. Eventu-
ally the film’s focus becomes the process of its own creation, 
rather than the character of Andy, and he and Scott’s on-screen 
argument as to what direction the project should take calls into 
question conventional ideas about authorship in art, although, 
as Willis pointed out in a Q&A, he had the upper hand in the 
edit suite.
Walk With A Cart Through Upperthorpe (pictured above, 
and available at vimeo.com/159962181) by Bloc resident Ian 
Nesbitt charts the turbulent history of one of Sheffield’s most 
deprived neighbourhoods through interviews with a diverse 
set of residents, from a recently-arrived Burmese family to 
99-year-old Dotty, who blames the area’s commercial decline 
on government inaction. 
Other films were less than five minutes, like Andrée-Anne 
Roussel’s Chestnut Cookies. This short featured a single pano-
ramic shot from a Mount Moiwa cable car above the Japanese 
city of Sapporo, over which a young woman talked about her 
late sister and the cookies she used to make. The contrast 
between the skyscraper-strewn metropolis stretching beyond 
the horizon and a quiet story of grief was a simple effect but a 
highly poignant one. Using a similar approach, but for humor-
ous reasons, was Michael Day’s Little Things, all two minutes 
of which showed a passenger seat view of a jaw-dropping Nor-
wegian mountain range, over which the car’s occupants talked 
about the banal intricacies of an insurance policy, seemingly 
unconcerned with their extraordinary surroundings.
Also set in Japan, Jagata by Daniel Jacoby told a strange 
little tale about a Hokkaido man who has chosen to reject pub-
lic life – one of the country’s infamous hikikomori – to form a 
bond with a potato. Whether this bond was romantic, sexual or 
merely platonic remained unclear, and the man was never seen, 
his story told through a series of letters read by an unknown 
narrator. The accompanying images of monorails running 
backward and labourers constructing greenhouses left us in 






It’s been an ambition of mine to have a look inside the Moore 
Street substation for several years. I’d once seen a single image 
of an enormous room being used years ago for a performance 
and heard that it was usually out of bounds. The impression 
stayed with me of something in the city centre so incredible 
but inaccessible. Art Sheffield were lucky enough to secure the 
substation this year as one of the exhibition venues for their 
biannual festival featuring international visual artists.
Sheffield likes to use unusual spaces for art. I’ve been to 
shows in disused public toilets, abandoned pubs and in lots of 
the old, cold factory spaces now inhabited by artists. Moore 
Street substation, though, is something different. For fans of 
brutalist architecture, it’s one of the greatest buildings in the 
city. The vast, bunker-like structure with no windows and acres 
of concrete can feel imposingly cold, but go inside and the 
effect of the narrow stairwells running up to the top floor is 
surprisingly comforting and earthy, an effect heightened by the 
imprints of wood grain left on the smooth concrete walls.
The hall itself is one of the most astonishing spaces in our 
city. It’s a vast, completely empty concrete shell, extra capacity 
space for producing electricity that was never required. The 
only times spaces of this size are usually encountered are in 
religious contexts. Some of that reverence is in the darkness 
with you as you enter.
For Art Sheffield, artist Steven Claydon presented an 
installation called Infra-idol Assembly. This drew on footage 
from IBM’s research programme in manipulating the location 
of individual atoms. At the far end of the hall is a large visual 
piece, a roughly human figure comprised of atoms. It is prim-
itive and totemic and occasionally blinks at the viewer, whilst 
the air is filled with sounds derived from experiments with the 
movement of atoms. It is powerful and ethereal and never really 
explains itself. 
Claydon talks of how he seeks to avoid explicit authorship 
in his work, preferring to create environments in which things 
can shape themselves, free of some of their usual constraints. 
The space itself is essential to the effect here. In this concrete 
cavern, the sense of awe that sometimes hides in science is 
given the space it needs to be felt.
The substation was only available for Art Sheffield due to 
maintenance work closing some sections of the building and 
making it safe to enter. I gather it will be several years before 
it can again be accessed by the public. In the meantime, it is 
hanging above the ring road, the sounds of atoms still bouncing 
around inside.
Andy Brown
Photo by Laura Page Photography
Photo by Andy Brown
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Review: Now Then Magazine, Issue 100, Page 28, July 2016. Writer: Sam Gregory.
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Web publication: Sheffield Fringe 2017, Object! On the Documentary as Art, January 2017.
HOME NEWS PROGRAMMES ARTISTS CONTRIBUTORS
SUPPORTERS ABOUT
OBJECT! ON THE
DOCUMENTARY AS ART -
SESSION 1
Saturday 4th February 11.30am
WHITECHAPEL GALLERY
London E1 7QX
Symposium presentations: Erika Balsom,
Rosalind Nashashibi, Mairéad McClean
Full details
OBJECT! ON THE
DOCUMENTARY AS ART -
SESSION 2
Saturday 4th February 2pm
WHITECHAPEL GALLERY
London E1 7QX
Film programme, performance by Hannah
C. Jones + discussion with Shela Sheikh
Full details
OBJECT! ON THE
DOCUMENTARY AS ART -
SESSION 3
Saturday 4th February 4pm
WHITECHAPEL GALLERY
Lomdon E1 7QX
Symposium presentations: Judy Price,




Tuesday 7th February 7.30pm
CLOSE-UP FILM CENTRE
London E1 6HR
Film programme + McClean in
conversation with art critic Declan Long
Full details
2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011
2017 | Sheffield Fringe http://sheffieldfringe.com/programmes/2017-events/
1 of 2 20/09/2017, 18:14
ROSALIND NASHASHIBI:
FILMN YOUR LIFE WITH
FASHION
Thursday 9th February 7.30pm
CLOSE-UP FILM CENTRE
London E1 6HR
16mm ﬁlm screening, and conversation
with Rosalind Nashashibi and Dan Kidner
Full details
CONCRETE FUTURES
Wednesday 8th March 7.30pm
CLOSE-UP FILM CENTRE
London E1 6HR
Film programme + Artists' talk with
Jasmina Cibic, Sebastian Brameshuber,
Thomas Draschan (tbc) and Mihaela
Brebenel
Full details
2017 | Sheffield Fringe http://sheffieldfringe.com/programmes/2017-events/
2 of 2 20/09/2017, 18:14
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Press announcement: Whitechapel Gallery, Object! On the Documentary as Art,  
January 2017. Writers: Minou Norouzi, Nikolaus Perneczky, Mihaela Brebenel.

Press announcement: Close-Up Film Centre, Mairéad McClean: Rerecorded Pasts,  
January 2017. Writers: Minou Norouzi, Esther Harris.
Sheffield Fringe, in association with the Whitechapel Gallery symposium Object! 
On the Documentary as Art, present the first retrospective screening in London of 
MAC award-winning Northern Irish artist-filmmaker Mairéad McClean. Presenting 
work made at the Slade School of Fine Art in 1991 to new and previously unseen 
films, McClean will be in conversation with Irish art critic and 2013 Turner Prize judge 
Declan Long.
Mairéad McClean’s films disrupt and restructure past events, highlighting the 
unreliability of personal and political histories. Using archival footage, sound 
recordings and film footage she generates herself, McClean opens, re-evaluates and 
reinterprets material evidence to create a highly personal narrative vantage point of 
politics and history. This selection of her films addresses the colliding fallibility of both 
government policy and personal memory, and the impact of this tension on family life 
and childhood in 1970s Northern Ireland.
Broadcast 32172, 2016, 4 min, Colour, Digital
For the Record, 2009, 54 min, Colour, Digital
Blue Is the Colour of Distance, 1991, 3 min, Colour, 16mm
No More, 2014, 16 min, Colour, Digital






7 February 2017: Mairéad McClean: Rerecorded Pasts
Press announcement: Close-Up Film Centre, Rosalind Nashashibi: FILMN YOUR LIFE 
WITH FASHION, January 2017. Writers: Minou Norouzi, Esther Harris.
Sheffield Fringe, in association with the Whitechapel Gallery symposium Object! On 
the Documentary as Art presents an evening of films by artist-filmmaker Rosalind 
Nashashibi, surveying her work from 2000-2015. Ahead of her upcoming presentation 
of new works at documenta 14 in April, this retrospective selection of films - rarely 
encountered together in the cinema context – will be screened in their original 16mm 
format, followed by a discussion with Nashashibi.
One way of approaching Rosalind Nashashibi’s films is through the prism of obser-
vational documentary film. And although the act of looking, as a contemplative yet 
outward-reaching act, is a big part of the Nashashibi method, it is by no means the 
only way to read her works.
Nashishibi predominantly uses 16mm film to create intimate perspectives and contem-
plative pacing, adding to each work an exacting sound design. These sound elements 
collide with the analogue source material to conjure a visceral, physical viewing 
experience. In Nashashibi’s work, the “real” world “out there” comes into sensuous 
contact with the viewer’s equally real internal world. Considering the progressive ob-
solescence of small gauge film stock, together with Nashashibi’s willingness to tackle 
subjects as diverse as a Scottish ballet school to the Gaza Strip, the films tease out 
the how and why of the “real,” and the degree of our participation in its construction. 
The State of Things, 2000, 3’30 min, Colour, 16mm 
Eyeballing, 2005, 10 min, Colour, 16mm 
Bachelor Machines Part 2, 2007, 5 min, Colour 16mm 
This Quality, 2010, 5 min, Colour, 16mm 
Carlo’s Vision, 2011, 11 min, Colour, 16mm 
Lovely Young People, 2012, 13’30 min, Colour 16mm 
Electrical Gaza, 2015, 17’53 min, Colour, Digital 








9 February 2017: Rosalind Nashashibi: FILMN YOUR 
LIFE WITH FASHION
Press announcement: Close-Up Film Centre, Concrete Futures, February 2017.  
Writer: Mihaela Brebenel.
Tear Down and Rebuild, Jasmina Cibic, 2015, 15’27 min, Colour, Digital
Concrete Affection (Zopo Lady), Kiluanji Kia Henda, 2014, 12’30 min, Digital 
Preserving Cultural Traditions in a Period of Instability, Sebastian Brameshuber & 
Thomas Draschan, 2004, 3 min, Colour, Digital 
Sueñan los androides, Ion de Sosa, 2014, 60 min, Colour, Digital
“Since nature is uncomfortable, violent, we resort to architecture. We build monu-
ments, houses, whole cities… And suddenly, it seems legitimate to rape the earth, 
to extract what we need from it. To construct a place and make it a home. A fortress 
where we cultivate our affections.” – Concrete Affection
Presented by Sheffield Fringe, Concrete Futures brings together films that deal with 
fiction and imagination, inviting encounters with speculative futures, which are none-
theless grafted onto the present, ‘documentary’ moment that haunts them. Moreover, 
through the use of images as documents and as drivers of the imagination, Serbian, 
Angolan and Spanish cityscapes are connected in a type of speculative haunting.
This haunting is expressed in the superimposition of images of construction and 
evacuation, of tearing down and rebuilding. By tearing down or leaving behind, old 
sites are revealed. And by rebuilding, one does not construct anew but instead returns 
to the terrains that already were there. In that sense, no conquering – symbolic or con-
crete – of lands or, for that matter, of our imaginations and affections, will ever be truly 
a form of building but instead remains haunted by its own violence. The screening is 
followed by a discussion with Jasmina Cibic.
This programme is presented in collaboration with the Whitechapel Gallery symposi-
um Object! On the Documentary as Art. With generous support by Openvizor, the Arts 






8 March 2017: Concrete Futures
